AN 0) OMS) Qs SOMEONE SID
A Statistical Reference
Richard W. Orloff _
About the cover image (AS10-27-3873):
The Apollo 10 Command and Service Modules (CSM) are photographed from the Lunar Module (LM) after CSM-LM separation in lunar orbit. The CSM was about 175 statute miles east of Smyth’s Sea and was above the rough terrain which is typical of the lunar farside. Numerous bright craters and the absence of shadows show that the sun was almost directly overhead when the photograph was taken.
APOLLO BY THE NUMBERS:
A Statistical Reference
by Richard W. Orloff
NASA History Division Office of Policy and Plans NASA Headquarters Washington, DC 20546
NASA SP-2000-4029
2000
For Sale e by the Su upel rintendent of D S. Gov g Office t: bookstore.gpo ov. Phon e: (202) 51D 1800 “Fax (200) SIE 2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Wa shington, DC 20402-0
ISBN 0-16-050631-X
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Orloff, Richard W., 1948- Apollo by the Numbers: A Statistical Reference / by Richard W. Orloff. p. cm—(NASA History Series)
“NASA SP-2000-4029.”
Includes bibliographical references. . 1. Project Apollo (U.S.) 2. Project Apollo (U.S.)—Statistics. 3. Space flight to the Moon. 4. Moon-—Exploration. I. Title. II. Series.
TL789.8.U6 A564 2000 629.45'4'00973—dc21 00-061677
Foreword
In a spring 1999 poll of opinion leaders sponsored by leading news organizations in the United States, the 100 most significant events of the 20th century were ranked. The Moon landing was a very close second to the splitting of the atom and its use during World War IJ. “It was agonizing,’ CNN anchor and senior correspondent Judy Woodruff said of the selection process. Probably historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., best summarized the position of a large number of individuals polled. “The one thing for which this century will be, remembered 500 years from now was: This was the century when we began the explo- ration of space.” He noted that Project Apollo gave many a sense of infinite potential. “People always say: If we could land on the Moon, we can do anything,” said Maria Elena Salinas, co-anchor at Miami-based Spanish-language cable network Univision, who also made it her first choice. "
Perhaps because of his long life, Schlesinger has looked toward a positive future, and that prompted him to rank the lunar landing first. “J put DNA and penicillin and the computer and the microchip in the first 10 because they've transformed civi- lization. Wars vanish,” Schlesinger said, and many people today cannot even recall when the Civil War took place. “Pearl Harbor will be as remote as the War of the Roses,” he said, referring to the English civil war of the 15th century. And there’s no need to get hung up on the ranking, he said. “The order is essentially very artificial and fictitious,” he said. “It’s very hard to decide the atomic bomb is more important than getting on the Moon.”
There have been many detailed historical studies of Project Apollo completed in the more than thirty years since the first lunar landing in 1969. The major contours of the American sprint to the Moon during the 1960s have been told and retold many times, notably in several books in the NASA History Series, and by William Burroughs, Andrew Chaikin, and Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox. All provide he end of the decade through the first lunar landing on July 20, 1969, on to the last of six successful Moon landings with Apollo 17 in December 1972, NASA carried out Project Apollo with enthusiasm and aplomb. With the passage of time, the demise of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent opening of archives on both sides of the space race, however, there are opportunities not present before to reconsider Project Apollo anew.
While there have been many studies recounting the history of Apollo, this new book in the NASA History Series seeks to draw out the statistical information about each of the flights that have been long buried in numerous technical memoranda and his- torical studies. It seeks to recount the missions, measuring results against the expectations for them.
This work appears in the NASA History Series as a Special Publication (SP) in the Reference Works section, SP-4000, of the series. Works in this section provide information, usually in dictionary, encyclopedic, or chronological form, for use by NASA personnel, scholars, and the public. This new publication captures for the use of all detailed information about Apollo and its unfolding during the 1960s and early 1970s.
Roger D. Launius
Chief Historian
National Aeronautics and Space Administration October 2, 2000
Introduction
The purpose of this work is to provide researchers, students, and space enthusiasts with a comprehensive reference for facts about Project Apollo, America’s effort to put humans on the Moon.
Research for this work started in 1988, when the author discovered that, despite the number of excellent books that focused on the drama of events that highlighted Apollo, there were none that focused on the drama of the numbers.
It may be impossible to produce the perfect Apollo fact book. For a program of the magnitude of Apollo, many NASA Centers and contractors maintained data files for each mission. As a result, the same measurements from different sources vary, some- times significantly. In addition, there are notable errors and conflicts even within official NASA and contractor documents. In order to minimize conflicts, the author sought original documents to create this work. Some documents were previously unavail- able to the public, and were released only following the author’s petitions through the Freedom of Information Act.
This book is separated into two parts. The first part contains narratives for the Apollo 1 fire and the 11 flown Apollo missions. Included after each narrative is a series of data tables, followed by a comprehensive timeline of events from just before liftoff to . just after crew and spacecraft recovery. The second part contains more than 50 tables. These tables organize much of the data - from the narratives in one place so they can be compared among all missions. The tables offer additional data as well. The read- er can select a specific mission narrative or specific data table by consulting the Table of Contents.
Event times in this work are expressed mostly as GMT (Greenwich Mean Time) and GET (Ground Elapsed Time). Local U.S. Eastern time, in which all missions were launched, is included only for significant events. In regular usage, GMT does not use a colon between the hours and minutes; however for the convenience of readers of this work, most of whom are in the United States, where time is expressed as “00:00", the colon is included.
The term “GET” (Ground Elapsed Time), used for manned U.S. spaceflights prior to the Space Shuttle, was referenced to “Range Zero,’ the last integral second before liftoff. With the first launch of the Shuttle, NASA began using the term “MET” (Mission Elapsed Time), which begins at the moment of solid rocket booster ignition. The format for GET used here is hhh:mmiss.sss (e.g., hours:minutes:seconds). Example: 208:23:45.343, with “GET” excluded and assumed in order to avoid confusion with GMT.
Some other abbreviations used frequently in this work include:
B.S.: Bachelor of Science degree M.S.: Master of Science degree
CM: Command Module : MET: Modular Equipment Transport (used only on Apollo 14) CMP: Command Module Pilot NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
CSM: Command and Service Module(s) (combined structure) Ph.D.: Doctor of Philosophy degree
GH,: Gaseous Hydrogen Sc.D.: Doctor of Science degree
LH,: Liquid Hydrogen | S-IB: Saturn IB launch vehicle
LM: Lunar Module S-IVB: Saturn IV-B launch vehicle
LMP: Lunar Module Pilot SM: Service Module
LOX: Liquid Oxygen SPS: Service Propulsion System
LRV: Lunar Rover Vehicle (used on Apollos 15, 16, and 17)
Trivia buffs will have a field day with the data published here, and it’s a sure bet that a few readers will disagree with some of it. However, it is a start. Enjoy!
Comments and documented potential corrections are welcomed. Mail inquiries should be sent to Richard Orloff, Apollo by the Numbers, c/o NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Mail Code ZH, Washington, DC 20546, U.S.A.
Richard W. Orloff October 2000
Apollo by the Numbers
Acknowledgments
The information contained in the mission narratives in this work was derived primarily from uncopyrighted NASA and con- tractor mission reports, and, in some cases, is quoted verbatim from the original text without attribution. Readers interested in specific sources will find them listed in the bibliography which appears at the end of this work. In a few cases, it was necessary to include information from copyrighted works, and the author acknowledges those cases as follows:
The source for some of the astronaut biographical data is Who’s Who In Space: The International Space Year Edition, by Michael Cassutt, although most information was derived from NASA biographies.
The primary source for descriptions of the mission emblems is the official NASA text that accompanied each emblem. However, additional information has been used from Space Patches From Mercury to the Space Shuttle, written by Judith Kaplan and Robert Muniz. Another source is Dick Lattimer’s unpublished draft of Astronaut Mission Patches and Spacecraft Callsigns, available at the time of this writing at Rice University’s Fondren Library.
The source for the COSPAR designations for the various Apollo spacecraft and launch vehicle stages once on orbit is the R.A.E. Table of Earth Satellites 1957-1986.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the following people for helping to locate original NASA documents, images and other information, and for checking the transcript for errors.
Becky Fryday, formerly Media Services, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center; Bunda L. Dean, formerly Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center; Dale Johnson, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center; Daryl L. Bahls, The Boeing Company; David Ransom, Jr., Rancho Palos Verdes, CA; J.L. Pickering, Normal, IL; Ricky Lanclos, Nederland, TX; Dr. Eric M. Jones, editor of the Apollo Lunar Surface Journal Internet Web site; Dr. John B. Charles, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center; Florastela Luna, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center; Gary Evans, TRW; Gordon Davie, Edinburgh, Scotland; Janet Kovacevich, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center; Joan Ferry and Lois Morris, Woodsen Research Center, Rice University; Joey Pellarin Kuhlman, formerly Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center; Kenneth Nail, formerly John F. Kennedy Space Center; Kipp Teague, Lynchburg, VA; Lee Saegesser, for- merly NASA Headquarters; Lisa Vazquez, formerly Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center; Mike Gentry, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center; Margaret Persinger, Kennedy Space Center; Oma Lou White, formerly George C. Marshall Space Flight Center; Paulo D’Angelo, Rome, Italy; Philip N. French and Jonathan Grant, NASA Center for Aerospace Information; Robert Sutton, Chantilly, VA; Robert W. Fricke, Jr., Lockheed Martin; Ruud Kuik, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Dr. David R. Williams, National Space Data Center, GSFC; Hayes M. Harper, Downers Grove, IL; Lt. Col. George H. Orloff USA-RET, Oakhurst, NJ; Harald Kucharek, Karlsruhe, Germany; Kay Grinter, Kennedy Space Center; and Louise Alstork, Stanley Artis, Steve Garber, Hope Kang, Roger Launius, Warren Owens, and Michael Walker, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
Acknowledgments
This book is dedicated to
ROBERT W. FRICKE, JR.
Lockheed Martin/Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas
Bob started working in the space program during Project Mercury. He’s seen it all, and his insights have been invaluable in making this book come to life. In fact, it was Bob’s gift to me of a copy of the Apollo Program Summary Report more than a decade ago that helped give birth to the concept of Apollo by the Numbers. During those years, Bob has continued to be a source of information, inspiration, and above all, a dear friend.
In recognition of the fact that he has worked on post-mission reports for more than 100 U.S. piloted spaceflights, NASA pre- sented Bob with the coveted “Silver Snoopy” award for his outstanding achievement.
Richard W. Orloff October 2000
Apollo by the Numbers
Table of Contents
Foreword Introduction Acknowledgments
Dedication
Apollo | The Fire
Apollo 7 The First Mission: Testing the CSM in Earth Orbit
Apollo 8 The Second Mission: Testing the CSM in Lunar Orbit
Apollo 9 The Third Mission: Testing the LM in Earth Orbit
Apollo 10 The Fourth Mission: Testing the LM in Lunar Orbit
Apollo |! The Fifth Mission: The First Lunar Landing
Apollo [2 The Sixth Mission: The Second Lunar Landing
Apollo 13 The Seventh Mission: The Third Lunar Landing Attempt
Apollo 14 The Eighth Mission: The Third Lunar Landing
Apollo 15 The Ninth Mission: The Fourth Lunar Landing
Apollo 16 The Tenth Mission: The Fifth Lunar Landing
Apollo |7 The Eleventh Mission: The Sixth Lunar Landing
Statistical Tables General Background Crew Information—Earth Orbit and Lunar Orbit Missions Crew Information—Lunar Landing Missions Apportionment of Training According to Mission Type Apollo Training Exercises Capsule Communicators (CAPCOMS) Support Crews Flight Directors Apollo Space Vehicle Configuration
Designations
3|
5 |
7\
89
135
159
183
211
239
266 267 268 269 269 270 27 | 272 273 274
Table of Contents
vii
Launch Vehicle/Spacecraft Key Facts Launch Vehicle/Spacecraft Key Facts Launch Vehicle/Spacecraft Key Facts Launch Windows Launch Weather Launch Weather Apollo Program Budget Appropriations Cail Signs Mission Insignias Ground Ignition Weights Ascent Data Earth Orbit Data Saturn Stage Earth Impact Launch Vehicle Propellant Usage Launch Vehicle Propellant Usage Launch Vehicle Propellant Usage Translunar Injection S-IVB Solar Trajectory S-IVB Lunar Impact LM Lunar Landing LM Descent Stage Propellant Status LM Ascent Stage Propellant Status LM Ascent and Ascent Stage Lunar Impact Extravehicular Activity Lunar Surface Experiments Package Arrays and Status Lunar Surface Experiments Lunar Surface Experiments Lunar Orbit Experiments Geology and Soil Mechanics Tools and Equipment Lunar Subsatellites Entry, Splashdown, and Recovery Entry, Splashdown, and Recovery Selected Mission Weights (Ibs) Command Module Cabin Temperature History Accumulated Time in Space During Apollo Missions Apollo Medical Kits Apollo Medical Kits Crew Weight History Inflight Medical Problems in Apollo Crews Postflight Medical Problems in Apollo Crews NASA Photo Numbers for Crew Portraits and Mission Emblems Bibliography Photo Credits The NASA History Series Index
Apollo by the Numbers
275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 30! 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315
317 323 325 329
The Fire
Apollo | Fire Summary
(27 January 1967)
The Apollo 1 crew (L to a: Ed White, Gus Grissom, Roger Chaffee (NASA S66-30236).
Author’s Note: None of the crew member photos in this chap- ter were taken on the day of the fire. These photos are used strictly to provide examples of training activities.
Background
The first piloted Apollo mission was scheduled for launch on 21 February 1967 at Cape Kennedy Launch Complex
34. However, the death of the prime crew in a command module fire during a practice session on 27 January 1967 put America’s lunar landing program on hold.
The crew consisted of Lt. Colonel Virgil Ivan “Gus” Grissom (USAF), command pilot; Lt. Colonel Edward Higgins White, IT (USAF), senior pilot; and Lt. Commander Roger Bruce Chaffee. (USN), pilot.
_ Selected in the astronaut group of 1959, Grissom had been pilot of MR-4, America’s second and last suborbital flight, and command pilot of the first two-person flight, Gemini 3. Born on 3 April 1926 in Mitchell, Indiana, Grissom was 40 years old on the day of the Apollo 1 fire. Grissom received a B.S. in mechanical engineering from Purdue University in 1950. His backup for the mission was _ Captain Walter Marty “Wally” Schirra (USN).
White had been pilot for the Gemini 4 mission, during which he became the first American to walk in space. He was born 14 November 1930 in San Antonio, Texas, and was 36 years old on the day of the Apollo 1 fire. He
Apollo by the Numbers
received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1952, an M.S. in aeronautical engineering from the University of Michigan in 1959, and was selected as an astronaut in 1962. His backup was Major Donn Fulton Eisele (USAF 8
Chaffee was training for his first spaceflight. He was born 15 February 1935 in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and was 31 years old on the day of the Apollo 1 fire. He received a B.S. in aeronautical engineering from Purdue University in 1957, and was selected as an astronaut in 1963. His backup was Ronnie Walter “Walt” Cunningham.
The Accident
The accident occurred during the Plugs Out Integrated Test. The purpose of this test was to demonstrate all space vehicle systems and operational procedures in as near a flight configuration as practical and to verify systems capa- bility in a simulated launch.
Grissom being checked out in Apollo 1 pressure suit (NASA S66-58023).
The test was initiated at 12:55 GMT on 27 January 1967. After initial system tests were completed, the flight crew entered the command module at 18:00 GMT. The com- mand pilot noted an odor in the spacecraft environmental control system suit oxygen loop and the count was held at 18:20 GMT while a sample of the oxygen in this system was taken. The count was resumed at 19:42 GMT with
hatch installation and subsequent cabin purge with oxygen beginning at 19:45 GMT. (The odor was later determined not to be related to the fire.)
Communication difficulties were encountered and the count was held at approximately 22:40 GMT to trou- bleshoot the problem. The problem consisted of a continu- ously live microphone that could not be turned off by the crew. Various final countdown functions were still per- formed during the hold as communications permitted.
By 23:20 GMT, all final countdown functions up to the transfer to simulated fuel cell power were completed and the count was held at T-10 minutes pending resolution of the communications problems.
Suna Chaffee, a White during Apollo 1 training (NASA S66-49181).
From the start of the T-10 minute hold at 23:20 GMT until about 23:30 GMT, there were no events that appear to be related to the fire. The major activity during this period was routine troubleshooting of the communications problem; all other systems were operating normally. There were no voice transmissions from the spacecraft from 23:30:14 GMT until the transmission reporting the fire, which began at 23:31:04.7 GMT.
During the period beginning about 30 seconds before the report, there were indications of crew movement. These indications were provided by the data from the biomedical sensors, the command pilot’s live microphone, the guidance and navigation system, and the environmental control sys- tem. There was no evidence as to what this movement was or that it was related to the fire.
The biomedical data indicated that just prior to the fire report the senior pilot was performing essentially no activi- ty until about 23:30:21 GMT, when a slight increase in pulse and respiratory rate was noted. At 23:30:30 GMT, the electrocardiogram indicated some muscular activity for several seconds. Similar indications were noted at 23:30:39 GMT. The data show increased activity but are not indica- tive of an alarm type of response. By 23:30:45 GMT, all of the biomedical parameters had reverted to the baseline “rest” level.
pola 1 es chee (L) is intents al CM don ing a visit to North American Aviation in 1966 (NASA S66-40760).
Beginning at about 23:30 GMT, the command pilot's live microphone transmitted brushing and tapping noises which were indicative of movement. The noises were simi- lar to,those transmitted earlier in the test by the live microphone when the command pilot was known to have been moving. These sounds ended at 23:30:58.6 GMT.
Any significant crew movement would result in minor motion of the command module as detected by the guid- ance and navigation system; however, the type of movement could not be determined. Data from this system indicated a slight movement at 23:30:24 GMT, with more intense activi- ty beginning at 23:30:39 GMT and ending at 23:30:44 GMT. More movement began at 23:31:00 GMT and continued until loss of data transmission during the fire.
Increases of oxygen flow rate to the crew suits also indicat- ed movement. All suits had some small leakage, and this _ leakage rate varied with the position of each crew member in the spacecraft. Earlier in the Plugs Out Integrated Test, the crew reported that a particular movement, the nature of which was unspecified, provided increased flow rate.
This was also confirmed from the flow rate data records. The flow rate showed a gradual rise at 23:30:24 GMT which reached the limit of the sensor at 23:30:59 GMT.
At 23:30:54.8 GMT, a significant voltage transient was
recorded. The records showed a surge in the AC Bus 2 voltage. Several other parameters being measured also
showed anomalous behavior at this time.
Beginning at 23:31:04.7 GMT, the crew gave the first verbal indication of an emergency when they reported a fire in the command module. |
Emergency procedures called for the senior pilot, occupy- ing the center couch, to unlatch and remove the hatch while retaining his harness buckled. A number of witnesses who observed the television picture of the command mod- ule hatch window discerned motion that suggested that the senior pilot was reaching for the inner hatch handle. The senior pilot’s harness buckle was found unopened after the fire, indicating that he initiated the standard hatch-opening procedure. Data from the Guidance and Navigation System indicated considerable activity within the command mod- ule after the fire was discovered. This activity was consis- tent with movement of the crew prompted by proximity of the fire or with the undertaking of standard emergency egress procedures.
Apollo 1 crew training (NASA 57-HC-21).
Personnel located on adjustable level 8 adjacent to the command module responded to the report of the fire. The pad leader ordered crew egress procedures to be started and technicians started toward the White Room which sur- rounded the hatch and into which the crew would step upon egress. Then, at 23:31:19 GMT, the command mod- ule ruptured.
Apollo by the Numbers
All transmission of voice and data from the spacecraft ter- minated by 23:31:22.4 GMT, three seconds after rupture. Witnesses monitoring the television showing the hatch window report that flames spread from the left to the right side of the command module and shortly thereafter cov- ered the entire visible area.
Flames and gases flowed rapidly out of the ruptured area, spreading flames into the space between the command module pressure vessel and heat shield through access hatches and into levels A-8 and A-7 of the service struc- ture. These flames ignited combustibles, endangered pad personnel, and impeded rescue efforts. The burst of fire, together with the sounds of rupture, caused several pad personnel to believe that the command module had exploded or was about to explode.
The immediate reaction of all personnel on level A-8 was to evacuate the level. This reaction was promptly followed by a return to effect rescue. Upon running out on the swing arm from the umbilical tower, several personnel obtained fire extinguishers and returned along the swing arm to the White Room to begin rescue efforts. Others obtained fire extinguishers from various areas of the serv- ice structure and rendered assistance in fighting the fires.
Three hatches were installed on the command module. The outermost hatch, called the boost protective cover (BPC) hatch, was part of the cover which shielded the command module during launch and was jettisoned prior to orbital operation. The middle hatch was termed the ablative hatch and became the outer hatch when the BPC was jettisoned after launch. The inner hatch closed the pressure vessel wall of the command module and was the first hatch to be opened by the crew in an unaided crew egress.
The day of the fire, the outer or BPC hatch was in place but not fully latched because of distortion in the BPC caused by wire bundles temporarily installed for the test. The middle hatch and inner hatch were in place and latched after crew ingress.
Although the BPC hatch was not fully latched, it was nec- essary to insert a specially-designed tool into the hatch in order to provide a hand-hold for lifting it from the com- mand module. At this time the White Room was filling with dense, dark smoke from the command module interi- or and from secondary fires throughout level A-8. While
- some personnel were able to locate and don operable gas
masks, others were not. Some proceeded without masks
while others attempted without success to render masks operable. Even operable masks were unable to cope with the dense smoke present because they were designed for use in toxic rather than dense smoke atmospheres.
Visibility in the White Room was virtually nonexistent. It was necessary to work essentially by touch since visual observation was limited to a few inches at best. A hatch removal tool was in the White Room. Once the small fire near the BPC hatch had been extinguished and the tool located, the pad leader and an assistant removed the BPC hatch. Although the hatch was not latched, removal was difficult.
The personnel who removed the BPC hatch could not remain in the White Room because of the smoke. They left the White Room and passed the tool required to open each hatch to other individuals. A total of five individuals took part in opening the three hatches and each made sev- eral trips into the White Room and out for breathable air.
The middle hatch was removed with less effort than was required for the BPC hatch.
The inner hatch was unlatched and an attempt was made to raise it from its support and to lower it to the com- mand module floor. The hatch could not be lowered the full distance to the floor and was instead pushed to one side. When the inner hatch was opened intense heat and a considerable amount of smoke issued from the interior of the command module.
= ee aes cf a. . | — Apollo 1 crew members inspect equipment before fire (NASA S66-40472).
When the pad leader ascertained that all hatches were
open, he left the White Room, proceeded a few feet along the swing arm, donned his headset and reported this fact. From a voice tape it has been determined that this report
came approximately 5 minutes 27 seconds after the first report of the fire. The pad leader estimates that his report was made no more than 30 seconds after the inner hatch was opened. Therefore, it was concluded that all hatches were opened and the two outer hatches removed approxi- mately five minutes after the report of fire or at about 23:36 GMT.
Medical opinion, based on autopsy reports, concluded that chances of resuscitation decreased rapidly once conscious- ness was lost (about 15 to 30 seconds after the first suit failed) and that resuscitation was impossible by 23:36 GMT. Cerebral hypoxia due to cardiac arrest resulting from myo- cardial hypoxia caused a loss of consciousness. Factors of temperature, pressure, and environmental concentrations of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, oxygen, and pulmonary irritants were changing extremely rapidly. It was impossible to integrate these variables on the basis of available infor- mation with the dynamic physiological and metabolic con- ditions they produced in order to arrive at a precise time when consciousness was lost and death supervened. The combined effect of these environmental factors dramatically increased the lethal effect of any factor by itself.
Visibility within the command module was extremely poor. Although the lights remained on, they could be perceived only dimly. No fire was observed. Initially, the crew was not seen. The personnel who had been involved in removing the hatches attempted to locate the crew without success.
Throughout this period, other pad personnel were fighting secondary fires on level A-8. There was considerable fear that the launch escape tower, mounted above the com- mand module, would be ignited by the fires below and destroy much of the launch complex.
Shortly after the report of the fire, a call was made to the fire department. From log records, it appeared that the fire apparatus and personnel were dispatched at about 23:32 GMT. After hearing the report of the fire, the doctor mon- itoring the test from the blockhouse near the pad proceed- ed to the base of the umbilical tower.
The exact time at which firefighters reached Level A-8 is not known. Personnel who opened the hatches unani- mously stated that all hatches were open before any firefighters were seen on the level or in the White Room. The first firefighters who reached Level A-8 stated that all hatches were open, but that the inner hatch was inside the command module when they arrived. This placed arrival of the firefighters after 23:36 GMT. It was estimated on the basis of tests that seven to eight minutes were required to
Apollo | | 5 |
travel from the fire station to the launch complex and to ride the elevator from the ground to Level A-8. Thus, the estimated time the firefighters arrived at level A-8 was shortly before 23:40 GMT.
When the firefighters arrived, the positions of the crew couches and crew could be perceived through the smoke but only with great difficulty. An unsuccessful attempt was made to remove the senior pilot from the command module.
Initial observations and subsequent inspection revealed the following facts. The command pilot’s couch (the left couch) was in the “170 degree” position, in which it was essentially horizontal throughout its length. The foot restraints and harness were released and the inlet and out- let oxygen hoses were connected to the suit. The electrical adapter cable was disconnected from the communications cable. The command pilot was lying supine on the aft bulkhead or floor of the command module, with his hel- met visor closed and locked and with his head beneath the pilot’s head rest and his feet on his own couch. A fragment of his suit material was found outside the command mod- ule pressure vessel five feet from the point of rupture. This indicated that his suit had failed prior to the time of rup- ture (23:31:19.4 GMT), allowing convection currents to carry the suit fragment through the rupture.
The senior pilot's couch (the center couch) was in the
“96 degree” position in which the back portion was hori- zontal and the lower portion was raised. The buckle releas- ing the shoulder straps and lap belts was not opened. The straps and belts were burned through. The suit oxygen outlet hose was connected but the inlet hose was discon- nected. The helmet visor was closed and locked and all electrical connections were intact. The senior pilot was lying transversely across the command module just below the level of the hatchway.
The pilot’s couch (the couch on the right) was in the
“264 degree” position in which the back portion was hori- zontal and the lower portion dropped toward the floor. All restraints were disconnected, all hoses and electrical con- nections were intact and the helmet visor was closed and locked. The pilot was supine on his couch.
From the foregoing, it was determined that in all probabili- ty the command pilot left his couch to avoid the initial fire, the senior pilot remained in his couch as planned for emergency egress, attempting to open the hatch until his restraints burned through. The pilot remained in his couch
ee Apollo by the Numbers
to maintain communications until the hatch could be opened by the senior pilot as planned. With a slightly higher pressure inside the command module than outside, opening the inner hatch was impossible because of the resulting force on the hatch. Thus the inability of the pres- sure relief system to cope with the pressure increase due to the fire made opening the inner hatch impossible until after cabin rupture. After rupture, the intense and wide- spread fire, together with rapidly increasing carbon monox- ide concentrations, further prevented egress.
Whether the inner hatch handle was moved by the crew cannot be determined because the opening of the inner hatch from the White Room also moves the handle within the command module to the unlatched position.
Immediately after the firefighters arrived, the pad leader on duty was relieved to allow treatment for smoke inhalation. He had first reported over the headset that he could not describe the situation in the command module. In this manner he attempted to convey the fact that the crew was dead to the Test Conductor without informing the many people monitoring the communication channels. Upon reaching the ground the pad leader told the doctors that the crew was dead. The three doctors proceeded to the
White Room and arrived there shortly after the arrival of
the firefighters. The doctors estimate their arrival to have been at 23:45 GMT. The second pad leader reported that medical support was available at approximately 23:43 GMT. The three doctors entered the White Room and determined that the crew had not survived the heat, smoke, and thermal burns. The doctors were not equipped with breathing apparatus, and the command module still contained fumes and smoke. It was determined that noth- ing could be gained by immediate removal of the crew. The firefighters were directed to stop removal efforts.
When the command module had been adequately ventilated, the doctors returned to the White Room with equipment for crew removal. It became apparent that extensive fusion of suit material to melted nylon from the spacecraft would make removal very difficult. For this reason it was decided to discontinue removal efforts in the interest of accident investigation and to photograph the command module with the crew in place before evidence was disarranged.
Photographs were taken and the removal efforts resumed at approximately 00:30 GMT, 28 January. Removal of the crew took approximately 90 minutes and was completed about seven and one-half hours after the accident.
Chronology of the Fire
It was most likely that the fire began in the lower forward portion of the left equipment bay, to the left of the com- mand pilot, and considerably below the level of his couch.
Once initiated, the fire burned in three stages. The first stage, with its associated rapid temperature rise and increase in cabin pressure, terminated 15 seconds after the verbal report of fire. At this time, 23:31:19 GMT, the com- mand module cabin ruptured. During this first stage, flames moved rapidly from the point of ignition, traveling along debris traps installed in the command module to prevent items from dropping into equipment areas during tests or flight. At the same time, Velcro strips positioned near the ignition point also burned.
The fire was not intense until about 23:31:12 GMT. The slow rate of buildup of the fire during the early portion of the first stage was consistent with the opinion that ignition occurred in a zone containing little combustible material. The slow rise of pressure could also have resulted from absorption of most of the heat by the aluminum structure of the command module.
The original flames rose vertically and then spread out across the cabin ceiling. The debris traps provided not only combustible material and a path for the spread of the flames, but also firebrands of burning molten nylon. The scattering of these firebrands contributed to the spread of the flames.
By 23:31:12 GMT, the fire had broken from its point of origin. A wall of flames extended along the left wall of the module, preventing the command pilot, occupying the left couch, from reaching the valve that would vent the com- mand module to the outside atmosphere.
Although operation of this was the first step in established emergency egress procedures, such action would have been to no avail because the venting capacity was insufficient to prevent the rapid buildup of pressure due to the fire. It was estimated that opening the valve would have delayed command module rupture by less than one second.
The command module was designed to withstand an inter- nal pressure of approximately 13 pounds per square inch above external pressure without rupturing. Data recorded during the fire showed that this design criterion was exceed- ed late in the first stage of the fire and that rupture occurred at about 23:31:19 GMT. The point of rupture was where the floor or aft bulkhead of the command module joined the
wall, essentially opposite the point of origin of the fire. About three seconds before rupture, at 23:31:16.8 GMT, the final crew communication began. This communication ended shortly after rupture at 23:31:21.8 GMT, followed by loss of telemetry at 23:31:22.4 GMT.
Apollo 1 CM after the fire (NASA $90-35348).
Rupture of the command module marked the beginning of the brief second stage of the fire. This stage was character- ized by the period of greatest conflagration due to the forced convection that resulted from the outrush of gases through the rupture in the pressure vessel. The swirling flow scattered firebrands throughout the crew compart- ment, spreading fire. This stage of the fire ended at approximately 23:31:25 GMT. Evidence that the fire spread from the left side of the command module toward the rupture area was found on subsequent examination of the module and crew suits. Evidence of the intensity of the fire includes burst and burned aluminum tubes in the oxygen and coolant systems at floor level.
This third stage was characterized by rapid production of high concentrations of carbon monoxide. Following the loss of pressure in the command module and with fire now throughout the crew compartment, the remaining atmosphere quickly became deficient in oxygen so that it could not support continued combustion. Unlike the earli- er stages where the flame was relatively smokeless, heavy smoke now formed and large amounts of soot were deposited on most spacecraft interior surfaces as they
Apollo |
cooled. The third stage of the fire could not have lasted more than a few seconds because of the rapid depletion of oxygen. It was estimated that the command module atmosphere was lethal by 23:31:30 GMT, five seconds after the start of the third stage.
External view of fire damage to the Apollo 1 CM (NASA $67-21295).
Although most of the fire inside the command module was quickly extinguished because of a lack of oxygen, a localized, intense fire lingered in the area of the environ- mental control unit. This unit was located in the left equipment bay, near the point where the fire was believed to have started. Failed oxygen and water/glycol lines in this area continued to supply oxygen and fuel to support the localized fire that melted the aft bulkhead and burned adjacent portions of the inner surface of the command module heat shield.
The Investigation Immediately after the accident, additional security person- nel were positioned at Launch Complex 34 and the com-
plex was impounded. Prior to disturbing any evidence, numerous external and internal photographs were taken of
Apollo by the Numbers
the spacecraft. After crew removal, two experts entered the command module to verify switch positions. Small groups of NASA and North American Aviation management, Apollo 204 Review Board members, representatives, and consultants inspected the exterior of Spacecraft 012.
Internal view of fire damage to the Apollo 1 CM (NASA S67-21294).
A series of close-up stereo photographs of the command module was taken to document the as-found condition of the spacecraft systems. After the couches were removed, a special false floor with removable 18-inch transparent squares was installed to provide access to the entire inside of the command module without disturbing evidence. A detailed inspection of the spacecraft interior was then per- formed, followed by the preparation and approval by the Board of a command module disassembly plan.
Command module 014 was shipped to NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on 1 February 1967 to assist the Board in the investigation. This command module was placed in the Pyrotechnics Installation Building and was used to develop disassembly techniques for selected com- ponents prior to their removal from command module 012. By 7 February 1967, the disassembly plan was fully operational. After the removal of each component, photo- graphs were taken of the exposed area. This step-by-step photography was used throughout the disassembly of the spacecraft. Approximately 5,000 photographs were taken.
All interfaces such as electrical connectors, tubing joints, physical mounting of components, etc. were closely inspected and photographed immediately prior to, during, and after disassembly. Each item removed from the com- mand module was appropriately tagged, sealed in clean
plastic containers, and transported under the required security to bonded storage.
On 17 February 1967, the Board decided that removal and wiring tests had progressed to a point which allowed mov- ing the command module without disturbing evidence. The command module was moved to the Pyrotechnics Installation Building at KSC, where better working condi- tions were available.
With improved working conditions, it was found that a work schedule of two eight-hour shifts per day for six days a week was sufficient to keep pace with the analysis and disassembly planning. The only exception to this was a three-day period of three eight-hour shifts per day used to remove the aft heat shield, move the command module to a more convenient workstation and remove the crew com- partment heat shield. The disassembly of the command module was completed on 27 March 1967.
Cause of the Apollo | Fire
Although the Board was not able to determine conclusively the specific initiator of the Apollo 204 fire, it identified the conditions that led to the disaster. These conditions were:
1. A sealed cabin, pressurized with an oxygen atmosphere. 2. An extensive distribution of combustible materials in the cabin. 3. Vulnerable wiring carrying spacecraft power.
4, Vulnerable plumbing carrying a combustible and corrosive coolant.
5. Inadequate provisions for the crew to escape. 6. Inadequate provisions for rescue or medical assistance.
Having identified these conditions, the Board addressed the question of how these conditions came to exist. Careful consideration of this question led the Board to the conclu- sion that in its devotion to the many difficult problems of space travel, the Apollo team failed to give adequate atten- tion to certain mundane but equally vital questions of crew safety. The Board’s investigation revealed many deficiencies in design and engineering, manufacture, and quality control.
As a result of the investigation, major modifications in design, materials, and procedures were implemented. The two-piece hatch was replaced by a single quick-operating, outward opening crew hatch made of aluminum and fiber- glass. The new hatch could be opened from inside in seven seconds and by a pad safety crew in 10 seconds. Ease of opening was enhanced by a gas-powered counterbalance mechanism. The second major modification was the change in the launch pad spacecraft cabin atmosphere for pre-launch testing from 100 percent oxygen to a mixture of 60 percent oxygen and 40 percent nitrogen to reduce support of any combustion. The crew suit loops still car- ried 100 percent oxygen. After launch, the 60/40 mix was gradually replaced with pure oxygen until cabin atmos- phere reached 100 percent oxygen at 5 pounds per square inch. This “enriched air” mix was selected after extensive flammability tests in various percentages of oxygen at vary- ing pressures.
Other changes included: substituting stainless steel for alu- minum in high-pressure oxygen tubing, armor plated water-glycol liquid line solder joints, protective covers over wiring bundles, stowage boxes built of aluminum, replace- ment of materials to minimize flammability, installation of fireproof storage containers for flammable materials, mechanical fasteners substituted for gripper cloth patches, flameproof coating on wire connections, replacement of plastic switches with metal ones, installation of an emer- gency oxygen system to isolate the crew from toxic fumes, and the inclusion of a portable fire extinguisher and fire-isolating panels in the cabin.
Safety changes were also made at Launch Complex 34. These included structural changes to the White Room for the new quick-opening spacecraft hatch, improved firefighting equipment, emergency egress routes, emergency access to the spacecraft, purging of all electrical equipment in the White Room with nitrogen, installation of a hand-held water hose and a large exhaust fan in the White Room to draw smoke and fumes out, fire-resistant paint, relocation of certain structural members to provide easier access to the spacecraft and faster egress, addition of a water spray system to cool the launch escape system (the solid propellants could be ignited by extreme heat), and the installation of additional water spray systems along the egress route from the spacecraft to ground level.
Apollo | Spacecraft History EVENT
Fabrication of spacecraft 012 at North American Aviation, Downey, CA.
Basic structure completed.
Installation and final assembly of subsystems completed. Critical design reviews completed. Checkout of all subsystems initiated, followed by integrated testing of all spacecraft subsystems.
Customer acceptance readiness review completed. NASA issued certificate of flightworthiness and authorized spacecraft to be shipped to KSC.
Command module received at KSC.
CM-012 mated with service module in altitude chamber. Alignment, subsystems and system certification tests and functional checks performed.
First combined systems tests completed.
Design certification document issued which certified design as flightworthy, pending satisfactory resolution of open items.
First piloted test at sea level pressure to verify total spacecraft system operation completed.
Unpiloted test at altitude pressures using oxygen to verify spacecraft system operation. ,
Piloted test with flight crew completed.
Second piloted altitude test with backup crew initiated, but discontinued when failure occurred in oxygen system regulator in spacecraft environmental control system. Regulator removed and found to have design deficiency.
Apollo program director conducted recertification review which closed out majority of open items remaining from previous reviews.
Sea level and unpiloted altitude tests completed.
Piloted altitude test with backup flight crew completed.
Command module removed from altitude chamber.
Spacecraft mated to launch vehicle at Cape Kennedy Launch Complex 34. Various tests and equipment installations and replacements performed.
Apollo by the Numbers
DATE
Aug 1964 Sept 1965 - Mar 1966
Aug 1966 26 Aug 1966
Sept 1966 1 Oct 1966
7 Oct 1966 13 Oct 1966 15 Oct 1966 19 Oct 1966 21 Oct 1966 21 Dec 1966 21 Dec 1966 30 Dec 1966
3 Jan 1967
6 Jan 1967
Apollo | Fire Timeline
Event GMT GMT Date Time
Plugs Out Integrated Test initiated when power applied to spacecraft. 27 Jan 1967 12:55 Following completion of initial verification tests of system operation, command
pilot entered spacecraft, followed by pilot and senior pilot. 18:00 Count held when command pilot noted odor in spacecraft environmental
control system suit oxygen. Sample taken. 18:20 Count resumed after hatch installed. 19:42 Cabin purged with oxygen. 19:45 Open microphone first noted by test crew. 22:25 Count held while communication difficulties checked. Various final countdown
functions performed during hold as communications permitted. 22:40 From this time until about 23:53 GMT, flight crew interchanged equipment
related to communications systems in effort to isolate communications problem.
During troubleshooting period, problems developed with ability of various ground
stations to communicate with one another and with crew. 22:45 Final countdown functions up to transfer to simulated fuel cell power completed
and count held at T-10 minutes pending resolution of communications problems.
For next 10 minutes, no events related to fire. Major activity was routine
troubleshooting of communications problem. All other systems operated
normally during this period. 23:20 First indication by either cabin pressure or battery compartment sensors of
a pressure increase. 23:21:11 Command pilot live microphone transmitted brushing and tapping noises,
indicative of movement. Noises similar to those transmitted earlier in test
by live microphone when command pilot was known to be moving. 23:30 No voice transmissions from spacecraft from this time until transmission
reporting fire. 23:30:14 Slight increase in pulse and respiratory rate noted from senior pilot. 23:30:21 Data from guidance and navigation system indicated undetermined type of
crew movement. Gradual rise in oxygen flow rate to crew suits began,
indicating movement. Earlier in Plugs Out Integrated Test, crew reported that an
unspecified movement caused increased flow rate. 23:30:24 Senior pilot's electrocardiogram indicated muscular activity for several seconds. 23:30:30 Additional electrocardiogram indications from senior pilot. Data show increased
activity but were not indicative of alarm type of response. More intense crew
activity sensed by guidance and navigation system. 23:30:39 Crew movement ended. 23:30:44 All of senior pilot's biomedical parameters reverted to “rest” level. 23:30:45 Variation in signal output from gas chromatograph. 23:30:50 First voice transmission ended. 23:31:10 Fire broke from its point of origin. Evidence suggests a wall of flames extended
along left wall of module, preventing command pilot, occupying left couch, from
reaching valve which would vent command module to outside atmosphere.
Original flames rose vertically and spread out across cabin ceiling. Scattering
of firebrands of molten burning nylon contributed to spread of flames. It was
estimated that opening valve would have delayed command module rupture
by less than one second. 23:31:12 Cabin pressure exceeded range of transducers, 17 pounds per square inch absolute
(psia) for cabin and 21 psia for battery compartment transducers. Rupture and
resulting jet of hot gases caused extensive damage to exterior. 23:31:16
Apollo | Lut |
Apollo | Fire Timeline
Event
Beginning of final voice transmission from crew. Entire transmission garbled. Sounded like, “They're fighting a bad fire—let’s get out. Open ‘er up.” Or, “We've got a bad fire—let’s get out. We're burning up. Or, “I'm reporting a bad fire.
I'm getting out.’ Transmission ended with cry of pain, perhaps from pilot.
Command module ruptured, start of second stage of fire. First stage marked by rapid temperature rise and increase in cabin pressure. Flames had moved rapidly from point of ignition, traveling along net debris traps installed to prevent items from dropping into equipment areas. At same time, Velcro strips positioned near ignition point also burned.
End of final voice transmission.
All spacecraft transmissions ended. Television monitors showed flames spreading from left to right side of command module and shortly covered entire visible area. Telemetry loss made determination of precise times of subsequent occurrences impossible.
Third stage of fire characterized by greatest conflagration due to forced convection from outrush of gases through rupture in pressure vessel. Swirling flow scattered firebrands, spreading fire. Pressure in command module dropped to atmospheric pressure five or six seconds after rupture.
Command module atmosphere reached lethal stage, characterized by rapid production of high concentrations of carbon monoxide. Following loss of pressure, and with fire throughout crew compartment, remaining atmosphere quickly became deficient in oxygen and could not support continued combustion. Heavy smoke formed and large amounts of soot deposited on most spacecraft interior surfaces. Although oxygen leak extinguished most of fire, failed oxygen and water/glycol lines supplied oxygen and fuel to support localized fire that melted aft bulkhead and burned adjacent portions of inner surface of command module heat shield.
Fire apparatus and firefighting personnel dispatched.
Attempts to remove hatches.
Pad leader reported that attempts had started to remove hatches.
Hatches opened, outer hatches removed. Resuscitation of crew impossible.
Pad leader ascertained all hatches open, left White Room, proceeded a few feet along swing arm, donned headset and reported this fact.
Firefighters arrived at Level A-8. Positions of crew couches and crew could be perceived through smoke but only with great difficulty. Unsuccessful attempt to remove senior pilot from command module.
Doctors arrived.
Photographs taken, and removal efforts started.
Removal of crew completed, about seven and one-half hours after accident.
Command module 014 shipped to KSC to develop disassembly techniques for selected components prior to their removal from command module 012.
Disassembly plan fully operational.
Command module moved to pyrotechnics installation building at KSC, where better working conditions available.
Disassembly of command module completed.
GMT Date
27 Jan 1967
28 Jan 1967 1 Feb 1967
7 Feb 1967 17 Feb 1967
27 Mar 1967
GMT Time
23:31:16.8
25:51:19 2553 1221.5
23:31:22.4
23:31:25
23:31:30 23:32 23:32:04 23:32:34 23:36 23:36:31
23:40
23:43
00:30 07:00
APOLLO 7
ission:
The First M Testing the CSM in Earth Orbit
Apollo 7 Summary (11 October—22 October 1968)
The Apollo 7 crew (lL. to. r.): Donn Eisele, Wally Schirra, Walt Cunningham (NASA S68-33744).
Background
Twenty-one months after the Apollo 1 fire, the United States was ready to begin the piloted phase of the Apollo program. The primary objectives of the first mission were:
* to demonstrate CSM and crew performance;
* to demonstrate crew, space vehicle, and mission support facilities performance; and
* to demonstrate CSM rendezvous capability.
The crew members were Captain Walter Marty “Wally” Schirra, Jr. [shi-RAH] (USN), commander; Major Donn Fulton Eisele [EYES-lee] (USAF), command module pilot; and Ronnie Walter “Walt” Cunningham, lunar module pilot.
Selected in the original astronaut group in 1959, Schirra had been pilot of the fifth (third orbital) Mercury mission (MA-8) and command pilot of Gemini 6-A. With
Apollo 7, Schirra would become the first person to make three trips into space. Born 12 March 1923 in Hackensack, New Jersey, Schirra was 45 years old at the time of the Apollo 7 mission. Schirra received a B.S. degree from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1945, His backup for the mission was Colonel Thomas Patten Stafford (USAF).
Eisele and Cunningham were each making their first space- flight. Born 23 June 1930 in Columbus, Ohio, Eisele was
38 years old at the time of the Apollo 7 mission. He received a B.S. in astronautics in 1952 from the U.S. Naval Academy, and an M.S. in astronautics in 1960 from the US. Air Force Institute of Technology, and was selected as an astronaut in 1963.1 His backup was Commander John Watts Young (USN).
Born 16 March 1932 in Creston, Iowa, Cunningham was 36 years old at the time of the Apollo 7 mission. He received a B.A. in physics in 1960 and an M.A. in physics" in 1961 from the University of California at Los Angeles. He was selected as an astronaut in 1963. His backup was Commander Eugene Andrew “Gene” Cernan (USN).
The capsule communicators (CAPCOMs) for the mission were Stafford, Lt. Commander Ronald Ellwin Evans (USN), Major William Reid Pogue (USAF)2, John Leonard “Jack” Swigert, Jr. [SWY-girt], Young, and Cernan. The support crew were Swigert, Evans, and Pogue. The flight directors were Glynn S. Lunney (first shift), Eugene E Kranz (second shift), and Gerald D. Griffin (third shift).
The Apollo 7 launch vehicle was a Saturn IB, an “uprated” Saturn, designated SA-205. The mission also carried the designation Eastern Test Range #66. The CSM combination was designated CSM-101 and formed the first block I] configuration spacecraft flown, that is, with the capability to accommodate the LM and other systems advancements.
Launch Preparations
The countdown began at 19:00 GMT on 6 October 1968. There were three planned holds. The first two, at T-72 hours for six hours and at T-33 hours for three hours, allowed sufficient time to fix any spacecraft problems. The final hold, at T-6 hours, provided a rest period for the launch crew. Six hours later, the clock resumed at
09:00 GMT, 11 October 1968.
The final countdown proceeded smoothly until T-10 min- utes when thrust chamber jacket chilldown was initiated for the launch vehicle S-IVB stage. The procedure took longer than necessary and would have required a recycling of the clock to T-15 minutes if the proper temperature were not reached in time for initiation of the automatic countdown sequence. As a result, a hold was called at T-6 minutes 15 seconds, and lasted for 2 minutes 45 seconds. Postlaunch analysis determined that chilldown would have occurred without the hold, but the hold was advisable in real-time to meet revised temperature requirements. At 14:56:30 GMT, the countdown resumed and continued to liftoff without further problems.
| Fisele died of a heart attack 1 December 1987 in Tokyo, Japan (Houston Chronicle, 3 Dec 1987, p. 8). 2 Pogue replaced Major Edward Galen Givens, Jr. (USAF), who died in an automobile accident in Pearland, TX, on 6 June 1967. Givens had been selected in the astronaut class of
1966 (Houston Chronicle, 8 Jun 1967).
Apollo by the Numbers
A large high pressure system centered over Nova Scotia caused high easterly surface winds at launch time. The upper winds, above 30,000 feet, were light from the west. Surface wind speeds were the highest observed for any Saturn vehicle to date. A few scattered clouds were in the area. Cumulonimbus clouds covered 30 percent of the sky with a base at 2,100 feet, visibility 10 statute miles, temper- ature 82.9° E, relative humidity 65 percent, dew point 70.0° F, barometric pressure 14.765 lb/in?, and winds 19.8 knots at 90° from true north measured by the anemometer on the light pole 59.4 feet above ground at the launch site.
Ascent Phase
Apollo 7 was launched from Launch Complex 34 at Cape Kennedy, Florida (USAF Eastern Test Range). Liftoff occurred at Range Zero time of 15:02:45 GMT (11:02:45 a.m. EDT) on 11 October 1968, well within the planned launch window of 15:00:00 to 19:00:00 GMT.
The ascent phase was nominal. Moments after liftoff, the vehicle rolled from a launch pad azimuth of 100° to a flight azimuth of 72° east of north. The first stage provided con- tinuous thrust until center engine cutoff at 000:02:20.65. The outboard engine shut down 3.67 seconds later at an Earth-fixed velocity of 6,479.1 ft/sec. Cutoff conditions were very close to prediction.
The S-IB was separated from the upper stage at 000:02:25.59, followed by S-IVB engine ignition at 000:02:26.97. Cutoff occurred at 00:10:16.76, with deviations from the planned trajectory of only 2.3 ft/sec in velocity and 0.054 n mi in altitude. The S-IVB burn time of 469.79 seconds was within one second of prediction, and all structural load limits were well within design tolerances during ascent.
The maximum wind conditions encountered during ascent were 81 knots at 172,000 feet. Wind shear in the high dynamic pressure region reached 0.0113 sec-! in the pitch plane at 48,100 feet. The maximum wind speed in the high dynamic pressure region was 30.3 knots from 309° at 44,500 feet.
The probable impact of the spent S-IB was determined from a theoretical, tumbling, free flight trajectory. Assuming the booster remained intact during entry, the impact occurred in the Atlantic Ocean at latitude 29.76° north and longitude 75.72° west, 265.01 n mi from the launch site.
At 000:10:26.76, the spacecraft entered Earth orbit, defined as S-IVB cutoff plus 10 seconds to account for engine tai- loff and other transient effects. At insertion, conditions
were: apogee and perigee 153.7 by 123.3 n mi, inclination 31.58°, period 89.70) minutes, and velocity 25,538.6 ft/sec.
Apollo 7’s Saturn IB lifts off from Cape Canaveral Pad 34 (NASA S68-48778).
The international designation for the spacecraft upon achieving orbit was 1968-089A and the S-IVB was desig-. nated 1968-0898.
Inflight Activities
The crew adapted) quickly and completely to the weightless environment. There were no disorientation problems asso- ciated with movement inside the CM nor looking out the windows at Earth. In fact, an attempt by the lunar module pilot to induce vertigo or motion sickness by movement of the head in all directions at rapid rates met with negative results. Early in the mission, however, the crew reported some soreness of their back muscles in the kidney area. The sore- ness was relieved by exercise and hyperextension of the back.
Prior to separation) from the S-IVB, a 2-minute 56-second manual takeover of attitude control from the launch vehicle stage was performed at 002:30:48. The crew exercised the
3 RAE Table of Earth Satellites 1957-1986, pps. vii, and viii. The international Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) has given all satellites a designation based on the year of launch (first four digits) and number of successful launches during that year (next three digits). In COSPAR terminoliny, the letter A usually refers to the instrumented spacecraft,
B to the rocket, and C, D, E, etc. to fragments.
Apollo 7 | 15 |
manual S-IVB/IU orbital attitude control capability. This con- sisted of a test of the closed loop spacecraft/launch vehicle control system by performing manual pitch, roll, and yaw maneuvers. The control system responded properly. After completion of the test, the crew switched attitude control back to the automatic launch vehicle system which resumed the normal attitude timeline. By the time the CSM/S-IVB separated at 002:55:02, venting of S-IVB propellants had raised the orbit to 167.0 by 125.3 n mi.
One objective of Apollo 7 was to perform a “safing” of the S-IVB stage by lowering pressure in the propellant tanks and high-pressure bottles to a level that would permit safe ren- dezvous and simulated docking maneuvers. The safing was scheduled to take place in several stages. First, the LH, tank safing was to be performed by three pre-programmed vent- ings; however, four additional ventings were required because the pre-programmed ones did not adequately safe the tank under the orbital conditions experienced. The first venting occurred at 000:10:17, and the final one ended at 005:11:15. The seven ventings totaled 3,274.1 seconds. Second, a liquid oxygen dump was initiated at 001:34:28 and lasted 721.00 sec- onds. Third, a cold helium dump was performed at 001:42:28 and again at 004:30:16, lasting 2,868.00 and 1,199.99 seconds, respectively. Finally, a stage control sphere helium dump occurred at 003:17:33, but was terminated by ground com- mand after 2,967 seconds to save the remaining helium for control of the LH, tank vent-and-relief valve. Safing, however, was adequately accomplished.
During the second revolution the crew observed that one of the spacecraft/LM adapter panels on the S-IVB was deployed only 25° instead of the normal 45°. It had opened fully, but a retention cable designed to prevent the panel from closing had become stuck and the panel had partially closed. This
‘ was not a problem because the panels would be jettisoned on future missions. By the 19th revolution, the panel had moved to the full open position.
In order to establish conditions required for rendezvous with the S-IVB, a 16.3-second phasing maneuver was performed at 003:20:09 using the service module reaction control system. This resulted in an orbit of 165.2 by 124.8 n mi.
The phasing burn was intended to place the spacecraft
_ 76.5 n mi ahead of the S-IVB. However, the S-IVB orbit decayed more rapidly than anticipated during the six sub- sequent revolutions. An additional phasing maneuver of 17.6 seconds was performed at 015:52:00 to obtain the desired conditions. The resulting orbit was 164.7 by
120.8 n mi.
16 | Apollo by the Numbers
Rendezvous operations with the S-IVB stage (NASA AS07-03-1541).
At 014:46, it was reported that the commander had devel- oped a bad head cold, which had begun about one hour after liftoff, and that he had taken two aspirins. The next day, the other two crew members also experienced head cold symptoms. This condition, which continued throughout the mission, caused extreme discomfort because it was very difficult to clear the ears, nose, and sinuses in “zero g” con- ditions. Medication was taken, but the symptoms persisted.
At 023:33, the spacecraft commander canceled the first tele- vision transmission, scheduled to begin in 20 minutes. Annoyed that mission control had added two burns and a urine dump to the crew’s workload while they were testing a new vehicle, and still suffering from a cold, Schirra reported that, “...TV will be delayed without further discussion...”
Two service propulsion system firings were required for rendezvous with the S-IVB. The first firing, a 9.26-second corrective combination maneuver at 026:24:55, was neces- sary to achieve the desired 1.32° phase and 8.0 nautical mile altitude offset so that the second firing would produce an orbit coelliptic with that of the S-IVB. The result was an orbit of 194.1 by 123.0 n mi. During this period, the sextant was used to track the S-IVB, which was visible in reflected sunlight. The 7.76-second firing at 028:00:56 occurred when the spacecraft was 80 n mi behind and
7.8 n mi below the S-IVB, and created a more circularized orbit of 153.6 by 113.9 n mi.
The two firings achieved the desired conditions for the 46-second rendezvous terminal phase initiation, which
occurred at 029:16:33, about four and one half minutes earlier than planned because of a minor variation in the orbit. A small midcourse correction was made at 029:37:48, followed by a 708-second braking maneuver at 029:43:55, and final closure to within 70 feet of the tumbling S-IVB. Stationkeeping was performed for 25 minutes starting at 029:55:43 in an orbit of 161.0 by 122.1 n mi, after which a 5.4-second service module reaction control system posi- grade maneuver removed the CSM from the vicinity of the S-IVB stage. The crew maneuvered the CSM around the S-IVB in order to inspect and photograph it.
The rendezvous maneuver was important because it demonstrated the ability of the spacecraft to rendezvous with the LM (represented by the S-IVB) if the ascent stage became disabled after leaving the lunar surface. However, the crew reported that the manually-controlled braking maneuver was frustrating because no reliable backup rang- ing information was available, as would be the case during an actual rendezvous with the LM.
The next 24-hour period was devoted to a sextant calibra- tion test at 041:00, two attitude control tests at 049:00 and 050:40, and two primary evaporator tests at 049:50 and 050:40. In addition, the crew performed a rendezvous navi- gation test, using the sextant to track the S-IVB visually to a distance of 160 n mi at 044:40 and to 320 n mi at 053:20. The crew later reported sighting the S-IVB at a range of nearly 1,000 n mi.
To ensure maximum return from Apollo 7, it was planned to complete as many primary and secondary objectives as possible early in the flight, and, by the end of the second day, more than 90 percent had been accomplished.
Three tests of the rendezvous radar transponder were per- formed. This system would be essential for docking the LM ascent stage to the CM after liftoff from the lunar sur- face. The first two tests occurred at 061:00 and 071:40. The third was performed during revolution 48 at 076:27, when the ground radar at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, acquired and locked onto the spacecraft transpon- der at a range of 390 n mi and tracked it to 415 n mi.
At 071:43, the first of seven television transmissions began and lasted for seven minutes. It was the first live television transmission from a piloted American spacecraft. The crew opened the telecast with a sign that read “From the lovely Apollo room high atop everything.” They then aimed the camera out the window as the spacecraft passed over New Orleans and then over the Florida peninsula. The orbital motion of the spacecraft was evident.
SEES
Message to the world from the Apollo 7 crew during first live television transmission (NASA S68-50713).
The service propulsion system was fired six additional times during the mission. The third firing, at 075:48:00 (advanced 16 hours from the original plan), was a 9.10-second maneuver controlled by the stabilization and control system. The maneuver was performed early to increase the backup deorbit capability of the service module reaction control system by lowering the perigee to 90 n mi and placing it in the northern hemisphere. The resulting orbit was 159.7 by 89.5 n mi.
After the third firing, a three-hour cold soak of the service propulsion thermal control system was performed. The cold soak stabilized the spacecraft and exposed one side away from the Sun for a period of time to lower the tem- perature and monitor the effects of the cold space environ- ment. The thermal characteristics of the system were better than anticipated for random, drifting flight, because the temperature decrease was less than predicted.
A test to determine whether the environmental control sys- tem radiator surface coating had degraded was conducted between 092:37 and 097:00. Results indicated that the solar absorptivity of the radiator panel tested was within pre- dicted limits, and validated the system for lunar flight.
The second television transmission started at 095:25 and lasted about 11 minutes. The program included a tour of the CM including various controls, a demonstration of the exercise device, and an attempt to show water condensation inside the spacecraft.
Condensation was a major problem associated with the
cabin and suit circuits. This problem was anticipated in the cabin because the cold coolant lines from the radiator to
Apollo 7
the environment control unit and from the environment control unit to the inertial measurement unit were not insulated. Each time excessive condensation was noted on the coolant lines or in a puddle on the aft bulkhead after service propulsion system maneuvers, the crew vacuumed the water overboard. Experiment S005 (Synoptic Terrain Photography) began at 098:40, using a hand-held’ modified 70 mm Hasselblad 500C camera. The photographs were used to study the origin of the Carolina bays in the United States, wind erosion in desert regions, coastal morphology, and the origin of the African rift valley. Near-vertical, high- sun-angle photographs of Baja California, other parts of Mexico, and parts of the Middle East were useful for geo- logic studies. Photographs of New Orleans and Houston were generally better for geographic urban studies than those available from previous programs.
Mission commander Wally Schirra (NASA AS07-04-1582).
Areas of oceanographic interest, particularly islands in the Pacific Ocean, were photographed for the first time. In addition, the mission obtained the first extensive photo- graphic coverage of northern Chile, Australia, and other areas. Of the 500 photographs taken of land and ocean areas, approximately 200 were usable, and, in general, the color and exposure were excellent. The need to change the film magazines, filters, and exposure settings hurriedly when a target came into view, and to hold the camera steady, accounted for the improper exposure of many frames.
The purpose of Experiment S006 (Synoptic Weather Photography) was to photograph as many as possible of 27 basic categories of weather phenomena, and began at 099:10. The camera was the same used for Experiment S005. Of the 500 photographs taken, approximately 300 showed clouds or other items of meteorological interest, and approx- imately 80 contained features of interest in oceanography. Categories considered worthy of additional interest included
Apollo by the Numbers
weather systems, winds and their effects on clouds, ocean surfaces, underwater zones of Australian reefs, the Pacific atolls, the Bahamas and Cuba, landform effects, climactic zones, and hydrology. Oceanographic surface features were revealed more clearly than in any of the preceding piloted flights. The photographs of Hurricane Gladys and Typhoon Gloria, taken on 17 October and 20 October 1968, respec- tively, were the best-to-date views of tropical storms. Image sharpness of photographs for this experiment ranged from fair to excellent, again affected by the difficulty in holding the camera steady. Regardless, ocean swells could be resolved from altitudes near 100 n mi.
Example of Synoptic Terrain Photography: India, Nepal, Tibet, and Himalayas from 126 n mi altitude (NASA AS07-11-1980).
The third television transmission began at 119:08 and last- ed about ten minutes. It featured a demonstration of how to prepare food in space, in particular a package of dried fruit juice reconstituted with water. The telecast also showed the process of vacuuming water that had accumu- lated on the cold glycol lines. Various controls at the com- mander’s workstation were also viewed.
The fourth service propulsion system firing, at 120:43:00.44, was performed to evaluate the minimum-impulse capability of the service propulsion engine. It lasted only 0.48 seconds and produced an orbit of 156.7 by 89.1 n mi.
A tour of the CM, the fourth television transmission, began at 141:11. The crew trained their camera on deposits on window 1 and on optical site markings used to meas- ure pitch angle on window 2. Panning around the space- craft, the camera gave viewers a look at sleep stations, stowage areas, helmet bags and pressure suit hoses. The commander also demonstrated weightlessness by blowing on a floating pen to control its motion. By 141:27, the crew had signed off and the transmission signal had faded.
Example of Synoptic Weather Photography: a view of Hurricane Gladys over the Pacific Ocean at an altitude of 99 n mi (NASA AS07-07-1877).
During this time, the S-IVB stage continued to orbit the Earth. It impacted the Indian Ocean at 09:30 GMT on 18 October. The estimated impact point was latitude 8.9° south and longitude 81.6° east.
A fifth service propulsion system firing was performed to position the spacecraft for an optimum deorbit maneuver at the end of the planned orbital phase by allowing at least two minutes of tracking by the Hawaii ground station if another orbit were required. This occurred at 165:00:00.42. To ensure verification of the propellant gauging system, the firing duration was increased from the original plan. -
CMP Walt Cunningham peers out the spacecraft win- dow (NASA AS07-04-1584).
The 66.95-second maneuver produced the largest velocity change of the mission, 1,691.3 ft/sec, and incorporated a manual thrust-vector-control takeover halfway through the maneuver. The resulting orbit was 244.2 by 89.1 n mi.
During translunar and transearth flight on future missions, it would be necessary to put the spacecraft into a slow “barbecue” roll to mdintain an even external temperature. This maneuver, called passive thermal control, was tested twice on Apollo 7, fitst at 167:00 and next at 212:00.
The fifth television transmission, starting at 189:04, featured another spacecraft tour. The program began with a view of the instrument panel including attitude thruster switches and the display keyboard, and cryogenic controls, and ended with the crew performing a military “close order drill.” An attempt to show scenes of Earth was unsuccessful.
The sixth SPS firing was performed during the eighth day, at 210:07:59, and was the second minimum-impulse maneuver. At the time, the apogee was 234.6 n mi and the perigee was 88.4 n mi. This firing lasted 0.50 seconds and was directed out-of-plane because no change in orbit was desired.
For the sixth television transmission, starting at 213:10, the crew aimed the camera out the window and gave ground controllers a view of the Florida peninsula. They then turned the camera inside the spacecraft to show off the beards they had grown during the mission.
At 231:08, the Solar Particle Alert Network facility at Carnarvon, Australia, detected a Class 1B solar flare. Analysis of data confirmed the flare would have no effect on the spacecraft or crew. However, this exercise proved to be an excellent checkout of the systems and procedures that would be used in the event of a solar flare during a lunar mission. This event was followed by the seventh service propulsion system firing, a 7.70-second maneuver at 239:06:11, which placed the spacecraft perigee at the prop- er longitude for entry and recovery, and lowered the orbit to 229.8 by 88.5 n mi.
For the final television transmission, starting at 236:18 and lasting for about 11 minutes, the crew showed off their beards again, and reported seeing several jet contrails far below them over the Gulf Coast. They also described the bands of color created by the day air glow above the Earth.
Apollo 7 | 19
B's i se
LMP Donn Eisele poses for a photo (NASA AS07-04-1583).
The midcourse navigation program, using the Earth hori- zon and a star, could not be accomplished because the Earth horizon was indistinct and variable. The air glow was about three degrees wide and had no distinct bound- aries or lines when viewed through the sextant. This prob- lem seemed to be associated with the spacecraft being in a low Earth orbit. Using this same program on lunar land- marks and a star, however, the task was very easy to per- form. Lunar landmarks showed up nearly as well as Earth landmarks. Stars could be seen at 10° and 15°, and greater, from the Moon. |
Sextant/star counts and star checks and star/horizon sightings were made throughout the mission; lunar landmark/star sightings were attempted at 147:00.
Recovery
The final day of the mission was devoted primarily to preparations for the deorbit maneuver. This was accom- plished by the eighth SPS firing, an 11.79-second eighth service maneuver at 259:39:16 over Hawaii, during the 163rd orbit. During the final orbit, the apogee was 225.3 n mi, the perigee was 88.2 n mi, the period was 90.39 minutes, and the inclination 29.88°.
Because of their cold symptoms, there was a considerable amount of discussion about whether the crew should wear helmets and gloves during entry. With helmets on, it might be impossible to properly clear the throat and ears as increasing gravity drew mucus down from the head area, where it remained during zero gravity conditions. It was
Apollo by the Numbers
decided 48 hours prior to entry, and at the crew’s insis- tence, that helmets and gloves would not be worn.
The service module was jettisoned at 259:43:33, and the CM entry followed both automatic and manually guided profiles. The command module reentered the Earth’s atmosphere (400,000 feet altitude) at 259:53:26 at a veloci- ty of 25,846 ft/sec. Trajectory reconstruction indicated that the service module impacted the Atlantic Ocean at 260:03:00 at a point estimated to be latitude 29° north and longitude 72° west. During entry, three objects—the CM, the service module, and a 12-foot insulation disk between the two—were tracked simultaneously and were also sight- ed visually. |
The parachute system effected a soft splashdown of the CM in the Atlantic Ocean southeast of Bermuda at 11:11:48 GMT (07:11:48 a.m. EDT) on 22 October 1968. Mission duration was 260:09:03. The impact point was 1.9 n mi from the target point and 7 n mi from the recovery ship USS.S. Essex. The splashdown site was estimated to be lati- tude 27.63° north and longitude 64.15° west. After splash- down, the CM assumed an apex-down flotation attitude, but was successfully returned to the normal flotation position within 13 minutes by the inflatable bag uprighting system. During this period, the recovery beacon was not visible and voice communication with the crew was interrupted.
The crew was retrieved by helicopter and was aboard the recovery ship 56 minutes after splashdown. The CM was recovered 55 minutes later. The estimated CM weight at splashdown was 11,409 pounds, and the estimated distance traveled for the mission was 3,953,842 n mi.
Tec
After splashdown, Wally Schirra exits the command module with the aid of a Navy support team member (NASA S68-49529).
following successful mission (NASA S68-49744).
At CM retrieval, the weather recorded onboard the Essex showed light rain showers, 600-foot ceiling; visibility 2 n mi; wind speed 16 knots from 260° true north; air temperature 74° F; water temperature 81° F; with waves to 3 feet from 260° true north.
The CM was offloaded from the Essex on 24 October at the Norfolk Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, and the Landing Safing Team began the evaluation and deactiva- tion procedures at 14:00 GMT. Deactivation was completed at 01:30 GMT on 27 October 1968. The CM was then flown to Long Beach, California and trucked to the North American Rockwell Space Division facility at Downey, California for postflight analysis.
Conclusions
The Apollo 7 mission was successful in every respect. All spacecraft systems operated satisfactorily, and all but one of the detailed test objectives were met. As an engineering test flight, Apollo 7 demonstrated the performance of the orbital safing experiment, the adequacy of attitude control in both the manual and automatic modes, and that the vehicle systems could perform for extended periods in orbit. For the first time, a mixed cabin atmosphere consist- ing of 65 percent oxygen and 35 percent nitrogen was used aboard an American piloted spacecraft. All previous flights had used 100 percent oxygen, a procedure changed as a result of recommendations made by the Apollo 1 fire investigation board. Another “first” was the availability of hot and cold drinking water for the crew as a by-product of the service module fuel cells, an important element for piloted lunar excursions. Consumables usage was main- tained at safe levels, and permitted the introduction of additional flight activities toward the end of the mission.
The most significant aerodynamic effect encountered was the unexpected phenomenon noted as “perigee torquing,’ a rotation of the CSM most noticeable when the perigee was at 90 n mi. |
The following conclusions were made from an analysis of post-mission data: |
1. The results of the Apollo 7 mission, when combined with results of previous missions and ground tests, demonstrated that the CSM was qualified for operation in the Earth orbital environment and was ready for tests in the cislunar and lunar orbital environments.
2. The concepts and operational functioning of the crew/spacecraft interfaces, including procedures, provisioning, accommodations, and displays and controls, were acceptable.
3, The overall thermal balance of the spacecraft, for both active and passive elements, was more favorable than predicted for the near-Earth environment.
4, The endurance required for systems operation on a lunar mis- sion was demonstrated.
5. The capability of performing rendezvous using the CSM, with only optical and onboard data, was demonstrated; however, it was determined that ranging information would be extremely desirable for the terminal phase.
6. Navigation techniques in general were demonstrated to be ade- quate for lunar missions. Specifically:
a. Onboard navigation using the landmark tracking technique proved feasible in Earth orbit.
b. The Earth horizon was not usable for optics measurements in low Earth orbit with the available optics design and techniques.
c. Although a debris cloud of frozen liquid particles following venting obscured star visibility with the scanning telescope, it could be expected to dissipate rapidly in Earth orbit without significantly contaminating the optical surfaces.
d. Star visibility data with the scanning telescope indicated that in cislunar spa¢e, with no venting and with proper spacecraft orientation to shield the optics from the Sun and Earth or Moon light, constellation recognition would be adequate for platform inertial orientation.
e. Sextant star visibility was adequate for platform realignments
in daylight using Apollo navigation stars as close as 30° from the Sun line-oftsight.
Apollo 7
7. The rendezvous radar acquisition and tracking test demonstrat- ed the capability of performance at ranges required for ren- dezvous between the CSM and the LM.
8. Mission support facilities, including the Piloted Space Flight
Network and the recovery forces were satisfactory for an Earth orbital mission.
Apollo 7 Objectives‘ Launch Vehicle Primary Detailed Objectives
1. To demonstrate the adequacy of the launch vehicle attitude con- trol system for orbital operation. Achieved.
2. To demonstrate S-IVB orbital safing capability. Achieved.
3. To evaluate S-IVB J-2 engine augmented spark igniter line modifications. Achieved.
Launch Vehicle Secondary Detailed Test Objectives
1. To evaluate the S-IVB/instrument unit orbital coast lifetime capability. Achieved.
2. To demonstrate command and service module piloted launch vehicle orbital attitude control. Achieved,
Spacecraft Primary Objectives
1. To demonstrate command and service module and crew per- formance. Achieved.
2. To demonstrate crew, space vehicle, and mission support facili- ties performance. Achieved.
3. To demonstrate command and service module rendezvous capa- bility. Achieved. |
Spacecraft Primary Detailed Test Objectives
1. P1.6: To perform inertial measurement unit alignments using the sextant. Achieved,
2. P1.7: To perform an internal measurement unit orientation deter- mination and a star pattern daylight visibility check. Achieved.
3, P1.8: To perform onboard navigation using the technique of the scanning telescope landmark tracking. Achieved.
4, P1.10: To perform optical tracking of a target vehicle using the sextant. Achieved, during rendezvous.
10.
by
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
. P1.12: To demonstrate guidance navigation control system atito-
matic and manual attitude controlled reaction control system maneuvers. Partially achieved, by the automatic mode prior to the service propulsion system burns and the manual mode. Although all required modes were demonstrated, all rates were not checked.
. P1.13: To perform guidance navigation control system controlled
service propulsion system and reaction control system velocity maneuvers. Achieved, at various times during the mission.
. P1.14: To evaluate the ability of the guidance navigation control
system to guide the entry from Earth orbit. Achieved, during entry.
. P1.15: To perform star and Earth horizon sightings to establish
an Earth horizon model. Not achieved. On the two occasions attempted, the Earth horizon was indistinct and variable, with no defined boundaries or lines, thus precluding obtaining the neces- sary data. |
. P1.16: To obtain inertial measurement unit performance data in
the flight environment. Achieved, in conjunction with the inertial measurement unit alignment checks. Two pulse integrating pendu- lous accelerometer bias tests were also performed.
P2.3: To monitor the entry monitoring system during service propulsion velocity changes and entry. Achieved, during the first service propulsion service burn and entry.
P2.4: To demonstrate the stabilization control system automatic and manual attitude controlled reaction control system maneu- vers. Achieved, except for testing the high and auto rate modes.
P2.5: To demonstrate the command and service module stabi- lization control system velocity control capability. Achieved.
P2.6: To perform a manual thrust vector control takeover. Achieved.
P2.7: To obtain data on the stabilization control systems capabil- ity to provide a suitable inertial reference in a flight environ- ment. Achieved, during the zero-g phase of the mission prior to the fourth service propulsion system burn and prior to the S-IVB separation. Desired data during the boost phase was not obtained.
P2.10: To accomplish the backup mode of the gyro display coupler-flight director attitude indicator alignment using the scanning telescope in preparation for an increment velocity maneuver. Achieved, although there was a problem with the flight director attitude indicator in the latter part of the mission.
P3.14: To demonstrate the service propulsion system minimum impulse burns in a space environment. Achieved, during the fourth and sixth service propulsion burns.
4 Apollo objectives and their level of achievement for all flights are derived from mission reports and from Boeing’s final flight evaluation reports for Apollo 7, 8, 9, and 10.
Apollo by the Numbers
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
P3.15: To perform a service propulsion system performance burn in the space environment. Achieved, during the fifth serv- ice propulsion burn.
P3.16: To monitor the primary and auxiliary gauging system. Achieved, during the fifth service propulsion burn.
P3.20: To verify the adequacy of the propellant feed line ther- mal control system. Achieved, by the demonstration of normal operation and the cold soak test.
P4.4: To verify the life support functions of the environmental control system. Achieved.
P4.6: To obtain data on operation of the waste management system in the flight environment. Achieved.
P4.8: To operate the secondary coolant loop. Achieved, and included daily redundant component tests.
P4.9: To demonstrate the water management subsystems opera- tion in the flight environment. Achieved, throughout the mission, despite a problem with the chlorination procedure and some hardware problems.
P4.10: To demonstrate the postlanding ventilation circuit opera- tion. Achieved.
P5.8: To obtain data on thermal stratification with and without the cryogenic fans of the cryogenic gas storage system. Achieved. Although only two of the three stratification tests were successful and part of the third test was accomplished (the rest was deleted), sufficient data were obtained.
P5.9: To verify automatic pressure control of the cryogenic tank systems in a zero-g environment. Achieved.
P5.10: To demonstrate fuel cell water operations in a zero-g environment. Achieved.
P6.7: To demonstrate S-band data uplink capability. Achieved.
P6.8: To demonstrate a simulated command and service mod- ule overpass of the lunar module rendezvous radar during the lunar stay. Achieved, during the 48th revolution.
P7.19: To obtain data on the environmental control system pri- mary radiator thermal coating degradation. Achieved, from 092:37 to 097:00.
P7.20: To obtain data on the block II forward heat shield ther- mal protection system. Achieved, during entry.
32. P20.8: To perform a command and service module/S-IVB sep- aration, transposition, and simulated docking. Achieved.
33. P20.10: To demonstrate the performance of the command and service module/Piloted Space Flight Network S-band communi-
cation system. Achieved.
34, P20.11: To obtain data on all command and service module consumables. Achieved.
35. P20.13: To perform a command and service module active ren- dezvous with the S-IVB. Achieved.
36. P20.15: To obtain crew evaluation of intravehicular activity in general. Achieved.
Spacecraft Secondary Detailed Test Objectives
1. $1.11: To monitor the guidance navigation control systems and displays during launch. Achieved.
2. $3.17: To obtain data on the service module reaction control subsystem pulse and steady state performance. Achieved.
Cn
. $7.24: To obtain data on initial coning angles when in the spin mode as used during transearth flight. Partially achieved. The first of three tests was accomplished. A pitch control mode was also accomplished but was not planned prior to launch. The third test was deleted (the crew objected because they expected excessive cross-coupling).
4. $7.28: To obtain command and service module vibration data. Achieved, during boost, powered flight, and deorbit.
. $20.9: To perform manual out-of-window command and service module attitude orientation for retrofire. Achieved, by two tests.
wn
6. $20.12: To perform crew controlled manual S-IVB attitude maneuvers in three axes. Achieved.
7. §20.14: To verify that the launch vehicle propellant pressure dis- plays are adequate to warn of a common bulkhead reversal. Achieved.
=)
. $20.16: To obtain photographs of the command module ren- dezvous windows during discrete phases of the mission. Achieved, although the second and third of four scheduled tests were deleted.
ad
$20.17: To obtain data on propellant slosh damping following service propulsion system cutoff and following reaction control subsystem burns. Achieved, by three tests.
Apollo 7
bb
10. $20.18: To obtain data via the command and service module/Apollo range instrumentation aircraft communication subsystems. Achieved.
11. $20.19: To demonstrate command and service module VHF voice communications with the Manned Space Flight Network. Achieved, throughout the mission and during recovery.
12. $20.20: To evaluate the crew optical alignment sight for dock- ing, rendezvous, and proper attitude verification. Achieved, throughout the mission and in conjunction with deorbit attitude.
13. $7.21: To obtain data on the service module lunar module adapter deployment system operation. Achieved.
Experiments
1. S005 (Synoptic Terrain Photography): To obtain elective, high
quality photographs with color and panchromatic film of select- ed land and ocean areas. Achieved. Of the more than 500 photo- graphs obtained, approximately 200 were usable for the purposes of the experiment. The objective of comparing color with black-and-white photography of the same areas was not successful because of problems with focus, exposure, and filters.
. 5006 (Synoptic Weather Photography): To obtain selective, high
quality color cloud photographs to study the fine structure of Earth’s weather system. Achieved. In particular, excellent views of Hurricane Gladys and Typhoon Gloria were obtained. The color
Apollo by the Numbers
.e
—
sn
photographs enabled meteorologists to ascertain much more accu- rately the types of clouds involved than with black-and-white satellite photographs. Oceanographic surface features were also . revealed more clearly than in any of the preceding piloted flights.
. M006: To establish the occurrence and degree of bone deminer-
alization during long spaceflights. Achieved, by preflight and post- flight x-ray studies of selected bones of crew members.
. M011: To determine if the space environment fosters any cellu-
lar changes in human blaod. Achieved, by comparison of preflight and postflight crew blood samples.
. M023: To measure changes in lower body negative pressure as
evidence of cardiovascular deconditioning resulting from pro- longed weightlessness. Achieved, by preflight and postflight med- ical examinations.
Test Objectives Added During Mission
l.
2.
J
Pitch about Y axis. Achieved. Optics degradation evaluation. Achieved.
Sextant/horizon sightings. Not achieved. Erroneous procedures were given to the crew.
4, Three additional S-band communication modes. Achieved.
Apollo 7 Spacecraft History*
EVENT DATE
Individual and combined CM and SM systems test completed at factory. 18 Mar 1968
Saturn IB stage delivered to KSC. 28 Mar 1968
Saturn IV-B stage delivered to KSC. 7 Apr 1968
Saturn IB instrument unit delivered to KSC. 11 Apr 1968
Integrated CM and SM systems test completed at factory. 29 Apr 1968
CM #101 and SM #101 ready to ship from factory to KSC. 29 May 1968
CM #101 and SM #101 delivered to KSC. 30 May 1968
CM #101 and SM #101 mated. 11 Jun 1968
CSM #101 combined systems test completed. 19 Jun 1968
CSM #101 altitude tests completed. 29 Jul 1968
Space vehicle moved to Cape Kennedy Launch Complex 34. 9 Aug 1968
CSM #101 integrated systems test completed. 27 Aug 1968
CSM #101 electrically mated to launch vehicle. 30 Aug 1968
Space vehicle overall test completed. 4 Sep 1968
Space vehicle countdown demonstration test completed. 17 Sep 1968
Space vehicle flight readiness test completed. 25 Sep 1968
Apollo 7 Ascent Phase
Space Fixed Space Earth Space Flight Fixed
Fixed Fixed Event Geocentric Path Heading Event GET Altitude Range Velocity Velocity Duration Latitude Longitude Angle Angle (hhh:mm:ss) (nmi) (n mi) (ft/sec) (ft/sec) (deg E} (deg N) (deg E) (deg) (E of N)
Liftoff 000:00:00.36 0.019 0.000 0.0 1,341.7 28.3608 -80.5611 0.06 90.01 Mach 1 achieved 000:01:02.15 4.120 0.753 1,039.1 1,960.1 28.3649 = -80.5477 29.63 — 86.70 Maximum.dynamic pressure 000:01:15.5 6.567 1.933 1,459.4 2,408.8 28.3708 -80.5264 31.64 83.65 S-IB center engine cutoff 000:02:20.65 30.626 29.184 6,264.7 7,394.5 123.64 28.5090 -80.0349 27.09 75.87 S-IB outboard engine cutoff 000:02:24.32 32.678 32.418 6,479.1 7,616.8 147.3] 28.5252 -79.9765 2655 75.78 S-IB/S-IVB separation’ 000:02:25.59 33.389 = 33.561 6,472.1 7,612.6 28.5310 = -79.9558 26.32 = 75,79 S-IVB engine cutoff 000:10:16.76 123.167 983.290 24,181.2 = 25,525.9 469.79 31.3633 -61.9777, 0.00 = 85.91 Earth orbit insertion 000:10:26.76 123.177 1,121.743 24,208.5 25,553.2 31.4091 = -61.2293 0.005 = 86.32
> There are conflicts in NASA literature regarding the history of Apollo hardware. Where conflicts exist, the author has used the dates that appear to be most logical. The sources for these events are: Apollo Program Summary Report (JSC-09423); Stages To Saturn: A Technological History of Saturn/Apollo Launch Vehicles (SP-4206); and the Saturn V Flight
Evaluation Report for each mission.
6 Altitude on the launch pad is measured at the instrument unit for all Apollo missions.
? Only the commanded time is available for this event.
Apollo 7
Apollo 7 Earth Orbit Phase
‘ Space Fixed Event Velocity GET Velocity Duration Change Apogee Perigee Perigee Inclination
Event (hhh:mm:ss) (ft/sec) (sec) (ft/sec) (nmi) (nmi) (mins) (deg) Earth orbit insertion 000:10:26.76 25,553.2 152.34 123.03 89.55 31.608 Separation of CSM from S-IVB 002:55:02.40 25,499.5 170.21 123.01 89,94 31.640 Ist rendezvous phasing ignition 003:20:09.9 yao 167.0 1253 89.99 31.61 Ist rendezvous phasing cutoff 003:20:26.2 25;525.0 16.3 a7 165.2 124.8 89.95 31.62 2nd rendezvous phasing ignition 015:52:00.9 25,283.1 165.1 124.7 89.95 31.62 2nd rendezvous phasing cutoff 015:52:18.5 25,277.4 17.6 7.0 164.7 120.8 89.86 31.62 Ist SPS ignition 026:24:55.66 25,289.9 1646 120.6 89.86 31.62 Ist SPS cutoff 026:25:05.02 25,354.0 9.36 204.1 194.1 123.0 90.57 31.62. 2nd SPS ignition 028:00:56.47 25,446.5 194.1 123.0 90.57 31.62 2nd SPS cutoff 028:01:04.23 ZOD 1 7.76 173.8 153.6 113.9 89.52 31.63 Terminal phase initiation ignition 029:16:33 29,9271 153.6 113.9 89.52 31.63 Terminal phase initiation cutoff 029:17:19 46 17.7
Terminal phase finalize (braking) 029:43:55 154.1 121.6 89.68 31.61 Terminal phase end 029:55:43 25,546.1 708 49.1 161.0 122.1 89.82 31.61 Separation ignition 030:20:00.0 25,914.1 161.0 122.1 89.82 31.61 Separation cutoff 030:20:05.4 23,919, 1 5.4 2.0 161.0 122.2 89.82 31.61 3rd SPS ignition 075:48:00.27. 25,326.1 159.4 1213 89.77. 31.61 3rd SPS cutoff 075:48:09.37 — 25,273.9 9.10 209.7 159.7. 89.5 89.17 31.23 4th SPS ignition 120:43:00.44 25,661.2 149.4 87.5 88.94 31.25 4th SPS cutoff 120:43:00.92 25,670.6 0.48 12.3 156.7 89.1 89.11 31.24 5th SPS ignition 165:00:00.42 255195 146.5 87.1 88.88 31.25 5th SPS cutoff 165:01:07.37 — 25,714.9 66.95 1,691.3 244.2 89.1 90.77 30.08 6th SPS ignition 210:07:59.99 25,354.7 234.8 88.5 90.59 30.08 6th SPS cutoff 210:08:00.49 25,354.6 0.50 14.2 234.6 88.4 90.58 30.07 7th SPS ignition 239:06:11.97 25,864.6 228.3 88.4 90.24 30.07 7th SPS cutoff 239:06:19.67 25,866.4 7.70 220.1 229.8 88.5 90.48 29.87 8th SPS ignition (deorbit) 259:39:16.36 25,155.3 225.3 88.2 90.39 29.88 8th SPS cutoff 259:39:28.15 24,966.5 11.79 343.6
Apollo by the Numbers
Apollo 7 Timeline
GET GMT GMT
Event (hhh:mmiss) Time Date Countdown started at T-101 hours. -101:00:00 19:00:00 06 Oct 1968 Scheduled 6-hour hold at T-72 hours. -072:00:00 00:00:00 08 Oct 1968 Countdown resumed at T-72 hours. -072:00:00 06:00:00 08 Oct 68 Scheduled 3-hour hold at T-33 hours. -033:00:00 21:00:00 09 Oct 1968 Countdown resumed at T-33 hours. -033:00:00 00:00:00 10 Oct 1968 Terminal countdown started. -018:00:00 14:30:00 10 Oct 1968 Scheduled 6-hour hold at T-6 hours. -006:00:00 03:00:00 11 Oct 1968 Terminal countdown started. -006:00:00 09:00:00 11 Oct 1968 Crew ingress. -002:27 12:35 11 Oct 1968 Unscheduled 2-minute 45-second hold to complete propellant chilldown. -000:06:15 14:53:45 11 Oct 1968 Countdown resumed at T-6 minutes 15 seconds. -000:06:15 14:56:30 11 Oct 1968 Guidance reference release. -000:00:04.972 15:02:40 11 Oct 1968 S-IB engine start command. -000:00:02.988 15:02:42 11 Oct 1968 Range zero. 000:00:00.00 15:02:45 11 Oct 1968 All holddown arms released (1st motion) (1.21 g). 000:00:00.17 15:02:45 11 Oct 1968 Liftoff (umbilical disconnected). 000:00:00.36 15:02:45 11 Oct 1968 Pitch and roll maneuver started. 000:00:10.31 15:02:55 11 Oct 1968 Roll maneuver ended. 000:00:38.46 [5:03:23 11 Oct 1968 Mach 1 achieved. 000:01:02.15 15:03:47 11 Oct 1968 Maximum bending moment achieved (7,546,000 lbf-in). 000:01:13.1 15:03:58 11 Oct 1968 Maximum dynamic pressure (665.60 lb/ft2). 000:01:15.5 15:04:00 11 Oct 1968 Pitch maneuver ended. 000:02:14.26 15:04:59 11 Oct 1968 S-IB maximum total inertial acceleration (4.28 g). 000:02:20.10 15:05:05 11 Oct 1968 S-IB center engine cutoff. 000:02:20.65 15:05:05 11 Oct 1968 S-IB outboard engine cutoff. 000:02:24.32 15:05:09 11 Oct 1968 S-IB maximum Earth-fixed velocity. 000:02:24.6 15:05:09 11 Oct 1968 S-IB/S-IVB separation command. 000:02:25.59 15:05:10 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB engine ignition command. 000:02:26.97 15:05:12 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB ullage case jettisoned. 000:02:37.58 1505.22 11 Oct 1968 Launch escape tower jettisoned. 000:02:46.54 13:09:51 11 Oct 1968 Iterative guidance mode initiated. 000:02:49.76 15:04:54 11 Oct 1968 S-IB apex. 000:04:19.4 15:06:54 1] Oct 1968 S-IB impact in the Atlantic Ocean (theoretical). 000:09:20.2 15:12:05 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB engine cutoff. 000: 10:16.76 15:13:01 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB maximum total inertial acceleration (2.55 g). 000:10:16.9 15:12:45 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—Start lst LH, tank vent. 000:10:17.37 15:13:02 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—Tank passivization valve open. 000:10:17.56 15:13:02 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB maximum Earth-fixed velocity. 000:10:19.3 15:12:54 11 Oct 1968 Earth orbit insertion. 000:10:26.76 Ios) 11 Oct 1968 Orbital navigation started. 000:10:32.2 15:13:17 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—Start LOX tank vent. 000:10:47.17 15:13:32 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—End LOX tank vent. 000:11:17.17 15:14:02 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—End Ist LH, tank vent (approximate due to data dropout). 000:31:17:36 15:34:02 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—Start 2nd LH, tank vent. 000:54:06.95 15:56:52 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—End 2nd LH, tank vent. 000:59:06.95 16:01:52 11 Oct 1968 Start of two-minute power failure in Mission Control Center started. No loss of communications. 001:18:34 16:21:19 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—LOX dump started. 001:34:28.96 16:37:14 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—LOX tank non-propulsive vent valve open (until end of mission). 001:34:38.95 16:37:24 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—Start 3rd LH, tank vent. 001:34:42.95 16:37:28 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—Start Ist cold helium dump. 001:42:28.95 16:45:14 11 Oct 1968 S-IVB safing experiment—End 3rd LH, tank vent. 001:44:42.95 16:47:28 11 Oct 1968
Apollo 7 | |
Apollo 7 Timeline
Event
S-IVB safing experiment—LOX dump ended. S-IVB safing experiment—End Ist cold helium dump. Manual takeover of S-IVB attitude control started. Manual takeover—Pitch maneuver started.
Manual takeover—Pitch maneuver ended.
Manual takeover—Roll maneuver started.
Manual takeover—Roll maneuver ended.
Manual takeover—Yaw maneuver started.
Manual takeover—Yaw maneuver ended.
Manual takeover of S-IVB attitude control ended. Window photography.
Separation of CSM from S-IVB.
S-IVB safing experiment—Start 4th LH, tank vent. S-IVB safing experiment—End 4th LH, tank vent.
S-IVB safing experiment—Start stage control sphere helium dump.
Ist rendezvous phasing maneuver ignition.
Ist rendezvous phasing maneuver cutoff.
S-IVB safing experiment—Start 5th LH, tank vent. S-IVB safing experiment—End stage control sphere helium dump. S-IVB safing experiment—End 5th LH, tank vent. S-IVB safing experiment—Start 2nd cold helium dump. S-IVB safing experiment—Start 6th LH, tank vent. S-IVB safing experiment—End 6th LH, tank vent S-IVB safing experiment—End 2nd cold helium dump. S-IVB safing experiment—Start 7th LH, tank vent. S-IVB safing experiment—End 7th LH, tank vent. Hydrogen stratification test.
2nd rendezvous phasing maneuver ignition.
2nd rendezvous phasing maneuver cutoff.
Y-Pulse Integrating Pendulum Accelerometer test.
S-IVB optical tracking.
Oxygen stratification test.
Ist SPS ignition (NCC/corrective combination maneuver—initiation of rendezvous sequence).
Ist SPS cutoff.
2nd SPS ignition (NSR/coelliptic maneuver). 2nd SPS cutoff.
S-IVB optical tracking.
Terminal phase initiation ignition.
Terminal phase initiation cutoff.
Midcourse correction.
Terminal phase finalize (braking).
Terminal phase end/start station-keeping. Separation maneuver ignition.
Separation maneuver cutoff.
Sextant calibration test.
Sextant tracking of S-IVB started.
Sextant tracking of S-IVB ended at 160 n mi. Attitude hold test.
Primary evaporator test.
Primary evaporator test.
Attitude hold test.
Apollo by the Numbers
GET
(hhh:mm:ss)
001:46:29.96 002:30:16.95 002:30:48.80 002:31:22 002:32:15 002:32:22 002:32:51 002:33:01 002:33:31 002:33:44.80 002:45 002:55:02.40 003:09:14.48 003:15:56.11 003:17:33.95 003:20:09.9 003:20:26.2 004:05:47.27 004:07:01.27 004:10:08.43
004:30:16.96
004:43:55.85 004:49:01.73 004:50:16.95 005:08:58.99 005:11:15.43 013:28:00 015:52:00.9 015:52:18.5 022:30 025:10 025:14:00 026:24:55.66 026:25:05.02 028:00:56.47 028:01:04.23 028:20 029:16:33 029:17:19 029:30:42 029:43:55 029:55:43 030:20:00.0 030:20:05.4 041:00 044:40 045:30 049:00 049:50 050:30 050:40
GMT Time
16:49:15 17:33:02 17:32:45 17:34:07 17:35:00 17:35:07 17:35:36 17:35:46 17:36:16 17:35:45 l2:17
17:57:47 18:11:59 18:18:41 18:20:19 18:22:54 18:23:11 19:08:32 19:09:46 19:12:53 19:33:02 19:46:40 19:51:46 19:53:02 20:11:44 20:14:00 04:30:45 06:54:45 06:55:03 13:32
16:12
16:16:45 17:27:40 17:27:50 19:03:41 19:03:49 19:22
20:19:18
20:20:04
20:33:27 20:46:40 20:58:28 21:22:45 21:22:50 08:02 11:42 1232 16:02 16:52 1a32 17:42
GMT Date
11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 11 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1968 13 Oct 1968 13 Oct 1968 13 Oct 1968 13 Oct 1968 13 Oct 1968 13 Oct 1968 13 Oct 1968
Apollo 7 Timeline
Event
Sextant tracking of S-IVB started.
Sextant tracking of S-IVB ended at 320 n mi. Rendezvous radar transponder test. Rendezvous radar transponder test.
Ist television transmission started.
Ist television transmission ended.
3rd SPS ignition (to position and size orbital ellipse). 3rd SPS cutoff.
Rendezvous radar transponder test.
Radiator degradation test started.
2nd television transmission started.
2nd television transmission ended.
Radiator surface coating degradation test ended. Hydrogen stratification test.
Experiment S005 photography.
Experiment $006 photography.
Window photography.
3rd television transmission started.
3rd television transmission ended.
4th SPS ignition (minimum impulse burn). 4th SPS cutoff.
Star/horizon sightings.
Oxygen stratification test.
4th television transmission started.
4th television transmission ended.
Lunar landmark star sightings.
S-IVB impact (theoretical).
5th SPS ignition (to position and size orbital ellipse). 5th SPS cutoff.
Passive thermal control test started.
Passive thermal control test ended.
Service propulsion cold soak test started. Service propulsion cold soak test ended.
5th television transmission.
Morse code emergency keying test started. Morse code emergency keying test ended. Oxygen stratification test.
6th SPS ignition (minimum impulse burn). 6th SPS cutoff.
Passive thermal control test (pitch procedure) started. Passive thermal control test ended.
6th television transmission.
Star/horizon sightings.
Hydrogen stratification test.
Optics degradation test started.
Solar Particle Alert Network Facility at Carnarvon reported class 1B solar flare.
7th television transmission started.
7th television transmission ended.
7th SPS ignition (time anomaly adjust for deorbit burn). 7th SPS cutoff.
Window photography.
GET
(hhh:mm:ss)
052:10 053:20 061:00 071:40 071:43 071:50 075:48:00.27 075:48:09.37 076:27 092:37:00 095:25 095:36 097:00 098:11 098:40 099:10 101:10 119:08 119:18 120:43:00.44 120:43:00.92 124:00 131352 141:11 141:27 147:00 162:27:15 165:00:00.42 165:01:07.37 167:00 167:50 168:00 171:10 189:04 190:36:06 190:43:01 198:27:00 210:07:59.99 210:08:00.49 212:00 212:50 213:10 213:30 227:12 228:30 231:08 236:18 236:29 239:06:11.97 239:06:19.67 242:30
GMT Time
19:12 20:22 04:02 14:42 14:45 14:52 18:50:45 18:50:54 19:29 11:39:45 14:27 14:38 16:02 17:13 17:42 18:12 20:12 14:10 14:20 15:45:45 15:45:45 19:02 02:54 12:13 12:29 18:02 09:30:00 12:02:45 12:03:52 14:02 14:52 15:02 18:12 12:06 13:38:51 13:45:46 21:29:45 09:10:45 09:10:45 11:02 L52 E212 132 02:14 03:32 06:10 11:20 21 11:31 14:08:57 14:09:04 17:32
GMT Date
13 Oct 1968 13 Oct 1968 14 Oct 1968 14 Oct 1968 14 Oct 1968 14 Oct 1968 14 Oct 1968 14 Oct 1968 14 Oct 1968 15 Oct 1968 15 Oct 1968 15 Oct 1968 15 Oct 1968 15 Oct 1968 15 Oct 1968 15 Oct 1968 15 Oct 1968 16 Oct 1968 16 Oct 1968 16 Oct 1968 16 Oct 1968 16 Oct 1968 16 Oct 1968 17 Oct 1968 17 Oct 1968 17 Oct 1968 18 Oct 1968 18 Oct 1968 18 Oct 1968 18 Oct 1968 18 Oct 1968 18 Oct 1968 18 Oct 1968 19 Oct 1968 19 Oct 1968 19 Oct 1968 19 Oct 1968 20 Oct 1968 20 Oct 1968 20 Oct 1968 20 Oct 1968 20 Oct 1968 20 Oct 1968 21 Oct 1968 21 Oct 1968 21 Oct 1968 Oct 1968 21 Oct 1968 21 Oct 1968 21 Oct 1968 21 Oct 1968
Apollo 7
Apollo 7 Timeline
Event
8th SPS ignition (deorbit burn).
8th SPS cutoff.
CM/SM separation.
Entry.
Communication blackout started.
Communication blackout ended.
Maximum entry g force (3.33 g).
SM impact in the Atlantic Ocean. S-band contact with CM by recovery aircraft. Drogue parachute deployed.
Main parachute deployed. VHF voice contact with CM established by recovery forces.
Splashdown (went to apex-down).
Inflation of flotation bags started.
CM returned to apex-up position.
VHF recovery beacon signal received by recovery aircraft. VHF voice communication with CM reestablished. CM sighted by recovery helicopter.
Swimmers and flotation collar deployed.
Flotation collar inflated.
CM hatch opened.
Crew aboard recovery helicopter.
Recovery ship at CM. Crew aboard recovery ship. CM aboard recovery ship.
Crew departed recovery ship.
Crew arrived at Cape Kennedy.
CM offloaded at Norfolk Naval Air Station.
Safing team started CM deactivation.
Deactivation of CM completed.
| 30.| Apollo by the Numbers
GET
(hhh:mm:ss)
259:39:16.36 259:39:28.15 259:43:33.8 259:53:26 259:54:58 259:59:46 260:01:09 260:03 260:03:23 260:04:13 260:09:03 260:18 260:22 260:23 260:24 260:30 260:32 260:41 260:45 260:58 261:06 262:01 285:54 288:43
310:58 370:28
GMT Time
10:42:01 10:42:13 10:46:18 10:56:11 10:57:43 11:02:31 11:03:54 11:055 11:06:08 11:06:58 11:11:48 11:20 11:24 11:25 11:26 11:32 11:34 11:43 11:47 12:00 12:08 13:03 12:56 15:45
14:00 01:30
GMT Date
22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 22 Oct 1968 23 Oct 1968 23 Oct 1968 24 Oct 1968 24 Oct 1968 27 Oct 1968
APOLLO 8
The Second Mission: Testing the CSM in Lunar Orbit
Apollo 8 Summary
(21 December—27 December 1968)
The Apollo 8 crew (L to. r.): Bill Anders, Jim Lovell, Frank Borman (NASA S68-53187). _
Background
Apollo 8 was a Type “C prime” mission, a CSM piloted flight demonstration in lunar orbit instead of Earth orbit like Apollo 7. It was the first mission to take humans to the vicinity of the Moon, a bold step forward in the devel- opment of a lunar landing capability.
The mission was originally designated SA-503, an unpilot- ed Earth orbital mission to be launched in May 1968 with boilerplate payload BP-30 instead of an operational space- craft. The success of Apollo 6 (AS-502), however, led to the decision on 27 April that AS-503 would be a piloted mis- sion with a CSM and LM instead of BP-30.
The change to a piloted flight required that the S-II stage be returned to the Mississippi Test Facility for “man- rating.” Additional tests for a piloted flight continued at KSC. The Mississippi tests were successfully completed on 30 May 1968 and the stage returned to the Kennedy Space Center on 27 June.
| 32 | Apollo by the Numbers
After two months of testing, which started 11 June 1968, it was determined that the LM would not be ready for the projected early December launch. Therefore, the decision was made on 19 August that a 19,900-pound LM test arti- cle would be installed in the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter for mass loading purposes, replacing the LM. It was also on this date that the crew was instructed to train for a mission to the Moon, officially designated “Apollo 8.”
The possibility of conducting a lunar mission was first dis- cussed with the crew on 10 August, and the results of Apollo 7, to be launched in October, would determine whether the mission would be lunar orbital, circumlunar, or Earth orbital. All training immediately focused on the lunar orbital mission, the most difficult of the three, and ground support preparations were accelerated. The first simulation exercise was conducted on 9 September, and the space vehi- cle was transferred to the launch site on 9 October.
Following the successful completion of Apollo 7 on
22 October, the official decision to conduct a lunar orbit mission was made 12 November, just five weeks before the scheduled launch. The decision was made after a thorough evaluation of spacecraft performance during Apollo 7’s ten days in Earth orbit and an assessment of the risks involved in a lunar orbit mission. These risks included the total dependency upon the service propulsion engine for pro- pelling the spacecraft from lunar orbit, and a lunar orbit return time of three days, compared to an Earth orbit return of just 30 minutes to three hours. Also considered was the value of the flight in furthering the goal of landing a human on the Moon before the end of 1969. The princi- pal gains from a lunar mission would include experience in deep space navigation, communications, and tracking; greater knowledge of spacecraft thermal response to deep space; and crew operational experience—all directly appli- cable to lunar landing missions.
Apollo 8 was the first piloted mission launched with the three-stage Saturn V vehicle; the two previous Saturn V flights had been unpiloted. The spacecraft was a Block II CSM, and the spacecraft/launch vehicle adapter was the first to incorporate a mechanism to jettison the panels that would cover the LM on future missions.
The primary objectives of Apollo 8 were: * to demonstrate the combined performance of the crew, space
vehicle, and mission support team during a piloted Saturn V mission with the CSM; and
* to demonstrate the performance of nominal and selected backup lunar orbit rendezvous procedures.
The crew members were Colonel Frank Frederick Borman II (USAF), commander; Captain James Arthur Lovell, Jr. (USN), command module pilot; and Major William Alison Anders (USAF), lunar module pilot.
Selected in the astronaut group of 1962, Borman had been command pilot of Gemini 7. Born 14 March 1928 in Gary, Indiana, he was 40 years old at the time of the Apollo 8 mission. Borman received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy in 1950 and an M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering in 1957 from the California Institute of Technology. His backup for the mission was Neil Alden Armstrong.
Lovell had been pilot for the Gemini 7 mission and com- mand pilot for Gemini 12. Born 25 March 1928 in Cleveland, Ohio, he was 35 years old at the time of the Apollo 8 mission. Lovell received a B.S. in 1952 from the U.S. Naval Academy, and was selected as an astronaut in 1962. His backup was Colonel Edwin Eugene “Buzz” Aldrin, Jr. (USAF).
Anders was making his first spaceflight. Born 17 October 1933 in Hong Kong, he was 35 years old at the time of the Apollo 8 mission. Anders received a B.S. in Electrical Engineering in 1955 from the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.S. in Nuclear Engineering in 1962 from the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology, and was selected as an astro- naut in 1963. His backup was Fred Wallace Haise, Jr.
The capsule communicators (CAPCOMs) for the mission were Lt. Col. Michael Collins (USAF), Lt. Commander Thomas Kenneth “Ken” Mattingly Il (USN), Major Gerald Paul Carr (USMC), Armstrong, Aldrin, Vance DeVoe Brand, and Haise. The support crew were Brand, Mattingly, and Carr. The flight directors were Clifford E. Charlesworth (first shift), Glynn S. Lunney (second shift), and Milton L. Windler (third shift).
The Apollo 8 launch vehicle was a Saturn V, designated SA-503. The mission also carried the designation Eastern Test Range #170. The CSM combination was designated CSM-103. The lunar module test article was designated LTA-B.
Because this was a lunar mission, it was necessary for the vehicle to be launched within a particular daily launch “window’, or time period, within a monthly launch win- dow. Part of the constraints were dictated by the desire to pass over selected lunar sites with lighting conditions simi-
lar to those planned for the later landing missions. Lunar orbit inclination, inclination of the free return trajectory, and spacecraft propellant reserves were other primary fac- tors considered in the mission planning.
The first monthly window was in December 1968, with launch dates of 20-27 December, and January 1969 as a backup. It was decided to make the first attempt on 21 December to have the total available daily window during daylight. Targeting for this day would allow the flight to pass over a future lunar landing site at latitude 2.63° and longitude 34.03° with a sun elevation angle of 6.74°. The window for 21 December lasted from 12:50:22 to 17:31:40 GMT, with liftoff scheduled for 12:51:00 GMT.
Launch Preparations
The terminal countdown sequence (T-28 hours) began at 13:51 GMT on 19 December. At that time, space vehicle operations were functionally ahead of the clock. Later in the count, it was discovered that the onboard liquid oxygen supply for the spacecraft environmental control system and fuel cell systems was contaminated with nitrogen. Preparations were made to replace the liquid oxygen, the reservicing operations were completed, and the tanks were pressurized at T-10 hours.
During the planned six-hour hold period at T-9 hours, vir- tually all of the countdown tasks, delayed by the liquid oxygen detanking and retanking operations, were brought back in line. When the count was picked up again at T-9 hours, space vehicle operations were essentially on sched- ule. At T-8 hours, S-IVB liquid oxygen loading operations began. The cryogenic loading operations were completed at 08:29 GMT on December 21, eight minutes into the one-hour scheduled hold. The count was picked up at T-3 hours 30 minutes at 09:21 GMT, and the crew entered the spacecraft at T-2 hours 53 minutes.
A cold front passed through the launch area the afternoon before launch and became a stationary front about launch time, laying through the Miami area. At launch time, sur- face winds were from the north but changed to westerly at 4,900 feet and remained generally from the west above that region. Cirrus clouds covered 40 percent of the sky (cloud base not recorded), visibility was 10 statute miles, the tem- perature was 59.0° §, relative humidity was 88 percent, dew point was 56 percent, barometric pressure was 14.804 |b/in? and winds were 18.7 ft/sec at 348° from true north meas- ured by the anemometer on the light pole 60.0 feet above ground at the launch site.
Ascent Phase
Apollo 8 was launched from Launch Complex 39, Pad A, at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida. Liftoff occurred at a Range Zero time of 12:51:00 GMT (07:51:00 a.m. EST) on 21 December 1968, well within the planned launch window.
The ascent phase was nominal. Moments after liftoff, the vehicle rolled from a launch pad azimuth of 90° to a flight azimuth of 72.124° east of north. The S-IC engine shut down at 000:02:33.82, followed by S-IC/S-II separation, and S-II engine ignition. The S-II engine shut down at 000:08:44.04 followed by separation from the S-IVB, which ignited at 000:08:48,29. The first S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 000:11:24.98, with deviations from the planned trajectory of only +1.44 ft/sec in velocity and only -0.01 n mi in altitude.
Apollo 8, the first piloted Saturn V flight and humankind’s first trip to the Moon, lifts off from Kennedy Space Center Pad 39A (NASA S68-56050).
The S-IC stage impacted at 000:09:00.410 in the Atlantic Ocean at latitude 30.2040° north and longitude 74.1090° " west, 353.462 n mi from the launch site. The S-II stage impacted at 000:19:25.106 in the Atlantic Ocean at latitude 31.8338° north and longitude 37.2774° west, 2,245.913
n mi from the launch site.
Apollo by the Numbers
Four recoverable film camera capsules were carried aboard the S-IC stage. Two were located in the forward interstage looking forward to view S-IC/S-II separation and S-II engine start. The other two were mounted on top of the S- IC stage LOX tank and contained pulse cameras which viewed aft into the LOX tank through fiber optics bundles. One of the LOX tank capsules was recovered by helicopter at 00:19:30 at latitude 30.22° north and longitude 73.97° west. Despite film damage caused by sea water and dye marker which had leaked into the camera compartment, the film provided usable data. It was not known if the other three capsules were ejected. There were also two tele- vision cameras on the S-IC to view propulsion and control system components. Both provided good quality data.
The maximum wind conditions encountered during ascent were 114.1 ft/sec at 284° from true north at 49,900 feet (high dynamic pressure region). Component wind shears were of low magnitude at all altitudes. The largest wind shear was a pitch plane shear of 0.0103 sec"! at 52,500 feet.
At 000:11:34.98, the spacecraft entered Earth orbit, defined as S-IVB cutoff plus 10 seconds to account for engine tail- off and other transient effects. At insertion, conditions were: apogee and perigee 99.99 by 99.57 n mi, inclination 32.509°, period 89.19 minutes, and velocity 25,567.06 ft/sec. The apogee and perigee were based upon a spherical Earth with a radius of 3,443.934 n mi.
The international designation for the spacecraft upon achieving orbit was 1968-118A and the S-IVB was desig- nated 1968-118B.
Earth Orbit Phase
At 000:42:05, the optics cover was jettisoned and the crew performed star checks over the Carnarvon, Australia, track- ing station to verify platform alignment. During the second revolution, at 001:56:00, all spacecraft systems were approved for translunar injection.
Because of the risks involved, the mission had been struc- tured with three commit points: launch, Earth parking orbit, and translunar coast preceding the point where the CSM was to brake into lunar orbit. Had any problems been detected at these points, the plan was to shift to alter- nate missions, which provided for maximum crew safety and maximum scientific and engineering benefit. Had there been reason for not committing to the third point, the CSM would have continued on its “free-return” trajec- tory, looping behind the Moon and returning directly to Earth.
After inflight systems checks, it was determined that liquid oxygen venting through the J-2 engine had increased the apogee by 6.4 n mi, a condition that was only 0.7 n mi greater than predicted.
The 317.72-second translunar injection maneuver (second S-IVB firing) was performed at 002:50:37.79. The S-IVB engine shut down at 002:55:55.51 and translunar injection occurred ten seconds later, at a velocity of 35,504.41 ft/sec, after 1.5 Earth revolutions lasting 2 hours 44 minutes 30.53 seconds.
Translunar Phase
The spacecraft was separated from the S-IVB at 003:20:59.3 by a small maneuver of the service module reaction con- trol system, and the high-gain antenna was deployed (later used for the first time at 006:33:04). After spacecraft turn- around, the crew observed and photographed the S-IVB and practiced station-keeping. At 003:40:01, a 1.1 ft/sec maneuver was performed using the service module reac- tion control system to increase the distance between the spacecraft and the S-IVB. The distance did not increase as rapidly as desired, and a second, 7.7 ft/sec maneuver was performed at 004:45:01.
View of Saturn V stage following separation from the CSM (NASA AS08-16-2583).
One objective of the mission was to place the S-IVB into solar orbit. The “slingshot” maneuver required to accom-
plish this objective included a continuous LH, vent, a LOX dump, and an auxiliary propulsion system ullage burn. At 004:55:56.02, the LH, vent valve was opened, and the remaining liquid oxygen and the auxiliary propulsion sys- tem propellant in the S-[VB were used to change the tra- jectory of the S-IVB stage. The liquid oxygen was expelled through the J-2 engine starting at 005:07:55.82 and ended five minutes later.
CMP Jim Lovell navigates during the first trip to the Moon (NASA S69-35097).
The auxiliary propulsion motors were fired from 005:25:55.85 to depletion at 005:38:34.00. The resulting velocity increment targeted the S-IVB to go past the trail- ing edge of the Moon. The closest approach of the S-IVB to the Moon was 682 n mi at 069:58:55.2. The point of closest approach was latitude 19.2 north by longitude 88.0 east. The trajectory after passing from the lunar sphere of influence resulted in a solar orbit with a semi-major axis of 77.130 million n mi, an aphelion and perihelion of 79.770 million by 74.490 million n mi, an inclination of 23.47°, and a period of 340.8 days.
The translunar injection maneuver was so accurate that only one small midcourse correction would have been sufficient to achieve the desired lunar orbit insertion alti- tude of 65 n mi. However, the second of the 2 maneuvers that separated the spacecraft from the S-IVB altered the trajectory so that a 2.4-second midcourse correction of 20.4 ft/sec at 010:59:59.2 was required to achieve the desired trajectory.! For this midcourse correction, the serv- ice propulsion system was used to reduce the altitude of closest approach to the Moon from 458.1 to 66.3 n mi. An additional 11.9-second midcourse correction of only
1.4 ft/sec was performed at 060:59:55.9 to refine the lunar insertion conditions further.
1 The maneuver at 010:59:59.2 was targeted for a velocity change of 24.8 ft/sec. Only 20.4 ft/sec was achieved because thrust was less than expected. The firing time of 2.4 seconds was correct for the constants loaded into the computer, but was approximately 0.4 second too short for the actual engine performance.
Apollo 8
Earth view following translunar injection (NASA AS08- 16-2596).
During the translunar coast, the crew made systems checks and navigation sightings, and tested the spacecraft high-gain antenna, a four-dish unified S-band antenna that swung out from the service module after separation from the S-IVB.
Apollo 8 was the first piloted U.S. mission in which the crew members experienced symptoms of a mild motion sickness, identical to incipient mild seasickness. Soon after leaving their couches, all three experienced nausea as a result of rapid body movements. The duration of symp- toms varied between 2 and 24 hours but did not interfere with operational effectiveness. After waking from a fitful rest period at 016:00:00, the commander experienced a headache, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. These symptoms were diagnosed inflight as a possible viral gastroenteritis, an epidemic that was noted in the Cape Kennedy area prior to the mission. During the post mission medical debriefing, the commander reported that the symptoms may have been a side effect of a sleeping tablet he had taken at 011:00:00, which had produced similar symptoms during pre-mission testing of the drug (Seconal™).
Two of the six live television transmissions were also made during translunar flight. The first was a 23-minute 37-sec- ond transmission at 031:10:36. The wide-angle lens was used to obtain excellent pictures of the inside of the space- craft and Lovell preparing a meal; however the telephoto lens passed too much light and pictures of Earth were very poor. A procedure for taping certain filters from the still camera to the television camera improved later transmis- sions. A 25-minute 38-second transmission at 55:02:45 pro- vided scenes of Earth’s western hemisphere.
Apollo by the Numbers
At 055:38:40 the crew were notified that they had become the first humans to travel to a place where the pull of Earth’s gravity was less than that of another body. The spacecraft was 176,250 n mi from Earth, 33,800 n mi from the Moon, and their velocity had slowed to 3,261 ft/sec. Gradually, as it moved farther into the Moon’s gravitational field, the spacecraft picked up speed.
Ignition for lunar orbit insertion was performed with the service propulsion system at 069:08:20.4, at an altitude of 76.6 n mi above the Moon. The 246.9-second burn result- ed in an orbit of 168.5 by 60.0 n mi and a velocity of 5,458 ft/sec. The translunar coast had lasted 66 hours 16 minutes 21.79 seconds.
View of the Moon from Apollo 8 (NASA AS08-14-2506).
Lunar Orbit Phase
As the spacecraft passed behind the Moon for the first time, and communications were interrupted, the Apollo 8 crew became the first humans to see the far side of the Moon. After four hours of navigation checks, ground-based determination of the orbital parameters, and a 12-minute television transmission of the lunar surface at 071:40:52, a 9.6-second lunar orbit circularization maneuver was per- formed at 073:35:06.6, which resulted in an orbit of 60.7 by 59.7 n mi.
The next 12 hours of crew activity in lunar orbit involved photography of both the near and far sides of the Moon and landing-area sightings. The principal photographic objectives were to obtain vertical and oblique overlapping (stereo strip) photographs during at least two revolutions, photographs of specified targets of opportunity, and pho- tographs through the spacecraft sextant of a potential land- ing site. The purpose of the overlapping photography was to determine elevation and geographical position of lunar far side features. The targets of opportunity were areas rec- ommended for photography if time and circumstances permitted. They were selected to provide either detailed coverage of specific features or broad coverage of areas not adequately covered by satellite photography. Most were proposed to improve knowledge of areas on the Earth- facing hemisphere. The sextant photography was included to provide image comparisons for landmark evaluation and navigation training purposes. A secondary objective was to photograph one of the certified Apollo landing sites.
The Apollo 8 photography afforded the first opportunity to analyze the intensity and spectral distribution of lunar sur- face illumination free from the atmospheric modulation present in Earth telescopic photography and without the electronic processing losses present in satellite photography.
The crew completed photographic exercises in an excellent manner. Over 800 70 mm still photographs were obtained. Of these, 600 were good-quality reproductions of lunar surface features, and the remainder were of the S-IVB dur- ing separation and venting, and long-distance Earth and lunar photography.
Over 700 feet of 16 mm film were also exposed during the S-IVB separation, lunar landmark photography through the sextant, lunar surface sequence photography, and docu- mentation of intravehicular activity.
LMP Bill Anders during CM activities (NASA S69- 56532).
Craters Goclenius (foreground), Columbo A, and Maegelhans (background) (NASA AS08-13-2224).
Apollo 8
The still photography contributed significantly to knowl- edge of the lunar environment. In addition, many valuable observations were made by the crew. Their initial com- ments during the lunar orbit phase included descriptions of the color of the lunar surface as “black-and-white,” “absolutely no color” or “whitish gray, like dirty beach sand.” As expected, the crew could recognize surface fea- tures in shadow zones and extremely bright areas of the lunar surface, but these features were not well delineated in the photographs.
Brightly rayed crater on far side of the Moon (NASA AS08-13-2327).
This recognition combined with the photographic informa- tion enabled new interpretations of lunar surface features and phenomena. As a result, lunar-surface lighting con- straints for the lunar landing missions were widened.
Prior to Apollo 8, the lower limit for lunar lighting was believed to be 6°. The Apollo 8 crew observed surface detail at sun angles in the vicinity of 2° or 3° and stated that these low angles should present no problem for a lunar landing, but landing sites in long shadow areas, how- ever, were to be avoided. At the higher limit, an upper | bound of 16° would still provide very good definition of surface features for most of the critical landing phase near touchdown. Between 16° and 20°, lighting was judged acceptable for viewing during final descent. A sun angle above 20° was considered unsatisfactory for a manual land- ing maneuver.
The crew report of the absence of sharp color boundaries was significant. The lack of visible contrast from an alti-
Apollo by the Numbers
tude of 60 n mi reduced the probability that a crew would be able to use color to distinguish geologic units while operating near or on the lunar surface.
View of the Sea of Tranquility, target site for the first piloted lunar landing attempt during Apollo 11 seven months later (NASA AS08-13-2344). |
# oF 8 ri Cae len ie i a 4 ‘eee Be a me a 1 ees Te . CP ee oe Ue a 1 LE j F at a , : r f ry " 1 sate i i at Fi ‘ “7
Just prior to sunrise on one of the early lunar orbit revolu- tions, the command module pilot observed what was believed to be zodiacal light and solar corona through the telescope. The lunar module pilot observed a cloud or bright area in the sky during lunar darkness on two suc- cessive revolutions. The identification, if correct, indicated that one of the Magellanic clouds had been observed.
Long-distance Earth photography of general interest high- lighted global weather and terrain features. Lunar photog- raphy had not been accomplished during translunar coast because of rigid spacecraft attitude constraints. However, good quality photography of most of the Moon disk was accomplished during transearth coast.
The crew initially followed the lunar orbit mission plan and performed all scheduled tasks. However, because of crew fatigue, the commander made the decision at 084:30 to cancel all activities during the final four hours in lunar orbit to allow the crew to rest. The only activities during this period were a required platform alignment and prepa- ration for transearth injection. A planned 26-minute 43- second television transmission of the Moon and Earth was made at 085:43:03, on Christmas eve. It was during this transmission that the crew read from the Bible the first ten verses of Genesis, and then wished viewers “Good night, goad luck, a Merry Christmas, and God bless all of you, all
of you on the good Earth.” An estimated one billion peo- ple in 64 countries heard or viewed the live reading and greeting; delayed broadcasts reached an additional 30 coun- tries that same day.
The Earth rising over the lunar surface as seen by the crew of Apollo 8 (NASA AS08-14-2383).
Orbit analysis indicated that previously unknown mass concentrations or “mascons” were perturbing the orbit. As a result, the final lunar orbit had an apogee and perigee of 63.6 by 58.6 n mi. The 203.7-second transearth injection maneuver was performed with the service propulsion sys- tem at an altitude of 60.2 n mi at 089:19:16.6 after ten revolutions and 20 hours 10 minutes 13.0 seconds in lunar orbit. The velocity at transearth injection was 8,842 ft/sec. During the mission, the spacecraft reached a maximum distance from Earth of 203,752.37 n mi.
Transearth Phase
After emerging from lunar occlusion following transearth injection, Apollo 8 experienced the only significant com- munications difficulty of the mission. Although two-way phaselock was established at 089:28:47, two-way voice con- tact and telemetry synchronization were not achieved until 089:33:28 and 089:43:00, respectively. Data indicated that high-gain antenna acquisition may have been attempted while line-of-sight was within the service module reflection region and that the reflections may have caused the anten- na to track on a side lobe. In addition, the spacecraft was erroneously configured for high-bit-rate transmission; therefore the command at 089:29:29 that configured the spacecraft for normal voice and subsequent playback of the data storage equipment, selected an S-band signal combi-
nation that was not compatible with the received carrier power.
The transearth coast activities included star/horizon naviga- tion sightings using both Moon and Earth horizons. Passive thermal control, using a roll rate of one revolution per hour, was used during most of the translunar and transearth coast phases to maintain nearly stable onboard temperatures. Only one small transearth midcourse correc- tion, a 15.0-second maneuver using the service module reaction control system, was required at 104:00:00, and changed the velocity by 4.8 ft/sec.
Because of a crew procedural error, the onboard state vec- tor and platform alignment were lost at 106:00:26. Realignment was performed at 106:45.
A special test of the automatic acquisition mode of the high-gain antenna was performed at 110:16:55. Results indicated that the antenna performed as predicted.
View of Earth on the way home (NASA AS08-15-2561).
The final two television transmissions were made during transearth coast. The fifth was a 9-minute 31-second trans- mission of the spacecraft interior at 104:24:04. The sixth transmission was for 19 minutes 54 seconds at 127:45:33 and featured views of Earth, particularly of the western hemisphere.
The service module was jettisoned at 146:28:48, and the CM entry followed an automatically guided entry profile. No radar tracking data for the service module were avail- able during entry, but photographic coverage information correlated well with the predicted trajectory in altitude, lat- itude, longitude, and time.
Apollo 8
Apollo 8 commander Frank Borman (NASA S68-56531).
Recovery
The command module reentered Earth’s atmosphere (400,000 feet altitude) at 146:46:12.8 at a velocity of
36,221.1 ft/sec, following a transearth coast of 57 hours 23 minutes 32.5 seconds. The ionization became so bright during entry that the CM interior was bathed in a cold blue light as bright as daylight. At 180,000 feet, as expect- ed, the lift of the CM bounced it to 210,000 feet, where it
then resumed its downward course.
r i, - i a i i ‘ ' '? me
Apollo 8 crew safely aboard the recovery ship U.S.S Yorktown (NASA S69-15737).
Apollo by the Numbers
The parachute system effected splashdown of the CM in the Pacific Ocean at 10:51:42 GMT (05:51:42 a.m. EST) on 27 December. Mission duration was 147:00:42.0. The impact point was 1.4 n mi from the target point and 2.6 n mi from the recovery ship U.S.S. Yorktown. The splashdown site was estimated to be latitude 8.10° north and longitude 165.00° west. Due to the splashdown impact, the CM assumed an apex-down flotation attitude, but was success- fully returned to the normal flotation position 6 minutes and 3 seconds later by the inflatable bag uprighting system.
As planned, helicopters and aircraft hovered over the spacecraft and pararescue personnel were not deployed until local sunrise, 43 minutes after splashdown. At dawn, the crew was retrieved by helicopter and were aboard the recovery ship 88 minutes after splashdown. The spacecraft was recovered 60 minutes later. Estimated distance traveled for the mission was 504,006 n mi.
* Apollo 8 CM is hoisted aboard the recovery ship (NASA
S68-56304).
At the time the recovery swimmers were deployed, the weather recorded onboard the Yorktown showed scattered clouds at 2,000 feet and overcast at 9,000 feet, visibility ten n mi, wind speed 19 knots from 70° true north, water tem- perature 82° F, and waves to six feet from 110° true north.
The CM was offloaded from the Yorktown on December 29 at Ford Island, Hawaii. The Landing Safing Team began the eval- uation and deactivation procedures at 09:00 GMT, and com- pleted them on 1 January 1969. The CM was then flown to
Long Beach, California, and trucked to the North American Rockwell Space Division facility at Downey, California for postflight analysis. It arrived on 2 January 1969 at 09:00 GMT.
Conclusions
With only minor problems, all Apollo 8 spacecraft systems operated as intended, and all primary mission objectives were successfully accomplished. Crew performance was admirable throughout the mission. Approximately 90 per- cent of the photographic objectives were accomplished and 60 percent of the additional lunar photographs requested as “targets of opportunity” were also taken, despite fogging of three of the spacecraft windows due to exposure of the window sealant to the space environment and early curtail- ment of crew activities due to fatigue. Many smaller lunar features, previously undiscovered, were photographed. These features were located principally on the far side of the Moon in areas which had been photographed only at much greater distances by automated spacecraft. In addi- tion, the heat shield system was not adversely affected by exposure to cislunar space or to the lunar environment and performed as expected. The following conclusions were made from an analysis of post-mission data:
1. The CSM systems were operational for a piloted lunar mission.
2. All system parameters and consumable quantities were main- tained well within their design operating limits during both cis- lunar and lunar orbit flight.
3. Passive thermal control, a slow rolling maneuver perpendicular to the Sun line, was a satisfactory means of maintaining critical spacecraft temperatures near the middle of the acceptable response ranges.
4, The navigation techniques developed for translunar and lunar orbit flight were proved to be more than adequate to maintain required lunar orbit insertion and transearth injection guidance accuracies,
5. Non-simultaneous sleep periods adversely affected the normal circadian cycle of each crew member and provided a poor envi- ronment for undisturbed rest. Mission activity scheduling for the lunar orbit coast phase also did not provide adequate time for required crew rest periods.
6. Communications and tracking at lunar distances were excellent in all modes. The high-gain antenna, flown for the first time, performed exceptionally well and withstood dynamic structural loads and vibrations which exceeded anticipated operating levels.
7. Crew observations of the lunar surface showed the “washout” effect (surface detail being obscured by backscatter) to be much less severe than anticipated. In addition, smaller surface details were Visible in shadow areas at low sun angles, indicating that lighting for lunar landing should be photometrically acceptable.
8. To accommodate the change in Apollo 8 from an Earth orbital to a lunar mission, pre-mission planning, crew training, and ground support reconfigurations were completed in a time peri- od significantly shorter than usual. The required response was particularly demanding on the crew and, although not desirable on a long-term basis, exhibited a capability which had never before been demonstrated.
Apollo 8 Objectives Spacecraft Primary Objectives 1. To demonstrate crew/space vehicle/mission support facilities performance during a piloted Saturn V mission with the com-
mand and service module. Achieved.
2. To demonstrate the performance of nominal and selected back- up lunar orbit rendezvous mission activities, including:
a. Saturn targeting for translunar injection. Achieved.
b. Long-duration service propulsion burns and midcourse cor- rections. Achieved. |
c. Pre-translunar injection procedures. Achieved.
d. Translunar injection. Achieved.
e. Command and service module orbital navigation. Achieved. Primary Detailed Test Objectives
1. PI.3I: To perform a guidance and navigation control system con- trolled entry from a lunar return. Achieved.
2. P1.33: To perform star-lunar horizon sightings during the translu- nar and transearth phases. Achieved, although the field of view in the scanning telescope was obscured by what appeared to be parti- cles whenever the telescope optics were repositioned.
3. P1.34: To perform star-Earth horizon sightings during translunar and transearth phases. Achieved, although the field of view in the scanning telescope was obscured by what appeared to be particies whenever the telescope optics were repositioned.
Apollo 8
10.
ll.
13.
14.
. P6.11: To perform manual and automatic acquisition, tracking,
and communication with the Manned Space Flight Network using the high-gain command and service module S-band antenna dur- ing a lunar mission. Achieved.
. P7.31: To obtain data on the passive thermal control system dur-
ing a lunar orbit mission. Achieved.
. P7.32: To obtain data on the spacecraft dynamic response.
Achieved.
. P7.33: To demonstrate spacecraft lunar module adapter panel jet-
tison in a zero-g environment. Achieved.
. P20.105: To perform lunar orbit insertion service propulsion sys-
tem guidance and navigation control system controlled burns with a fully loaded command and service module. Achieved.
. P20.106: To perform a transearth insertion guidance and naviga-
tion control system controlled service propulsion system burn. Achieved.
P20.107: To obtain data on the command module crew proce- dures and timeline for lunar orbit mission activities. Achieved,
P20.109: To demonstrate command service module passive ther- mal control modes and related communication procedures dur- ing a lunar orbit mission. Achieved.
. P20.110: To demonstrate ground operational support for a com-
mand and service module lunar orbit mission. Achieved.
P20.111: To perform lunar landmark tracking in lunar orbit from the command and service module. (The intent of this objective was to establish that an onboard capability existed to compute relative position data for the lunar landing mission. This mode was to be used in conjunction with the Manned Space Flight Network state-vector update). Partially achieved. All portions of the objective were satisfied except for the functional test, which required the use of onboard data to determine the error uncertainties in the landing site location. A procedural error caused the time intervals between the mark designations to be too short; thus, the data may have been correct but may not have been representative. The accu- racy of the onboard capability was not determined because the data analysis was not complete at the time the mission report was published. Sufficient data were obtained to determine that no con- straint existed for subsequent missions. A demonstration of this technique was planned for the next lunar mission.
P20.112: To prepare for translunar injection and monitor the guidance and navigation control system and launch vehicle tank pressure displays during the translunar injection burn. Achieved.
Apollo by the Numbers
15. P20.114: To perform translunar and transearth midcourse cor-
rections. Achieved, although the service propulsion system engine experienced a momentary drop in chamber pressure from 94 psi to 50 psi during the service propulsion system burn for midcourse correction, and the entry monitoring system velocity counter counted through zero at the termination of the transearth mid- course correction.
Secondary Detailed Test Objectives
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. $1.27: To monitor the guidance and as aaa control system
and displays during launch. Achieved.
. $1.30: To obtain inertial measurement unit performance data in
the flight environment. Achieved.
$1.32: To perform star-Earth landmark sighting navigation dur- ing translunar and transearth phases. Partially achieved. The three sets of sightings required at less than 50,000 n mi altitude were not obtained, The accuracy of other navigation modes was sufficient to preclude the necessity of using star-Earth landmarks for midcourse navigation. No constraint on subsequent missions resulted from this problem.
. $1.35: To perform an inertial measurement unit alignment and
a star pattern visibility check in daylight. Achieved.
. $3.21: To perform service propulsion system lunar orbit injec-
tion and transearth injection burns and monitor the primary and auxiliary gauging systems. Achieved.
S4.5: To obtain data on the block II environmental control sys- tem performance during piloted lunar return entry conditions. Achieved, although the #2 cabin fan was noisy.
. $6.10: To communicate with the Manned Space Flight Network
using the command and service module S-band omni antennas at lunar distance. Achieved.
S7.30: To demonstrate the performance of the block II thermal protection system during a piloted lunar return entry. Achieved.
. §20.104: To perform a command and service module/S-IVB sep-
aration and a command and service module transposition on a lunar mission timeline. Achieved.
10. $20.108: To obtain data on command: and service module con-
sumables for a command and service module lunar orbit mis- sion. Achieved.
11. §20.115: To obtain photographs during the transearth, translu-
nar and lunar orbit phases for operational and scientific pur-
poses. Achieved, although the hatch and side windows were obscured by fog or frost throughout the mission.
12. $20.116: To obtain data to determine the effect of the tower jettison motor, S-II retro and service module reaction control system exhausts, and other sources of contamination on the command module windows. Achieved. The hatch and side win-
dows were obscured by fog or frost throughout the mission.
Functional Tests Added to Primary Detailed Test Objectives During the Mission :
1. P1.34: Star/earth horizon photography through the sextant. Achieved. 2. P1.34: Midcourse navigation with helmets on. Achieved.
3. P1.34: Navigation with long eyepiece. Achieved.
4. P6.11: High-gain antenna, automatic reacquisition. Achieved.
5. P20.109: Passive thermal control, roll rate of 0.3° per second. Achieved.
Launch Vehicle Primary Detailed Test Objectives 1. To verify that modifications incorporated in the S-IC stage since
the Apollo 6 flight suppress low-frequency longitudinal oscilla- tions (POGO). Achieved.
2. To confirm the launch vehicle longitudinal oscillation environ- ment during the S-IC stage burn. Achieved.
3. To verify the modifications made to the J-2 engine since the Apollo 6 flight. Achieved.
4. To confirm the J-2 engine environment in the S-II and S-IVB stages. Achieved.
5. To demonstrate the capability of the S-IVB to restart in Earth orbit. Achieved.
6. To demonstrate the operation of the S-IVB helium heater repres- surization system. Achieved.
7. To demonstrate the capability to safe the S-IVB stage in orbit. Achieved.
8. To verify the capability to inject the S-IVB/instrument unit/lunar module test article “B” into a lunar “slingshot” trajectory. Achieved.
9. To verify the capability of the launch vehicle to perform a free-return translunar injection. Achieved.
Launch Vehicle Secondary Detailed Test Objective To verify the onboard command and communications system and
ground system interface and the operation of the command and communications system in the deep space environment. Achieved.
Apollo 8
Apollo 8 Spacecraft History
EVENT DATE
Saturn S-II stage #3 delivered to KSC. 26 Dec 1967 Saturn S-IC stage #3 delivered to KSC. 27 Dec 1967 Saturn S-IC stage #3 erected on MLP #1. 30 Dec 1967 Saturn S-IVB stage #503 delivered to KSC. 30 Dec 1967 Saturn V instrument unit #503 delivered to KSC. 04 Jan 1968 BP-30 delivered to KSC. 06 Jan 1968 Lunar test article B delivered to KSC. 09 Jan 1968 Lunar test article B mated to spacecraft/LM adapter. 19 Jan 1968 Saturn S-II stage #3 erected. 31 Jan 1968 Saturn S-IVB stage #503 erected. 01 Feb 1968 Saturn V instrument unit #503 erected. 01 Feb 1968 Boilerplate payload (BP-30) and summary launch escape system erected. 05 Feb 1968 Launch vehicle electrically mated. 12 Feb 1968 Space vehicle overall test #1 completed (for unpiloted mission). 11 Mar 1968 Space vehicle pull test completed (for unpiloted mission). 25 Mar 1968 Space vehicle overall test #2 completed (for unpiloted mission). 08 Apr 1968 Decision made to de-erect boilerplate payload (BP-30) for service propulsion system skirt modifications. 10 Apr 1968 C mission changed to C prime mission. 27 Apr 1968 Spacecraft/LM adapter #11, instrument unit #503 and Saturn S-IVB stage #503 de-erected. 28 Apr 1968 Saturn S-II stage #3 de-erected. 29 Apr 1968 Saturn S-II stage #3 departed for Mississippi Test Facility for man-rating tests. 01 May 1968 Individual and combined CM and SM systems test completed at factory. 02 Jun 1968 LM descent stage #3 delivered to KSC. 09 Jun 1968 LM ascent stage #3 delivered to KSC. 14 Jun 1968 Saturn S-II stage #3 delivered to KSC from Mississippi Test Facility. 27 Jun 1968 Integrated CM and SM systems test completed at factory. 21 Jul 1968 Saturn S-II stage #3 re-erected. 06 Aug 1968 CSM #103 quads delivered to KSC. 11 Aug 1968 CM #103 and SM #103 ready to ship from factory to KSC. 11 Aug 1968 Service module #103 delivered to KSC. | 12 Aug 1968 CM #103 delivered to KSC. 14 Aug 1968 Saturn S-IVB stage #503 erected. 14 Aug 1968 Saturn V instrument unit #503 erected. 15 Aug 1968 Facility verification vehicle erected. 16 Aug 1968 AS-503 designated Apollo 8. Decision made to replace LM with spacecraft/LM adapter and lunar test article B. 19 Aug 1968 CM #103 and SM #103 mated. 22 Aug 1968 Launch vehicle electrical systems test completed. 23 Aug 1968 CSM #103 combined systems test completed. 05 Sep 1968 Facility verification vehicle de-erected. 14 Sep 1968 BP-30 erected for service arm checkout. 15 Sep 1968 Spacecraft/LM adapter #11 delivered to KSC. 18 Sep 1968 CSM #103 altitude tests completed. 22 Sep 1968 Lunar test article B mated with spacecraft/LM adapter. 29 Sep 1968 Service arm overall test completed. 02 Oct 1968 BP-30 de-erected. 04 Oct 1968 CSM #103 moved to VAB. 07 Oct 1968 Space vehicle and MLP #1 transferred to launch complex 394A. 09 Oct 1968 Mobile service structure transferred to launch complex 39A. 12 Oct 1968 Space vehicle cutoff and malfunction test completed. 22 Oct 1968 CSM #103/Mission Control Center Houston test completed. 29 Oct 1968 CSM #103 integrated systems test completed. 02 Nov 1968 CSM #103 electrically mated to launch vehicle. 04 Nov 1968
Apollo by the Numbers
Apollo 8 Spacecraft History
EVENT
DATE Space vehicle electrically mated. 05 Nov 1968 Space vehicle overall test completed. 06 Nov 1968 Space vehicle overall test #1 (plugs in) completed. 07 Nov 1968 Launch vehicle/Mission Control Center Houston test completed. 11 Nov 1968 Launch umbilical tower/pad water system test completed. 12 Nov 1968 Space vehicle flight readiness test completed. 19 Nov 1968 Space vehicle hypergolic fuel loading completed. 30 Nov 1968 Saturn S-IC stage #3 RP-1 fuel loading completed. 02 Dec 1968 Space vehicle countdown demonstration test (wet) completed. 10 Dec 1968 Space vehicle countdown demonstration test (dry) completed. 11 Dec 1968 Apollo 8 Ascent Phase Space Fixed Space Earth Space Flight Fixed Fixed Fixed Event Geocentric Path Heading GET Altitude Range Velocity Velocity Duration Latitude Longitude Angle Angle Event (hhh:mm:ss) (n mi} (n mi) (ft/sec) (ft/sec) (deg E) (deg N) (degE) (deg) (E of N) Liftoff 000:00:00.67 0.032 0.000 2.2 1,340.7 28.4470 -80.6041 0.00 90.00 Mach | achieved 000:01:01.45 3.971 1.297 1,076.3 2,078.4 28.4526 = -80.5805 26.79 85.21 Maximum dynamic pressure 000:01:18.9 7.252 3.545 1,735.4 2,/94.7 28.4645 = -80.5398 =. 29.56 = 82.43 S-IC center engine cutoff? 000:02:05.93 22.398 22.704 5,060.1 6,213.78 = 132.52 28.9981 —-80.1934 = 24.527) 76.572 S-IC outboard engine cutoff 000:02:33.82 35.503 48.306 7,698.0 8,899.77 = 160.4] 28.6856 = -79.7302 = 20.699 = 75.387 S-IC/S-II separation? 000:02:34.47 35.838 49.048 = 7,727.36 = 8,930.15 28.6893 -79.7168 20.605 75.384 S-II engine cutoff 000:08:44.04 103.424 812.267 21,055.6 = 22,379.] 367.85 31.5492 = -65.3897. 0.646 —s 81.777 S-II/S-IVB separation? 000:08:44.90 103.460 815.159 21,068.14 22,391.60 31.5565 = -65.3338 ~=— 0.636 ~— 811.807 S-IVB ist burn cutoff 000:11:24.98 103.324 1,391.63] 24,238.3 25,562.43 156.69 32.4541 = -54.0565 = -0.001 88.098 Earth orbit insertion 000:11:34.98 103.326 1,430.363 24,242.9 35,532.4] 32.4741 = -33.2923,-2.072 87.47 Apollo 8 Earth Orbit Phase Space Fixed Event Velocity GET Velocity Duration Change Apogee Perigee Period Inclination Event (hhh:mm:ss) (ft/sec) (sec) (ft/sec) (nmi) (nmi) (mins) (deg) Earth orbit insertion 000:11:34.98 25,567.06 99.99 99.57 88.19 32.509 S-IVB 2nd burn ignition 002:50:37.79 — 25,558.6 S-IVB 2nd burn cutoff 002:55:55.51 35,932.41 = 317.72 9,973.81 30.639
2 Only the commanded time is available for this event.
Apollo 8
Apollo 8 Translunar Phase
Space Fixed Space Space Flight Fixed Fixed Event Velocity Path Heading GET Altitude Velocity Duration Change Angle Angle Event (hhh:mm:ss) (n mi) (ft/sec) (sec) (ft/sec) (deg) (E of N) Translunar injection 002:56:05.51 187.221 35,505.41 7.897 67.494 CSM separated from S-IVB 003:20:59.3 3,797.775 24,974.90 45.110 107.122 Midcourse correction ignition 010:59:59.2 52,768.4 8,187 73.82 120.65 Midcourse correction cutoff 011:00:01.6 52,771.7 8,172 2.4 20.4 73.75 120.54 Midcourse correction ignition 060:59:55.9 21,064.5 4,101 -84.41 -86.90 Midcourse correction cutoff 061:00:07.8 21,099.2 4,103 11.9 1.4 -84.41 -87.01 Apollo 8 Lunar Orbit Phase Space Fixed Event Velocity GET Altitude Velocity Duration Change Apogee Perigee Event (hhh:mm:ss) (n mi) (ft/sec) (sec) (ft/sec) (nmi) (n mi) Lunar orbit insertion ignition 069:08:20.4 75.6 8,391 Lunar orbit insertion cutoff 069:12:27.3 62.0 5,458 246.9 2,997 168.5 60.0 Lunar orbit circularization ignition 073:35:06.6 59.3 5,479 Lunar orbit circularization cutoff 073:35:16.2 60.7 5,345 9.6 134.8 60.7 59.7 Apollo 8 Transearth Phase Space Fixed Space Space Flight Fixed Fixed Event Velocity Path Heading GET Altitude Velocity Duration Change Angle Angle Event (hhh:mm:ss) (n mi) (ft/sec) (sec) (ft/sec) (deg) (E of N) Transearth injection ignition 089:19:16.6 60.2 5,342 -0.16 -110.59 Transearth injection cutoff 089:22:40.3 66.1 8,842 203.7 = 3,519.0 5.10 -115.00 Midcourse correction ignition 104:00:00.00 165,561.5 4,299 -80.59 52.65 Midcourse correction cutoff 104:00:15.00 167,552.0 4,298 15.00 4.8 -80.60 52.65
Apollo by the Numbers
Apollo 8 Timeline
Event
Terminal countdown started.
Scheduled 6-hour hold at T-9 hours.
Countdown resumed at T-9 hours.
Scheduled 1-hour hold at T-3 hours 30 minutes. Countdown resumed at T-3 hours 30 minutes.
Crew ingress.
Guidance reference release.
S-IC engine start command.
S-IC engine ignition (#5).
All S-IC engines thrust OK.
Range zero.
All holddown arms released.
ist motion (1.16 g).
Liftoff (umbilical disconnected).
Tower clearance yaw maneuver started.
Yaw maneuver ended.
Pitch and roll maneuver started.
Roll maneuver ended.
Mach 1 achieved.
Maximum bending moment achieved (60,000,000 Ibf-in). Maximum dynamic pressure (776.938 Ib/ft2).
S-IC center engine cutoff command.
Pitch maneuver ended.
S-IC outboard engine cutoff.
S-IC maximum total inertial acceleration (3.96 g).
S-IC maximum Earth-fixed velocity; S-IC/S-II separation command. S-IT engine start command.
S-II ignition.
S-II aft interstage jettisoned.
Launch escape tower jettisoned.
Iterative guidance mode initiated.
S-IC apex.
S-II engine cutoff.
S-II maximum total inertial acceleration (1.86 g).
S-I] maximum Earth-fixed velocity; S-II/S-IVB separation command. S-IVB 1st burn start command.
S-IVB 1st burn ignition.
S-IVB ullage case jettisoned.
S-IC impact (theoretical).
S-IT apex.
S-IVB 1st burn cutoff.
S-IVB 1st burn maximum total inertial acceleration (0.72 g). S-IVB 1st burn maximum Earth-fixed velocity.
Earth orbit insertion.
Maneuver to local horizontal attitude started.
Orbital navigation started.
S-II impact (theoretical).
Optics cover jettisoned.
All spacecraft systems approved for translunar injection. CAPCOM (Coilins): “All right, Apollo 8. You are go for TLI” S-IVB 2nd burn restart preparation.
GET (hhh:mmss)
-028:00:00 -009:00:00 -009:00:00 -003:30:00 -Q03:30:00 -002:53 -000:00:16.970 -000:00:08.89 -000:00:06.585 -000:00:01.387 000:00:00.00 000:00:00.27 000:00:00.33 000:00:00.67 000:00:01.76 000:00:09.72 000:00:12.11 000:00:31.52 000:01:01.45 000:01:14.7 000:01:18.9 000:02:05.93 000:02:25.50 000:02:33.82 000:02:33,92 000:02:34.47 000:02:35.19 000:02:36.19 000:03:04.47 000:03:08.6 000:03:16.22 000:04:26.54 000:08:44.04 000:08:44.14 000:08:44,90 000:08:45.00 000:08:48.29 000:08:56.8 000:09:00.41 000:09:20.34 000:11:24.98 000:1 1:25.08 000:11:25.50 000:1 1:34.98 000:11:45.19 000:13:05.19 000:19:25.106 000:42:05 001:56:00 002:27:22 002:40:59.54
GMT Time
01:51:00 20:51:00 02:51:00 08:21:00 09:21:00 09:58
12:50:43 12:50:51 12:30:53 12:50:58 12:51:00 12:51:00 12:51:00 12:51:00 1275150) 12:51:09 12:51:12 12:31:31 12:52:01 12:52:14 12527718 12:53:05 12:53:25 12353533) 1253233 12:53:34 12555:55 12:53:36 12:54:04 12:54:08 12:54:16 12:55:26 12:59:44 12:59:44 12:59:44 12:59:45 12:59:48 12:59:56 13:00:00 13:00:20 13:02:25 13:02:25 13:02:25 13:02:35 13:02:45 13:04:05 13:10:25 13:33:05 14:47:00 15:18:22 15:31:59
GMT Date
20 Dec 1968 20 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968
Apollo 8
Apollo 8 Timeline
Event
S-IVB 2nd burn restart command.
S-IVB 2nd burn ignition.
S-IVB 2nd burn cutoff.
S-IVB 2nd burn maximum total inertial acceleration (1.55 g). S-IVB LH, tank latch relief valve open.
S-IVB 2nd burn maximum Earth-fixed velocity.
S-IVB LH, tank CVS valve open.
S-IVB safing procedures started.
S-IVB LOX tank non-propulsive vent valve open.
Translunar injection.
Maneuver to local horizontal attitude and orbital navigation started. S-IVB LOX tank non-propulsive vent valve closed.
S-IVB LH, tank CVS valve and tank relief valve closed. Maneuver to transposition and docking attitude started.
Sequence to separate CSM from S-IVB/LIA started. High-gain antenna deployed.
CSM separated from S-IVB.
lst CSM evasive maneuver from S-IVB (RCS).
§-IVB LH, tank latch relief valve open.
S-IVB LH, tank latch relief valve closed.
Last reported VHF uplink reception.
S-IVB lunar slingshot attitude maneuver initiated. 2nd CSM evasive maneuver from S-IVB (RCS).
Last reported VHF downlink reception.
S-IVB LH, tank CVS valve open.
S-IVB lunar slingshot maneuver—LH, vent valve open command. S-IVB LOX dump start.
S-IVB lunar slingshot maneuver—LOX dump started. S-IVB lunar slingshot maneuver—Apply velocity change. S-IVB start bottle vent dump start.
S-IVB start bottle vent dump end.
S-IVB pneumatic sphere dump start.
S-IVB LOX dump end.
S-IVB lunar slingshot maneuver—LOX dump ended. S-IVB LOX tank non-propulsive vent valve open. S-IVB LH, tank latch relief valve open.
S-IVB cold helium dump start.
S-IVB lunar slingshot maneuver—APS ignition. S-IVB lunar slingshot maneuver—APS cutoff.
S-IVB lunar slingshot maneuver—APS depletion. S-IVB cold helium dump end.
S-IVB pneumatic sphere dump end.
Ist use of high gain antenna.
Midcourse correction ignition.
Midcourse correction cutoff.
Data processing by missions operations computer and backup computer lost for ten minutes
due to undesirable instruction sequence. S-band mode testing started. Ist television transmission started. Ist television transmission ended. 2nd television transmission started. 2nd television transmission ended.
Apollo by the Numbers
GET
(hhh:mm:ss)
002:50:29.51 002:50:37.79 002:55:55.51 002:55:55.61 002:55:55.91 002:55:56.00 002:55:56.19 002:55:56.19 002:55:56.42 002:56:05.51 002:56:15.77 002:58:26.39 003:10:55.71 003:10:58.40 003:20:56.3 003:20:59.3 003:40:01 003:55:56.16 004:10:55.77 004:39:54 004:44:56.63 004:45:01 004:48 004:55:56.02 004:55:56.02 005:07:55.82 005:07:55.82 005:07:56.03 005:08:25.82 005:10:55.83 005:12:25.83 005:12:55.82 005:12:56.03 005:12:59.0 005:13:01.23 005:13:03.6 005:25:55.85 005:38:08.56 005:38:34.00
- 006:03:03.5
006:11:05.88 006:33:04 010:59:59.2 011:00:01.6
011:51:00 012:03:01 031:10:36 031:34:13 055:02:45 055:28:23
GMT Time
15:41:29 15:41:37 15:46:55 15:46:55 15:46:55 15:46:56 15:46:56 15:46:56 15:46:56 15:47:05
(15:47:15
15:49:26 16:01:55 16:01:58 16:11:56 16:11:59 16:31:01 16:46:56 17:01:55 17:30:54 17:35:56 17:36:01 17:39
17:46:56 17:46:56 17:58:55 17:58:55 17:58:56 17:59:25 18:01:55 18:03:25 18:03:55 18:03:56 18:03:59 18:04:01 18:04:03 18:16:55 18:29:08 18:29:34 18:54:03 19:02:05 19:24:04 23:50:59 23:51:01
00:42:00
00:54:01 ~
20:01:36 20:15:13 19:53:45 20:19:23
GMT Date
21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968
21 Dec 1968 |
21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968
‘21 Dec 1968
21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968 21 Dec 1968
22 Dec 1968 22 Dec 1968 22 Dec 1968 22 Dec 1968 23 Dec 1968 23 Dec 1968
Apollo 8 Timeline
Event
Equigravisphere.
Midcourse correction ignition.
Midcourse correction cutoff.
CAPCOM: “Apollo 8, this is Houston. At 68:04, you are go for LOI? Lunar orbit insertion ignition.
CAPCOM: “Apollo 8, Houston. One minute to LOS. All systems go.’ CAPCOM: “Safe journey, guys.”
LMP (Anders): “Thanks a lot, troops.’
CMP (Lovell): “We'll see you on the other side?
CAPCOM: “Apollo 8, 10 seconds to go. Youre go all the way.”
CDR (Borman): “Roger”
CAPCOM: “Apollo 8, Houston. Over.”
CMP: “Go ahead, Houston. This is Apollo 8. Burn complete...”
CAPCOM: “Apollo 8, this is Houston. Roger...good to hear your voice.”
Lunar orbit insertion cutoff.
S-IVB closest approach to lunar surface. Control point sightings.
16 mm camera photography started. 3rd television transmission started. 3rd television transmission ended. Pseudo-landing site sightings.
16 mm photography stopped.
Lunar orbit circularization ignition. Lunar orbit circularization cutoff. Training photography.
CSM landmark tracking and photography. Stereo photography started.
Stereo photography ended. Landmark lighting evaluation. Control point sightings.
Control point sightings. Pseudo-landing site sightings. Pseudo-landing site sightings. Control point sightings. Pseudo-landing site sightings.
4th television transmission started.
LMP: “We are now approaching the lunar sunrise, and for all the people back on Earth, the crew of Apollo 8 has a message that we would like to send to you. In the beginning
(reading from the Bible)...” CMP: “And God called the light “Day’...”
CDR: “And from the crew of Apollo 8, we close with good night, good luck, a Merry Christmas,
and God bless all of you, all of you on the good Earth” 4th television transmission ended. Maneuver to transearth injection attitude. CAPCOM: “Okay, Apollo 8...you have a go for TEI? Transearth injection ignition (SPS). Transearth injection cutoff.
Two-way communication phaselock established, but no voice or telemetry.
Two-way voice synchronization established. CMP: “Houston, Apollo 8, over.” CAPCOM: “Hello, Apollo 8. Loud and clear”
GET (hhh:mm:ss)
055:38 060:59:55.9 061:00:07.8 068:04:07 069:08:20.4 068:57:06 068:57:19 068:57:24 068:57:26 068:57:54 068:58:00 069:33:44 069:33:52 069:34:07 069:12:27.3 069:58:55.2 071:00 071:10 071:40:52 071:52:52 071:55 072:20 073:35:06.6 073:35:16.2 074:00 074:15 075:20 076:00 076:15 079:20 077:20 078:00 080:00 081:20 082:00 085:43:03
086:06:56 086:07:29
086:08:36 086:09:46 087:15 088:03:36 089:19:16.6 089:22:40.3 089:28:47 089:33:28 089:34:16 089:34:19
GMT Time
20:29 01:50:55 OF51:07 08:55:07 09:59:20 09:48:00 09:48:19 09:48:24 09:48:26 09:48:54 09:49:00 10:24:44 10:24:52 10:25:07 10:03:27 10:49:55 11:51 12:01 1223152 12:43:52 12:46 13:11 14:26:06 14:26:16 14:51 15:06 16:11 16:51 17:06 20:11 18:11 18:51 20:51] 22:11 22:51 02:34:03
02:57:56 02:58:29
02:59:36 03:00:46 04:06
04:54:36 06:10:16 06:13:40 06:19:47 06:24:28 06:25:16 06:25:19
GMT Date
23 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 24 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968
25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968
25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968
Apollo 8
Apollo 8 Timeline
Event
CMP: “Roger. Please be informed there IS a Santa Claus.” CAPCOM: “That's affirmative. You are the best ones to know’ Two-way telemetry synchronization established.
Midcourse correction ignition.
Midcourse correction cutoff.
5th television transmission started.
5th television transmission ended.
Onboard state vector and platform alignment data corrupted due to crew error. State vector and platform alignment data corrected.
Test of high-gain antenna automatic acquisition.
6th television transmission started.
6th television transmission ended.
Ist reception of ground VHF during transearth coast. CM/SM separation.
Entry.
Communication blackout started.
Maximum entry g force (6.84 g).
Recovery aircraft received direction-finding signals from CM and established visual contact.
Radar contact with CM established by recovery ship at 270 nautical miles.
Radar contact with CM established by recovery ship at 109 nautical miles.
Communication blackout ended.
Radar contact with CM established by recovery ship at 60 nautical miles.
Drogue parachute deployed.
Main parachute deployed.
Voice contact established with CM by recovery helicopter. Recovery beacon signal contact established with CM by recovery aircraft.
Recovery beacon contact with CM established.
Splashdown (went to apex-down).
CM went to apex down position. Voice contact lost.
CM returned to apex-up position.
Crew aboard recovery ship.
Recovery ship arrived at CM.
Crew in life raft.
Swimmers deployed to CM.
Flotation collar inflated.
CM hatch opened.
Crew aboard recovery helicopter.
CM aboard recovery ship.
Deactivation of CM started at Ford Island, Hawaii.
CM arrived at contractor’s facility in Downey, CA.
| 50 | Apollo by the Numbers
GET
(hhh:mm:ss)
089:34:25 089:34:31 089:43:00 104:00:00.00 104:00:15.00 104:24:04 104:33:35 106:26 106:45 110:16:55 127:45:33 128:05:27 142:16:00 146:28:48.0 146:46:12.8 146:46:37 146:47:38.4 146:49 146:50 146:51 146:51:42.0 146:52 146:54:47.8 146:55:38.9
146:56:01 146:57:05 147:00:42.0 147:00:50 147:07:45 148:29 149:22 148:15 147:44 148:07 148:12 148:23 149:29 200:09 296:09
GMT Time
06:25:25 06:25:31 06:34:00 20:51:00 20:51:15 21:15:04 21:24:35 27 23:36 3:07:55 20:36:33 20:56:27 11:07:00 15:19:48 19337:12 LO 707 15:38:38 15:4 15:41 15:42 15:42:42 15:43 15:45:47 15:46:38
14:52 15:48:05 15:51:42 15:51:50 15:58:45 17:20 Is15 17:06 16:35 16:58 17:03 17:14 18:20 21:00 21:00
GMT Date
25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 25 Dec 1968 26 Dec 1968 26 Dec 1968 26 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968
27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 27 Dec 1968 29 Dec 1968
- Q2 Jan 1969
APOLLO 9
iP \*
> Och aes late
>= ss
Vv -a
govantt
mic = 7
~, A a
P
0 r i 3 2)
The Third Mission: Testing the LM in Earth Orbit
Apollo 9 Summary
(3 March-13 March 1969)
Apollo 9 crew (L to r.): Jim McDivitt, Dave Scott, Rusty Schweickart (NASA S69-17590).
Background
Apollo 9 was a Type D mission, a lunar module piloted flight demonstration in Earth orbit. It was the first piloted test of the “lunar ferry” that would put astronauts on the Moon. A lunar module first had been flown without a crew aboard Apollo 5 on 22 January 1968.
Many of the LM tests on Apollo 9 exceeded conditions expected in a lunar landing. To ensure that major objec- tives would be accomplished if Apollo 9 ended early, the schedule for the first half of the mission also included more work for the crew than the schedule of either Apollo 7 or Apollo 8.
Apollo 9 lunar module being prepared for altitude chamber testing (NASA S68-44471).
Apollo by the Numbers
The primary objectives were as follows:
* to demonstrate crew, space vehicle, and mission support facilities performance during a piloted Saturn V mission with command and service modules and lunar module;
* to demonstrate lunar module crew performance;
* to demonstrate performance of nominal and selected backup lunar orbit rendezvous mission activities; and
¢ to assess command and service module and lunar module con- sumables.
To meet these objectives, the lunar module was evaluated during three separate piloting periods that required multi- ple activation and deactivation of systems, a situation unique to this mission.
The crew members were Colonel James Alton McDivitt (USAF), commander; Colonel David Randolph Scott (USAF), command module pilot; and Russell Louis “Rusty” Schweickart, lunar module pilot.
Selected in the astronaut group of 1962, McDivitt had been command pilot of Gemini 4. Born 10 June 1929 in Chicago, Illinois, he was 39 years old at the time of the Apollo 9 mission. McDivitt received a B.S. in aeronautical engineering from the University of Michigan in 1959. His backup for the mission was Commander Charles “Pete” Conrad, Jr. (USN).
Scott had been pilot of Gemini 8. Born 6 June 1932 in San Antonio, Texas, he was 36 years old at the time of the Apollo 9 mission. Scott received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy in 1954 and an M.S. in aeronautics and astronautics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1962. He was selected as an astronaut in 1963. His backup was Commander Richard Francis “Dick” Gordon, Jr. (USN).
Schweickart, a civilian, was making his first spaceflight. Born 25 October 1935 in Neptune, New Jersey, he was 33 years old at the time of the Apollo 9 mission. Schweickart received a B.S. in aeronautical engineering in 1956 and an M.S. in aeronautics and astronautics in 1963 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His backup was Commander Alan LaVern Bean (USN).
The capsule communicators (CAPCOMs) for the mission were Major Stuart Allen Roosa (USAF), Lt. Commander Ronald Ellwin Evans (USN), Major Alfred Merrill Worden
(USAF), Conrad, Gordon, and Bean. The support crew were Major Jack Robert Lousma (USMC), Lt. Commander Edgar Dean Mitchell (USN/Sc.D.), and Worden. The flight directors were Eugene F. Kranz (first shift), Gerald D. Griffin (second shift), and M.P. “Pete” Frank (third shift).
The Apollo 9 launch vehicle was a Saturn V, designated SA-504. The mission also carried the designation Eastern Test Range #9025. The CSM was designated CSM-104 and had the call-sign “Gumdrop,” derived from the appearance of the command module when it was transported on Earth. During shipment, it was covered in blue wrappings that gave it the appearance of a wrapped gumdrop. The lunar module was designated LM-3 and had the call-sign “Spider,” derived from its arachnid-like configuration.
Launch Preparations
The launch was originally scheduled for 28 February 1969, and the terminal countdown had actually begun for that launch at 03:00:00 GMT on 27 February at T-28 hours. However, one-half hour into the scheduled 3-hour hold at T-16 hours, the countdown was recycled to T-42 hours to allow the crew to recover from a mild viral respiratory ill- ness. The count was picked up at 19:30:00 GMT on
1 March.
A low-pressure disturbance southwest of Cape Kennedy in the Gulf of Mexico was the principal cause of overcast conditions. At launch time, stratocumulus clouds covered 70 percent of the sky (base 3,500 feet) and altostratus clouds covered 100 percent (base 9,000 feet); the tempera- ture was 67.3° F; the relative humidity was 61 percent; and the barometric pressure was 14.642 lb/in?. The winds, as measured by the anemometer on the light pole 60.0 feet above ground at the launch site, measured 13.4 knots at 160° from true north.
Ascent Phase
Apollo 9 was launched from Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39, Pad A, at a Range Zero time of 16:00:00 GMT (11:00:00 a.m. EST) on 3 March 1969. The planned launch window for Apollo 9 extended to 19:15:00 GMT.
Between 000:00:13.3 and 000:00:33.0, the vehicle rolled from a launch pad azimuth of 90° to a flight azimuth of 72°. The S-IC engine shut down at 000:02:42.76, followed by S-IC/S-II separation and S-II engine ignition. The S-II engine shut down at 000:08:56.22, followed by separation from the S-IVB, which ignited at 000:09:00.82. The first S-IVB engine cutoff occurred at 000:11:04.66, with devia-
tions from the planned trajectory of +2.86 ft/sec in velocity and -0.17 n mi in altitude.
Apollo 9, the first piloted flight with a lunar module, lifts off from Kenney Space Center Pad 39A to test the LM in Earth urbit (NASA $1969-25863).
The S-IC stage impacted at 000:08:56.44 in the Atlantic Ocean at latitude 3,143" north and longitude 74.238° west, 346.64 n mi from the launch site. The S-II stage impacted at N0:20:25.35 in the Atlantic Ocean at latitude 31.462° north and longitude 34.041° west, 2,413.2 n mi from the launch site.
The maximum wind conditions encountered during ascent were 148.1 knots at 264° from true north at 38,480 feet, and a maximum ‘wird shear of 0.0254 sec-! at 48,160 feet.
Parking orbit conditions at insertion, 000:11:14.65 (S-IVB cutoff plus 10 secands to account for engine tailoff and other transient effects}, showed an apogee and perigee of 100.74 by 99.68 n mi, an inclination of 32.552°, a period of 88.20 minutes, and a velocity of 25,569.78 ft/sec. The apogee and perigee were based upon a spherical Earth with a radius of 3,443,934 n mi.
The international designation for the CSM upon achieving orbit was 1969-01744; the S-IVB was designated 1969-018B. After undocking, thu LM ascent stage would be designated 1969-018C and tlie descent stage 1969-018D.
Apollo 9 | 53 |
Earth Orbit Phase
After post-insertion checkout, the CSM was separated from the S-IVB stage at 002:41:16.0. The adapter that housed the LM and shielded it from the rigors of launch was then jetti- soned. The CM was turned so its apex, holding the docking probe, faced the LM. Docking with the LM was completed at 003:01:59.3. |
Lunar module inside S-IVB stage following separation (NASA AS09-19-2919).
Once docking was complete, the commander and lunar module pilot started preparations for their eventual entry into the LM. They pressurized the tunnel between the two spacecraft, and with the aid of the CMP, removed the CM hatch and checked the latches on the docking ring to verify the seal. Then they connected the electrical umbilical lines that would provide power to the LM while docked to the CM. The hatch was then replaced.
At 004:08:06, an ejection mechanism, used for the first time, ejected the docked spacecraft from the S-IVB.
Following a separation maneuver, the S-IVB was restarted at 004:45:55.54 and burned for 62.06 seconds. Ten seconds later, the S-IVB entered a 1,671.58 by 105.75 n mi intermediate coasting orbit that would allow the engine to cool down sufficiently prior to a restart within one revolution. The peri- od of the orbit was 119.22 seconds, the inclination was 32,302°, and the velocity at insertion was 27,753.61 ft/sec.
Apoilo by the Numbers
At 005:59:01.07, the crew performed the first of eight serv- ice propulsion firings, a 5.23-second maneuver that raised the CSM/LM orbit to 127.6 by 113.4 n mi.
The third and final S-IVB ignition at 006:07:19.26 was a 242.06-second maneuver to demonstrate restart capability after the 80-minute coast and to test the engine perform- ance under “out-of-specification” conditions. It also provid- ed better ground tracking lighting conditions for the upcoming rendezvous. The escape orbit was achieved 10 seconds after S-IVB engine cutoff, and the velocity was 31,619.85 ft/sec. S-IVB performance was not as predicted due to various anomalies, including the failure of an LH, and LOX dump. The LH, dump through the engine could not be accomplished due to loss of pneumatic control of the engine valves. The LOX dump was not performed due loss of engine pneumatic control during the third burn. The LOX tank was satisfactorily safed by utilizing the LOX non-propulsive venting system.
The third ignition also served to place the S-IVB into a solar orbit with an aphelion and perihelion of 80,280,052 by 69,417,732 n mi, an inclination of 24.390°, an eccentric- ity of 0.07256, and a period of 325.8 days.
Crew activity on the second day was devoted to systems checks, pitch and roll yaw maneuvers, and the second, third, and fourth service propulsion system burns while docked to the LM. The second burn, a 110.29-second maneuver at 022:12:04.07, raised the orbit to 192.5 by 110.76 n mi. The third burn, at 025:17:39.27, lasted 279.88 seconds. It raised the orbit to 274.9 by 112.4 n mi and lightened the spacecraft so that it could be controlled by the reaction control system engines later in the mission and be in a better rescue position for rendezvous activities. During these two burns, tests were made to measure the oscillatory response of a docked spacecraft to provide data to improve the autopilot response for this configuration. The fourth burn, at 028:24:41.37, was a 27.87-second phas- ing maneuver to shift the node east and put the spacecraft in a better position later for lighting, braking, and docking.
On the third day, at 043:15, the lunar module pilot trans- ferred to the LM to activate and check out the systems. The commander followed at 044:05. The LM landing gear was deployed at 045:00.
At 045:40, the commander reported that the lunar module pilot had been sick on two occasions and that the crew was behind in the timeline. For these reasons, the extrave- hicular activity was restricted to one daylight pass and would include only the opening of the hatches of the CM
and LM. It was also decided to keep the lunar module pilot connected to the environmental control system hoses.
After communication checks for both vehicles, a five-minute television transmission was broadcast at 046:25 from inside the LM. The camera was trained on the instrument displays, other features of the LM interior, and the crew. The picture was good, but the sound was unsatisfactory.
The descent engine was fired for 371.51 seconds at 49:41:34.46 with the vehicles still docked. Attitude control with the digital autopilot and manual throttling of the descent engine to full thrust were also demonstrated. Transfer back to the CM began at 050:15, and the LM was deactivated at 051:00. The fifth service propulsion system firing, 43.26 seconds in duration, occurred at 054:26:12.27 to circularize the orbit for the LM active rendezvous. The resulting orbit was 131.0 by 125.9 n mi, compared to a desired circular orbit of 130.0 n mi, but it was considered acceptable for the rendezvous sequence.
Extravehicular operations were demonstrated on the fourth day of the mission. The plan was for the lunar module pilot to exit the LM, transfer to the open hatch in the CM, and then return. This plan was abbreviated from 2 hours 15 minutes to 39 minutes because of several bouts of nau- sea experienced by the lunar module pilot on the preced- ing day and because of the many activities required for rendezvous preparation.
The LM was depressurized at 072:45 and the forward hatch opened at 072:53. The lunar module pilot began his egress to the forward platform at 72:59:02, feet first and face up, and completed egress at 073:07. He was wearing the extravehicular mobility unit backpack, which provided communications and oxygen; it also circulated water through the suit to keep him cool. His only connection to the LM was a 25-foot nylon rope to keep him from drift- ing into space. He secured his feet in the “golden slippers,” the gold-painted restraints affixed to the surface outside the hatch, called the “front porch” by the astronauts, where he remained while outside the LM.
During this same period, the command module pilot, dependent on CSM systems for life support, depressurized the CM and opened the side hatch at 073:02:00. He par- tially exited the hatch for observation, photography, and retrieval of thermal samples from the side of the CM. The samples were missing, so he retrieved the service module thermal samples at 073:26. The lunar module pilot retrieved the LM thermal samples at 073:39. Three minutes later, he began an abbreviated evaluation of translation and
body-attitude-control capability using the extravehicular transfer handrails. The initially planned hand-over-hand trip from the LM to the CM was not made. During this period, the lunar module pilot also completed 16 mm and 70 mm photography of the command module pilot’s activ- ities and the exterior of both spacecraft.
Schweickart on “porch” of LM during EVA activities (NASA AS09-19-2994).
The lunar module pilot began his ingress at 073:45 and completed it at 073:46:03. By 073:53, the forward hatch was closed and locked and the LM was repressurized. The CM hatch was then closed and locked at 073:49, and the CM was repressurized by 074:02. The second television transmission was made at 074:55. The commander returned to the CM at 075:15, followed by the lunar mod- ule pilot at 076:55.
After the lunar module pilot came back inside, both space- craft were repressurized, and a second and final 10-minute television broadcast was telecast from inside the LM. Voice and pictures were both good, an improvement over the previous day’s transmission.
On the fifth day, the lunar module pilot transferred to the
LM at 088:05, followed by the commander at 088:55, to prepare for the first LM free flight and active rendezvous.
Apollo 9
The CSM was maneuvered to the inertial undocking atti- tude at 092:22. Undocking was attempted at 092:38:00, but the capture latches did not release immediately. Undocking occurred at 092:39:36, and the LM was rolled on its axis so that the CMP could make a visual inspection. A small sep- aration maneuver at 093:02:54, using the service module reaction control system, placed the LM 2.0 n mi behind the CSM 45 minutes later. The maximum range between the LM and CSM was 98 n mi, achieved about halfway between the coelliptical sequence initiation and constant differential height maneuver.
Scott opens the CM hatch during EVA activities (NASA AS09-20-3064).
Schweickart during EVA (NASA AS09-19-2983).
Apollo by the Numbers
During this maneuver, the LM engine ran smoothly until throttled to 20 percent, at which time it chugged noisily. The commander stopped throttling and waited. Within sec- onds, the chugging stopped. He accelerated to 40 percent before shutting down and had no more problems. The LM crew then checked their systems and fired the descent engine again to 10 percent. It ran evenly.
LM in first free flight following separation from CSM (NASA AS09-21-3199).
The first LM rendezvous phasing maneuver was executed at 093:47:35.4 with the descent propulsion system under abort guidance control. This maneuver placed the LM in a near equiperiod orbit with apogee and perigee altitudes 12.2 n mi above and below the CSM. The second maneu- ver was not applied; it was a computation to be used only in case of a contingency requiring an LM abort. The solu- tion time was 094:57:53. The third rendezvous maneuver was executed at 095:39:08.06 and resulted in an LM orbit of 138.9 by 133.9 n mi.
Coelliptic sequence initiation was performed at 096:16:06.54, and the descent stage was jettisoned immedi- ately after the start of reaction control system thrusting. The maneuver left the LM 10 n mi below and 82 n mi behind the CSM. The descent stage remained in Earth orbit until 03:45 GMT on 23 March, when it impacted the Indian Ocean off the coast of eastern Africa.
The resulting ascent stage orbit was 116 by 111 n mi. After coelliptic sequence initiation using the CSM reaction con- trol system, rendezvous radar tracking was reestablished,
but the CM was unable to acquire the ascent stage tracking light, which had failed. The constant differential height maneuver was performed at 096:58:15.0, using the ascent stage engine for the first time. The onboard solution for terminal phase initiation was executed at 097:57:59, creat- ing an ascent stage orbit of about 126 by 113 n mi. Two small midcourse corrections were performed at 10 and 22 minutes after terminal phase initiation. Terminal phase braking began at 098:30:03, followed by stationkeeping, formation flying, photography, and docking at 099:02:26. The ascent stage had been separated from the CSM for 6 hours 22 minutes 50 seconds.
SE = Boar:
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Jf
LM ascent stage following separation from descent stage, preparing to redock with CM (NASA AS09-21-3236).
After docking, the crew transferred back to the CSM by 101:00. The ascent stage was jettisoned at 101:22:45.0, and the ascent engine fired for 362.4 seconds at 101:53:15.4 until oxidizer depletion. The final orbit for the ascent stage was 3,760.9 by 126.6 n mi, with an expected orbital lifetime of five years; however, entry occurred on 23 October 1981.
The sixth service propulsion burn, a 1.43-second maneuver at 123:25:06.97, had been postponed for one revolution because the reaction control translation required prior to ignition for propellant settling was improperly programmed. The maneuver, originally scheduled for 121:48:00, was an orbit-shaping retrograde maneuver to lower the perigee so that the reaction control system deorbit capability would be enhanced in the event of a contingency.
During the final four days in orbit, the crew conducted Earth resources and multispectral terrain photography
experiments over the southern United States, Mexico, Brazil, and Africa. One objective, designated experiment S065, was to determine the extent to which multiband photography in the visible and near-initared regions from orbit may be effectively applied tu the Earth resources disciplines.
Thunderhead over South America as seen in nearly ver- tical view from Apolla 9 (NASA AS09-22-3374).
The other abjective was to obtain simultaneous photo- graphs with four ditierent film/filter combinations from orbit to assist in defining future multispectral photographic systems. The results were excellent. The quality and subject material exceeded that of any previous orbital mission and would aid in future program planning. The reasons for the excellent results were the amount of time available (four days so the crew could wait for cloud cover to pass); the orbital inclination ef 33.6°, which permitted vertical and near-vertical average of areas never photographed before; sufficient reaction cntrol propellants which allowed the crew to orient the spacecraft whenever necessary; the lack of contamination on the spacecraft windows; and the con- tinuous assistance and evaluation of the science support room at the Manned Spacecraft Center.
The crew also made an inertial measurement unit align- ment with a sighting of the planet Jupiter (the first time a planet had been used) and performed a number of day- light star sightings, landmark sightings, and star sextant sightings. During hws successive revolutions, at 192:43 and 194:13, the crew stxcccssiuily tracked the Pegasus III satel- lite at a range of 1,{H)t} n mi. Pegasus III had been launched on 30 fiily 1965.
Apollo 9 | 57 |
While over Hawaii, the crew made a sighting of the ascent stage from 222:38:40 to 222:45:40.
The service propulsion system was fired for the seventh time at 169:30:00.36, a 24.90-second maneuver that raised the apogee to 253.2 by 100.7 n mi and established the desired conditions for the nominal deorbit point. If the service propulsion system had failed at deorbit, the reac- tion control system could have conducted a deorbit maneuver from this apogee condition and still landed near the primary recovery area. The deorbit maneuver was accomplished after 151 orbits with the eighth service propulsion firing, an 11.74-second maneuver at 240:31:14.84. It was performed one revolution later than planned because of unfavorable weather in the planned recovery area.
Recovery
The service module was jettisoned at 240:36:03.8, and the CM entry followed a primary guidance system profile. The command module reentered Earth’s atmosphere (400,000 feet altitude) at 240:44:10.2 at a velocity of 25,894 ft/sec. Although the service module could not survive entry intact, radar tracking data predicted impact in the Atlantic Ocean at a point estimated to be latitude 22.0° north and longitude 65.3° west, 175 n mi downrange from the CM.
The parachute system effected splashdown of the CM in the Atlantic Ocean at 17:00:54 GMT (12:00:54 p.m. EST) on 13 March. Mission duration was 241:00:54. The impact point was about 2.7 n mi from the target point and 3 n mi from the recovery ship U.S.S. Guadalcanal. The splash- down site was estimated to be latitude 23.22° north and longitude 67.98° west. After splashdown, the CM assumed an apex-up flotation attitude. The crew was retrieved by helicopter and was aboard the recovery ship 49 minutes after splashdown. The CM was recovered 83 minutes later. The estimated CM weight at splashdown was 11,094
pounds, and the estimated distance traveled for the mission
was 3,664,820 n mi.
At CM retrieval, the weather recorded onboard the
Guadalcanal showed scattered clouds at 2,000 feet and bro-
ken clouds at 9,000, visibility 10 n mi, wind speed 9 kn from 200° true north, air temperature 79° F, and water temperature 76° F, with waves to seven feet.
The crew left the Guadalcanal by helicopter at 15:00 GMT
on 14 March and arrived at Eleuthera, Bahamas, at 16:30 GMT. From there, they were flown to Houston.
| 58 | Apollo by the Numbers
The CM was offloaded from the Guadalcanal on 16 March at the Norfolk Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, and the Landing Safing Team began the evaluation and deactiva- tion procedures at 16:00 GMT. Deactivation was completed on 19 March. The CM was then flown to Long Beach, California, and trucked to the North American Rockwell Space Division facility at Downey, California, for postflight analysis, where it arrived on 21 March.
.
Apollo 9 CM on parachute system just before splash- down (NASA S69-20364).
Apollo 9 crew aboard recovery ship U.S.S. Guadalcanal (L to r.: Schweickart, Scott, McDivitt) (NASA S69-27921).
5. Performance of the lunar module systems demonstrated the operational capability to conduct a lunar mission, except for the steerable antenna’ which was not operated, and the landing radar, which could not be fully evaluated in Earth orbit. None of the anomalies adversely affected the mission. The concepts and operational functioning of the crew/spacecraft interfaces, includ- ing procedures, provisioning, restraints, displays, and controls, were satisfactory for piloted lunar module functions. The inter- faces between the two spacecraft, while both docked and undocked, were also verified.
6. The lunar module consumable expenditures were well within predicted values, thus demonstrating adequate margins to per- form the lunar mission.
7. Gas in the CM potable water supply interfered with proper food rehydration and therefore had some effect on food taste and palatability. Lunar module water was acceptable.
8. Orbital navigation of the CSM, using the yaw-control technique for landmark tracking, was demonstrated and reported to be adequate. The stir visibility threshold of the CM scanning tele-
Apollo 9 CM onboard recovery ship (NASA S69-20239). scope was not definitely established for the docked configura- tion; therefore, platform orientation using the sun, the Moon, Conclusions and planets may be required if inertial reference is inadvertently
lost during translunar flight. The following conclusions were made from an analysis of
post-mission data: 9. Mission support, including the Manned Space Flight Network, adequately provided simultaneous ground control of two piloted 1. The onboard rendezvous equipment and procedures in both spacecraft. spacecraft provided the required precision for rendezvous opera- tions to be conducted during a lunar landing mission. The CSM Apollo 9 Objectives computations and preparations for mirror-image maneuvers | were completed on time by the command module pilot. Spacecraft Primary Objectives 2. The functional operation of the docking process of the two space- 1. To demonstrate |crew/space vehicle/mission support facilities craft was demonstrated. However, the necessity for proper lighting performance during a piloted Saturn V mission with command, conditions for the docking alignment aids was illustrated. service, and lunar modules. Achieved. 3. The performance of all systems in the extravehicular mobility 2. To demonstrate/ lunar module/crew performance. Achieved. unit was excellent throughout the entire extravehicular opera- | tion. The results of this mission, plus satisfactory results from 3. To demonstrate| performance of nominal and selected backup additional qualification tests of minor design changes, provided lunar orbit rendezvous mission activities, including the following: verification of the operation of the extravehicular mobility unit on the lunar surface. a. Transposition, docking, and lunar module withdrawal. Achieved. 4. The extent of the extravehicular activity indicated the practicali- | ty of extravehicular crew transfer in the event of a contingency. b. Intravehicular and extravehicular crew transfer. Achieved. Cabin depressurization and normal repressurization were demonstrated in both spacecraft. c. Extravehicular capability. Achieved.
d. Service propulsion system and descent propulsion system burns. Achieved.
e. Lunar module active rendezvous and docking. Achieved.
4. To assess command, lunar, and service module consumables.
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Achieved.
Mandatory Detailed Test Objectives
. M11.6: To perform a medium-duration descent propulsion sys-
tem firing to include manual throttling with command and service module and lunar module docked, and a short-duration descent propulsion system firing with an undocked lunar mod- ule and approximately half-full descent propulsion system pro- pellant tanks. Achieved; the primary guidance and navigation control system/digital auto-pitch performance was monitored and found acceptable during the first and second descent propulsion system burns.
. M13.11: To perform a long-duration ascent propulsion system
burn. Achieved; a burn to depletion was performed by the ascent propulsion system for an extended period.
. M13.12: To perform a long-duration descent propulsion system
burn and obtain data to determine that no adverse interactions exist between propellant slosh, vehicle engine vibration, and ° descent propulsion system performance during a burn. Achieved; data were collected during the docked descent propulsion system burn and the rendezvous.
M14: To demonstrate the performance of the environmental control system during lunar module activity periods. Achieved, although minor problems occurred in the system.
. M15.3: To determine the performance of the lunar module elec-
trical power subsystem in the primary and backup modés. - Achieved, despite some problems in the fuel cells.
M16.7: To operate the landing radar during the descent op sion system burns. Achieved.
. M17.9: To deploy the lunar module landing gear and obtain i
on landing gear temperatures resulting from descent poopulsion system operation. Achieved.
. M17.17: To verify the peiformance of the passive thernial sub-
systems (thermal blanket, plume protection, ascent and descent stage base heat shields, and thermal control coatings) to’ provide adequate thermal control when the spacecraft is exposed to the
Apoilo by the Numbers
natural and propulsion-induced thermal environments. Achieved; lunar module environmental and thermal effect data were collect- ed during the docked descent propulsion system burn, extravehicu- lar activity, and post-rendezvous inspection.
9. M17.18: To demonstrate the structural integrity of the lunar
module during Saturn V launch and during descent propulsion system and ascent propulsion system burn in an orbital environ- ment. Achieved.
Primary Detailed Test Objectives
. P1.23: To demonstrate block II command and service module
attitude control during service propulsion system thrusting with the command and service module and lunar module docked. ‘Achieved during the first, second, and third service propulsion burns,
. P1.24: To perform inertial measurement unit alignments using
the sextant while docked. Achieved.
. P1.25: To perform an inertial measurement unit and a star pat-
tern visibility check in daylight while docked. Achieved; many daytime sightings were made with visible star patterns, although reflective light hindered some tests.
. P2.9: To perform manual thrust vector control takeover of a
guidance navigation control system initiated service propulsion docked burn. Achieved during the third service propulsion system burn.
. P7.29: To obtain data on the effects of the tower jettison motor,
S-II retrorockets, and service module reaction control system _ exhaust on the command and service module. Achieved. Spacecraft exhaust effects data were collected following Earth orbital insertion, and lunar module/command and service module ejection during the revised extravehicular period and during the post-rendezvous inspection; however, the revised extravehicular activity permitted recovery of only part of the thermal samples.
. P11.5: To perform lunar module inertial measurement unit |
alignments using the alignment optical telescope and calibrate the coarse optical alignment sight. Achieved; lunar module inflight inertial measurement unit alignment data were collected at various times during lunar module activity periods.
. P11.7: To demonstrate reaction control system translation and
attitude control of the staged lunar module using automatic and manual primary guidance and navigation control system con- trols. Achieved.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14,
15.
we
18.
19,
. P11.10: To obtain data to verify inertial measurement unit per- formance in the flight environment. Achieved; lunar module pri-
mary guidance and navigation control system and command and
service module guidance navigation control system inertial measure-
ment unit performance data were collected throughout the mission.
. P11.14: To perform a primary guidance and navigation control
system/digital autopilot controlled long-duration ascent propul- sion burn. Achieved.
P12.2: To demonstrate an abort guidance system calibration and obtain abort guidance system performance data in the flight environment. Achieved during docked descent propulsion system burn and the rendezvous phasing burn.
P12.3: To demonstrate reaction control system translation and attitude control of unstaged lunar module using automatic and manual abort guidance system/control electric section control modes. Achieved.
P12.4 To perform an abort guidance system/control electric section controlled descent propulsion system burn with a heavy descent stage. Achieved.
P16.4: To demonstrate tracking of command and service mod- ule rendezvous radar transponder at various ranges between the command and service module and the lunar module. Achieved.
P16.6: To perform a landing radar self-test. Achieved.
P16.19: To obtain data on rendezvous radar corona susceptibili- ty during lunar module -X translation reaction control system engine firings while undocked and during -X reaction control system engine firings while docked. Partially Achieved. Data were obtained, but the rendezvous radar failed to lock.
. P20.21: To demonstrate the lunar module/Manned Space Flight
Network operational S-band communication subsystem capa- bility. Achieved, despite intermittent discrepancies.
P20.22: To demonstrate lunar module/command and service module/ Manned Space Flight Network/extravehicular activity operational S-band and VHF communication compatibility. Achieved, despite sporadic failures.
P20.24: To demonstrate command and service module docking with the S-IVB/spacecraft/lunar module adapter/lunar module. Achieved.
P20.25: To demonstrate lunar module separation and ejection of the command and service module/lunar module from the spacecraft/lunar module adapter. Achieved.
20.
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23
24.
25,
26.
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P20.26: To demonstrate the technique to be employed for the undocking of the lunar module from the command and service module prior to lunar descent. Achieved.
P20.27: To perform a lunar module active rendezvous with a passive command and service module. Achieved.
P20.28: To demonstrate lunar module active docking capability with the passive command and service module. Achieved.
P20.29: To perform a pyrotechnic separation of the lunar mod- ule and command and service module in flight. Achieved.
P20.31: To demonstrate mission support facilities performance during an Earth orbital mission. Achieved.
P20.33: To perform procedures required to prepare for a com- mand and service module active rendezvous with the lunar mod- ule. Achieved; the command and service modules were maintained in a recovery mode during the lunar module simulated descent.
P20.34: To demonstrate crew capability to transfer themselves and equipment from the command and service module to the lunar module and return. Achieved; the crew was successful in
making the transfer in the time allotted.
P20.35: To demonstrate extravehicular transfer and obtain extravehicular activity data. Achieved, although the program was modified during the mission.
Secondary Detailed Test Objectives
. $1.26: To perform onboard navigation using the technique of
scanning telescope landmark tracking. Achieved.
. $13.10: To perform an unpiloted ascent propulsion burn to
depletion. Achieved.
. §20.32: To evaluate one-person lunar module operation capabili-
ty and obtain data on crew maneuverability, crew compartmen- tation, and propulsive venting. Achieved.
. $20.37: To obtain data on descent propulsion plume effects on
astronauts’ visibility. Achieved; the descent propulsion system did not affect the crews visibility during the two burns.
. §20.120: To obtain data on the electromagnetic compatibility of
the command and service module, lunar module, and portable
life support system. Achieved; the command and service module,
lunar module, and portable life support system were electromag- netically compatible with respect to any conducted or radiated electromagnetic interference.
Functional Tests Added During The Mission
1. Command and service module intravehicular transfer, unsuited. Achieved.
2. Tunnel clearing, unsuited. Achieved. 3. Command module platform alignment in daylight. Achieved.
4, Command module platform alignment, using a planet (Jupiter). Achieved.
5. Digital autopilot orbital rate, pitch and roll. Achieved.
6. Backup gyro display coupler alignment of stabilization and con- trol system. Achieved.
7. Window degradation photography. Achieved. 8. Satellite tracking, ground inputs. Achieved.
9. Command and service module high-gain S-band antenna reac- quisition test. Achieved. ;
10. Passive thermal control cycling at 0.1°/second at three dead- bands: +/-10°, +/-20°, and +/-25°. Achieved.
Experiment S-065: To obtain selective, simultaneous multispectral photographs, with four different film/filter combinations, of selected land and ocean areas. Achieved.
Launch Vehicle Primary Objective To demonstrate S-IVB/instrument unit control capability during
transposition, docking, and lunar module ejection maneuver. Achieved.
Apollo by the Numbers
2.
Launch Vehicle Secondary Objectives
. To demonstrate S-IVB restart capability. Achieved. . To verify J-2 engine modifications. Achieved. . To confirm J-2 environment in S-II stage. Achieved.
. To confirm launch vehicle longitudinal oscillation environment