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of life, can be represented by art; and the other accidental relation, that esthetic facts also may sometimes enter into the processes described, as in the impression of the sublime that the work of a Titanic artist such as Dante or Shakespeare may produce. . . ."

What is ordinarily called beautiful or physically beautiful is simply the stimulant of esthetic reproduction. This statement applies to what we usually call works of art as well as to natural objects.

These in brief are the main elements in Croce's own doctrine. His work is valuable, however, not simply for the theory which it presents, but for the many suggestive views which the author puts forward on most of the subjects related to esthetics. His criticisms of other esthetic doctrines are very outspoken and usually adverse, nevertheless they are stimulating and valuable. In the historical part of his treatise, Croce presents in brief a review of all the historical contributions to esthetics. According to his own statement a historian always adds something to the facts; he is never absolutely impartial. What Croce himself adds (or omits) is determined partly by his own doctrine and partly by his admiration for Vico and a few other Italian contributors.

The main question with regard to Croce's esthetic doctrine seems to the reviewer to be this: Is the identification of art with a purely subjective state the most effective means for organizing the facts which fall within the field which is generally recognized as belonging to esthetics? Can the question of the meaning and significance of what Croce calls the "externalizations" of art, can the problems connected with the production of art and the nature of the artistic genius, can the questions occasioned by every consideration of the esthetic experience, be handled any more successfully on this theory than on any other that has been presented? To the present writer the great value of Croce's work seems to lie in its freshness and in its many stimulating suggestions, not in the novelty which it has nor in the conclusiveness which it has not.

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*Old Criticism and New Pragmatism.* J. M. O'SULLIVAN. Dublin and Waterford: M. H. Gill & Son, Ltd.; London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1909.

One closes this book with the sense of having enjoyed with the writer a period of fruitful reflection leading to a riper realization of the meaning of familiar things, yet with a feeling of regret that a work of such fine quality of thought and scholarship should be on the whole so fragmentary in result. The work consists of four essays, two on "Old Criticism," which form its main body, and two on "New Pragmatism," which are brief in compass and rather supplementary in character. So that, while the "and" of the title stands for a certain degree of unity, the addition which it marks renders the unity rather unimportant.

The first essay is the author's doctoral thesis entitled, "A Comparison of the Methods of Kant and Hegel, Illustrated by their Treatment of the Category of Quantity." This occupies two thirds of the book and is a

valuable contribution. Its point of departure, reached after a careful comparison of the standpoints, first of Kant and Hume, then of Kant and Hegel, is Kant's treatment of the categories. This most obscure portion of the "Critique of Pure Reason" is subjected to a patient and searching, yet not unsympathetic, criticism, with reference mainly to the category of quantity, for the purpose of laying bare the actual disconnectedness of Kant's treatment of the categories, along with his sense of their relationship, as shown by many suggestions which were afterwards developed by Hegel. According to the author, disconnectedness between the elements is everywhere characteristic of the system of Kant. Pure reason is itself a rather forced abstraction. Then the logic and the esthetic are left in mutual isolation. When we come to the categories we find that all are supposed to arise from the synthetic unity of apperception; yet in point of fact they are derived in a rather haphazard way from the current forms of judgment. Hence, "the 'metaphysical deduction' was foredoomed to failure, since it reverses the natural order of things." It is in the "transcendental deduction" that we begin to appreciate their systematic relations. From this point he undertakes an exhaustive analysis of the category of quantity, to show that even in Kant there is not only a certain order among the categories, but a certain development, *e. g.*, from unity, through plurality to totality, corresponding, respectively, to Hegel's (1) attraction, continuity or unity, (2) repulsion, discontinuity or amount, (3) limit or number. All of these are interrelated forms of the synthesis of the homogeneous in the given of sense; and thus forms alike of intuition and of thought.

What is to explain Kant's failure to develop the systematic character of the categories? The author gives two reasons: First, because Kant was interested, from beginning to end, in the application of the categories to experience—with the problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*; while Hegel was interested in the logical development of the ideas for themselves. Secondly, because of Kant's profound respect for the laws of physical science. For him the forms of science were, after Newton, once for all fixed, while for Hegel they were steps in a still uncompleted critical process.

The second essay is on Kant's Treatment of Causation. Kant's purpose here is "to provide a firm basis for natural science, and at the same time to show the impossibility of freedom as an empirical factor and the futility of the attempt to prove the existence of God by means of the cosmological argument." But Kant adopts a "streak" view of causation, *i. e.*, the cause of an isolated event *b* is sought in another isolated event *a*. This, however, is a very rough-and-ready way of treating the matter. Really, the totality of phenomena at any moment is the cause of the totality of the next moment. And this is presupposed in Kant's proof of the causal axiom. But statements about the world as a totality in fact assume that the world is a thing in itself. Kant is then in an awkward dilemma: he must reject either the principle of causation or else the fundamental idea of his dialectic as a whole. Or, he must either renounce his phenomenalism or else his hope of proving the validity of necessary

synthetic *a priori* judgments. Or again, he must either adopt a streak view of causation or presuppose an "ideally perfect experience" as given. With his failure to prove the absolutely necessary character of the laws of nature, his attack on freedom must also be rejected. And in any case his proof of the causal axiom leaves the inner experience untouched.

The titles of the last two essays are "Pragmatism as an Epistemological Method in its Relation to Criticism" and "General Comment on Criticism and Pragmatism." They are well written, and thoughtful as far as they go, but rather lacking in substance. The author's suggestion that criticism is responsible for pragmatism is not made nearly so strong as it might be. He makes one point, however, which is well worth noting, namely, that a pragmatic epistemology may be adopted in conjunction with almost any brand of metaphysics.

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## JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. March, 1910. *Amour spirituel et synthèse aperceptive* (pp. 225-240): P. ROUSSELOT. — *Amour* (desire or appetite in general) plays a double rôle in the intellectual processes: (1) in the form of the desire for God and for the complete self it is the motive power, the dynamic, active element, of the intelligence; (2) in the form of the desire for the God who is truth, a desire which causes us to see our good in every truth, it effects in us the synthesis of apperception. *La défense de la vie* (pp. 241-261): DR. GRASSET. — A description of the physiological processes of defence against the attacks of extraneous matter and a plea for a similar concerted defence against the enemies of the social life. *L'Absolu. Étude historique* (pp. 262-281): C. HUIT. — An inquiry into the place of the concept of the absolute in the philosophies of Israel, India, Egypt and pre-Socratic Greece. *Chronique pédagogique* (pp. 282-293): G. JEANJEAN. — Short critical reviews of Cramanssel's *Le premier éveil intellectuel de l'enfant*; Dugas's *Le problème de l'Éducation*; A. Binet's *Les Idées modernes sur les enfants*; Foerster's *L'école et le caractère*; Ferrière's *Projet d'école nouvelle*; Gerini's *Gli scrittori Pedagogici Italiani del secolo decimonono*; Vowinckel's *Pädagogische Deutungen*; and of the latest volumes of *Archives de psychologie*, *Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Pädagogik*, *Zeitschrift für Kinderforschung*, and *Eos*. *Étude sur les théories de la connaissance. III. Le Kantisme* (pp. 294-305): P. CHARLES. — The Critique of Pure Reason, summarized in the first portion of the article, may be criticized on the grounds, (1) that the concept of space is acquired through the exercise of the senses—hence is *à posteriori*; (2) that the categories may be explained without resort to innate forms *à priori*; (3) that these subjective forms applied to the world of experience lead inevitably to scepticism. *Analyses et comptes rendus*. L. Prat, *Contes pour les métaphysiciens*: G. BRUNEL. A. Bros, *La survivance de l'âme chez les peuples non-civilisés*. A. Leclère, *Pragmatisme*,