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as for *itself*—all throughout is *not* as well as *is*; it *appears* and does *not* appear.” Or: The One is the Totality—All that *is*—Being and Non-Being—One and Many.

NOTE.—I make a distinction between “Being” and “Existence,” which I think was suggested to me by the “Secret of Hegel.”

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## BOOK NOTICES.

*The Sciences of Nature versus the Science of Man: A Plea for the Science of Man.*  
By Noah Porter, LL.D. New York: Dodd & Mead. 1871.

Portions of this essay were delivered as an address before the societies of the Phi Beta Kappa at Harvard and Trinity Colleges, in 1871.

Dr. Porter has done valiant service in the cause of Philosophy in two directions. First, against the Sir William Hamilton school he has contended in favor of the capacity of thought to solve the problems that arise in Consciousness; second, against the modern materialistic and especially the Positivist school he contends for the transcendent interest of Mind over matter, and for its substantiality as compared with the “fleeting shows of sense.” In no previous work of his, however, have we seen so successful a vindication of the spiritual over the sensuous as in the little book named above. He begins his essay with a true art-instinct, starting from the summit of modern physical science and inquiring into the pre-suppositions of its structure.

“Science, objectively viewed, is universally conceived as *related knowledge*. Those who limit it most narrowly, assert that it gives us phenomena connected by relations. But facts or phenomena do not connect themselves.” “Whence do these relations—these mystic bonds of science—proceed? The interpreting mind does, in some sense, find them already in its hands. Whether they are evolved from its own experience as the progressive acquisitions of association, that cannot be broken, as Mill, Bain and Spencer would teach us; whether, like a mystic veil, they are thrown over the otherwise chaotic phenomena of both matter and spirit by the formative energy of man, as Kant confidently suggests; or whether they are at once the conditions of thought to man because they are conditions of being in nature and God, as the wit and common sense and the research of the profoundest philosophy declare, these relations must, in the study of nature, be confidently applied by man as fast and as far as the chaos which bewilders the infant and overawes the savage, is thought into a cosmos by man’s interpreting reason.” “Briefly, *an inductive science of nature presupposes a science of induction, and a science of induction presupposes a science of man.*”

“Before Socrates, the physics were as crude as the metaphysics. Both alike were vain guess-work founded on hasty resemblances more rudely interpreted and generalized. From such speculations about matter and

spirit Socrates wisely withdrew his thoughts, that he might first understand himself as nearer and more intelligible to himself than nature. But in learning how to study himself, he also learned the secret of knowing other things. If we may trust the brief expositions of Xenophon and the embellished dialogues of Plato, he learned the rules of cautious observation, wise definition, and comprehensive comparison, and rigidly enforced them as the conditions of all trustworthy knowledge."

The labors of Aristotle, that have stood the test of centuries, the geometry of Euclid, the modern labors of Descartes and Bacon, prove the same result that knowledge of all else is based on self-knowledge. For what can be clearer than that there must be a bridge over from the subject to the object to render knowing at all possible? And this bridge must be the universality of the Ego. For if the Ego has nothing in common with the object—no participation with it, then its activity in the act of knowing will have nothing objective in it, but will be sheer subjective illusion! If knowledge of objects is at all possible, it can be only through "universal and necessary ideas," which are the basis not only of the subjective but likewise of the objective. This identity of subject and object in a universal, is presupposed just as much by the materialist as by the idealist. Those who assume with Büchner that thought is a mode of material motion, do nothing less than assume a universal solvent—material motion—which is general enough to be the same under phenomena as widely different as the bubbling of Professor Huxley's yeast and the thinking activity which speculates upon it—the same in fact in Shakespeare's creative phantasy composing the *Tempest* and in the meteorological disturbance of a real tempest. So far as difference in general presuppositions are concerned—whether one assumes that Mind is a mode of matter or that matter is a mode of mind—both schools assume an identity as the basis. Nor can one resist the conviction that in the subject there is found a deeper and more total identity with the universal essence than on the part of the object as mere object. Seeing that the movement of knowing proceeds from the subject, and goes, through its identity with the universal, to the object, its activity is complete in the perception of the twofold identity—1st, that of the Ego with the universal; 2d, that of the object with the universal: thus each act of knowing is a real syllogism, of which the Universal is the middle term, and subject and object the extremes. When universals themselves are objects, they are related to one another as of different extension and comprehension.

A science of universals is that *First Philosophy* that Aristotle and Bacon speak of. Such a science is a science of Man and at the same time a science of Nature, for it is the universal form and presupposition of all sciences. Such a science, if found by man at all, must be found within himself, for he cannot get out of himself except by its means. It is true that he may be unconscious of the possession of it, as the materialists generally are: they may use general ideas without ever suspecting it, or even while polemicizing against their use. But just as soon as a thinker directs his attention to the form or presuppositions of his scientific system, he will

pass through the experience made by the Greeks in the time of Socrates, just as described by Dr. Porter in this essay.

In his examination of the recent philosophies, he commences with the *Positive Philosophy*, thus summed up by Mill: "We have no knowledge of anything but phenomena (and our knowledge of phenomena is relative and not absolute). We know not the essence nor the real mode of production of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession, or of similitude. These relations are constant, that is, always the same in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature, their ultimate causes either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us." Dr. Porter calls attention to the fact that this philosophy, as thus expounded, is properly if not emphatically metaphysical. And yet Comte claims to have demonstrated that the human mind passes through the stages of Theology and Metaphysics as crude and undeveloped youthful stages of growth, and finally comes to the stage of Positivism as the highest form of development. "That the Positive Philosophy is metaphysical in the proper sense of the term is too obvious to admit of question. Its *problem* is metaphysical. It proposes not only to discover the criteria of the processes which are common to all the special sciences, but it sets these forth as the criteria of every true science." That is to say, it deals with the universal and necessary, and announces the forms of all knowledge. "Like every other metaphysical system, it concerns itself with *relations*. But constant relations are what in all systems exalt observed phenomena to the dignity of Science. Other systems recognize more relations—those of causation or force—mayhap those of design. Comte's metaphysics hold to fewer; those of sequence and similitude. To use a figure of clothing, while other systems honor, by recognition and use, the habiliments which obvious necessity and universal usage have sanctioned, this sect appear among the *sans culottes* of philosophers, on the principle that the fewer clothes we have the nearer we come to naked truth, and the less occasion we have to look after our clothes, or the less we are tempted to think more of the clothes than of the man."

After showing that Comte, while condemning the metaphysical procedure of setting up abstractions as real agencies, yet actually does this everywhere, always appealing to "sequence and similitude" as the most real facts in the world, Dr. Porter takes up the system of *John Stuart Mill*. His theory of mind reduced to "a series of feelings with a background of the possibilities of feeling"; his definition of matter as "a permanent possibility of sensations"; his theory of the process of induction as "the result of repeated experiences of sensations so closely combined as to have become practically inseparable"; his theory of ultimate beliefs as "derived from induction, even those beliefs concerning the sequence and similitude of phenomena upon which the whole process of induction depends, depend on induction—all come from inseparable association";—these four doctrines, or parts of the same doctrine, are exhibited in their vicious circle.

From Mill, with "his admirable candor in confessing difficulties of his own, and with something more than admirable unconsciousness that his confessions amount to a complete surrender of everything for which he would contend," our author turns to the *cerebralists*, to Alexander Bain and his school, who claim that the analysis of the brain and its functions is the only basis for a solid science of the soul. To this he remarks that even if brain convolutions and nerve vibrations explain differences of development in mind, they do not explain nature, and hence do not suffice as a basis for philosophy.

Lastly, he comes to the *Law of Evolution* as set forth by Herbert Spencer. While Mr. Spencer gives full credit to the science of Man, yet as he hides all the difficulties of his system behind abstract entities like *force* and *evolution*, and claims inscrutability for them, he becomes one of the worst sticklers for *a priori* ideas and methods; "worst" because he does not proceed consciously, and hence not *critically*, to work.

"The study of man is not necessarily the study of psychology or speculative philosophy. Man is made manifest in history, philology, literature, art, politics, ethics, and theology. The thoughts of man have recognized and accepted those principles and institutions, those manners and laws, that civilization and culture, which give security and grace to the present life, which awaken the anticipations and confirm the faiths which reach into another. The study of all these is a study of the *humanities*."

W. T. H.

*Radical Problems.* By C. A. Bartol. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1872. For sale by Soule, Thomas & Winsor.

*Contents:* I. Open Questions. II. Individualism. III. Transcendentalism. IV. Radicalism. V. Theism. VI. Naturalism. VII. Materialism. VIII. Spiritualism. IX. Faith. X. Law. XI. Origin. XII. Correlation. XIII. Character. XIV. Genius: Father Taylor. XV. Experience. XVI. Hope. XVII. Ideality.

No one who reads these essays could fail to know from internal evidence that the author was from Boston or its vicinity, and he would be quite safe in assuming that he had lived somewhere on the line of the Eastern Railroad. The illustrations are so often drawn from objects well-known only in Boston and its environs, that one who is not acquainted with that locality must necessarily lose much of the pleasure with which a Bostonian follows the train of thought. It is everywhere taken for granted that all must know about these things. This peculiarity makes one conscious all the time that the essays were written with a particular audience in view. Those acquainted with the attitude taken by the celebrated author will not fail here and there also to detect traces of the personal pain which he has sometimes suffered from the misrepresentation of his views.

In reading the volume through—and one will not be likely to lay it down unfinished—one has a glimpse of a sensitive, eager mind, keenly alive to all the actual problems of the day; of a thought which follows closely the daily events of the world and history, and reads in them all the action of broad and deep motive-powers,—these lying behind, and asserting every day under new aspects their claim for recognition and solution. The author

is no dreamy thinker who seeks to evolve from his own consciousness the Truth of the world. Rather he seizes it on the wing, at once perceives and photographs its many forms, and so gives us material for thought. For example, the Franco-Prussian war, Sheridan's management of the Indians, the portraits of Fiske and Gould on the new Fall-River boats, Darwin's theories, the correlation of forces,—all play continually into and out of his illustrations. Through all the essays the poetic thought shows itself clearly. To it, everywhere, each one individual is only the image of the all. From this universality in the treatment of the subjects, it easily follows that the reader will often find himself in doubt as to the title of the essay which he is reading. It seems that the title might be transferred and no one be the wiser; for through all the essays it is one thought that runs, only one thing that is to be said.

The whole book is a plea for absolute freedom of thought; an earnest expression that growth, active development, is a necessity of life, in whatever form it present itself. In every essay we come continually face to face with an illustration where something is not large enough to contain something else. The rolling-stock on the railroad was not ample enough to accommodate the number of passengers and the amount of freight; the country barn is not large enough for the increasing harvests, and so on indefinitely. If there is one thing which Dr. Bartol must say, and say so that no one who reads or hears can forget it, it is that the old is not large enough to contain the new; or one might more truly put it in the opposite form, and say that the new is not large enough to contain the old. The transient can only for a time display the eternal and abiding; the phenomenal is only the shifting play of the real light of Truth. The content perpetually shivers its form, only to make for itself another and one more adequate.

For such an utterance so forcibly given, so earnestly impressed, so illumined from all sides by perpetually shifting lights of illustration, one cannot fail to be grateful to the eloquent speaker.

The mind of the writer is so quick, and so alive to all the phases, whether humorous or serious, of the thought in hand, that the style is sometimes involved, and the meaning, for the instant, difficult to grasp; and the frequent omission of relative pronouns, and, in some cases, careless punctuation, increases the difficulty; and again, in some passages, one seems to be reading a series of proverbs, as for instance on page 7. From the same cause result figures of speech carelessly used, as when we are told of a "flock of islands beating at our windows." And sometimes the writer's keen sense of the ludicrous lowers for a moment the dignity of the subject. But these faults are, as has been said, only the result of the versatile, appreciative, and poetic mind of the writer, and are soon forgotten, while the impulse to thought given by the perusal of the essays will be invaluable. One is only left to regret that the localization as to time and place of so many of the illustrations may withhold the volume from the permanent place in our libraries which from its thought, it has a right to claim.